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THE USE OF PRIOR IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
The hearsay rule and its many exceptions
have troubled legal scholars and practitioners
since as early as the sixteenth century.1 One of
the most controversial exceptions concerns the
admission of prior identification evidence in
criminal trials. Prior identifications are in es-
sence a special sub-class of prior statements :2
the declarant at some time prior to the trial
3
has identified the accused, and that statement is
now being offered in court as evidence, gener-
ally to corroborate or impeach, either by the
declarant himself or by a second person, often a
police officer, who observed the declarant make
the identification. The validity and accuracy of
identifications in general has been seriously
questioned by a number of scholars 4 and strongly
supported by almost as many other scholars.
5
15 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE: § 1364 (3d ed. 1940).
2 R. McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE § 251 (2d ed. 1972).
The statement may have been oral testimony at
previous trial, a deposition, or a writing such as a
letter, affidavit or accident report. Conduct as well
which shows a belief inconsistent with or consistent
with facts asserted on the stand is also classified as
a "prior statement."
3 Prior identification confrontations generally
occur when law enforcement officials request an
eyewitness to an offense, often the victim, to iden-
tify a suspect through one of the following proce-
dures: (1) a lineup, where the suspect is observed
in a group by the eyewitness; (2) a showup,
where the suspect is presented alone; or (3) a
photograph or photographs, where the eyewitness
views the suspect's photograph. The photograph
may show the suspect alone or in a group.
4 Beaver & Biggs, Attending Witnesses' Prior
Declaration as Evidence: Theory v. Reality, 3 IND.
LEGAL F. 309 (1970); Levine & Tapp, The Psy-
chology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from
Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079 (1973).
5 Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Wit-
nesses, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 391 (1933); Hutchins &
In addition, a number of works have appeared
dealing with the problems of misidentification
in actual cases. 6 Misidentification may not only
lead to the conviction of the wrong person, but
to failure to convict the right person.
At common law, such an identification would
have been admitted, if at all, under the prior
statement exception to the hearsay rule.7 How-
ever, on January 3, 1975, President Ford
signed into law the new Federal Rules of
Evidence" to take effect on July 1, 1975. It is
this statutory code which now governs admis-
sion of evidence in federal courts.
Congressional scrutiny of the proposed rules,
the final stage in a journey begun nearly fif-
teen years ago, resulted in a number of amend-
ments, many of which significantly changed
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evi-
dence, 41 HARv. L. REv. 860 (1928).
6 E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT
(1932); F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO
AND VANZETTI (1927); P. WALL, EEwrrNEss
IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965).
7See 4 J. WIGMOPJ, EVIDENCE § 1130 (3d ed.
1940).
Evidentiary admissions in federal criminal trials
had gone through two stages. Prior to 1933, the
Court had concluded in United States v. Reid, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 360 (1851), that neither the
Rules of Decision Act, Conformity Act, nor Com-
petency of Witness Act applied because they were
limited to "civil causes" or to "trials at common
law." Thus, the rules of criminal evidence were to
be taken from the law of the state in which the
federal court was sitting. Logan v. United States,
144 U.S. 263 (1892). The Court overruled these
decisions in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371
(1933), and later Wolfle v. United States, 291
U.S. 7 (1934), holding that rules of criminal evi-
dence were to be determined by the common law
as interpreted by the federal courts in the light of
reason and experience.
s Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88
Stat. 1926.
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the rules.9 Rule 801(d) (1), as promulgated by
the Supreme Court, excluded certain state-
ments from the definition of hearsay which
were clearly within the common law definition
of hearsay; a prior statement of identification
by a witness was one such statement.10 One of
the congressional amendments deleted this ex-
clusion, thus making prior identification again
subject to possible exclusion as hearsay from
criminal trials in the federal courts.
Given the action by Congress, the question
became: "Can such a statement of prior identi-
fication be admitted into evidence at all now?"
There were a number of possible answers to
this question: amend the rule formally; admit
the prior identification under the "other excep-
tions" clauses of either rule 803(24) or
804(5);" or under rule 801(d)(1)(A) or
9 In the case of privileges, article V of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the Congress per-
formed radical surgery on the proposed rules elim-
inating the Advisory Committee's carefully
thought out and integrated set of nine rules and
replacing them with a single rule which leaves the
law of privilege in its present state. See Rules of
Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates,
56 F.R.D. 183, 230 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
PROPOSED RULNs] ; Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1933.
1o The following definitions apply under article
V, according to rule 801:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A
statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by ziiness. The de-
clarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and the
statement is . . . (C) one of identifi-
cation of a person made after perceiv-
ing him....
PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 9, at 293.
11 The following are not excluded by the hear-
say rule, even though the declarant is available as
a witness:
(24) Other Exceptions.-A statement not spe-
cifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if
the court determines that (A) the state-
ment is offered as evidence of a material
fact; (B) the statement is more proba-
tive on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the propo-
nent can procure through reasonable ef-
forts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a
statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it
makes known to the adverse party suffi-
ciently in advance of the trial or hearing
(B) ;12 or through the "present series" impres-
sion exception of rule 803(1)."3 Initially, given
the action of Congress in deleting proposed
rule 801(d) (1) (C), one might conclude that
prior identification testimony should be exclud-
able per se. However, Congress reversed itself
soon after the time that the new Federal Rules
of Evidence took effect and passed an amend-
ment which put 801(d) (1) (C) back into the
rules. 14 As it stands now, prior identification
evidence can be introduced at trial in the prose-
cution's case in chief.
Congress, in effect, chose the first of the op-
tions listed above which, while having the vir-
tue of establishing some degree of predictabil-
ity as to future receipt into evidence of prior
identification evidence, has a number of vices
as well.
This comment will address Congress' action
in expressly exempting statements of prior
to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, his in-
tention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.
Fx. R. Ev. 803(24).
The identical wording is found in FED. R. Ev.
804(5), which requires that the declarant be una-
vailable. See text accompanying notes 96-100
infra.
12 The following definitions apply under this ar-
ticle:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A
statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness-The de-
clarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and the
statement is (A) inconsistent with his
testimony, and was given under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
in a deposition, or (B) consistent
with his testimony and is offered to
rebut an express or implied charge
against him of recent fabrication or
improper influence of motive....
FED. R. Ev. 801.
13 The following are not excluded by the hear-
say rule, even though the declarant is available as
a witness:
(1) Present sense impression.-A statement
describing or explaining an event or con-
dition made while the declarant was per-
ceiving the event or condition or immedi-
ately thereafter.
FED. R. Ev. 803(1). See text accompanying notes
101-108 infra.
'14Pub. L. No. 94-113 (Oct. 16, 1975).
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identification from the hearsay rule, and exam-
ine as well the alternatives had Congress not
acted as it did. The comment will first address
the Advisory Committee's attitudes and goals in
fashioning the federal evidence rules, focusing
on the hearsay rule in general, and on the rule
with respect to prior identifications in
particular.15 A part of this assessment will be
a discussion of the wisdom of admitting prior
identifications at all.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE
For over four decades there has been in-
creasing pressure for the Supreme Court to
promulgate uniform federal rules of evidence.
Among the most vocal advocates were the leg-
endary John Henry Wigmore,16 as well as
Cleary (reporter to the Advisory Commit-
tee), Green, Todd, McCormick, and Morgan.
17
Finally, in 1961, the Judicial Conference au-
thorized Chief Justice Earl Warren to estab-
lish an ad hoc committee to study and analyze
the evidence rules and their effect on federal
trials. In 1963, the Judicial Conference ap-
proved the special committee's finding that "...
the formulation of uniform rules of evidence
for the federal courts is both feasible and
desirable," Is and authorized the Chief Justice
15 The Advisory Committee published notes with
each rule of evidence presenting the Committee's
view with respect to the particular rule and rele-
vant sources of information. See PROPOSED RULES,
supra note 9, at 288-92 for the introductory note on
the hearsay problem, and at 295-97 for the note on
hearsay statements specifically excluded from the
federal hearsay rule.
16 Dean Wigmore, in 1936, characterized the
law of evidence prior to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as being in a deplorable condition.
"It is inferior to that of any of the fifty States
and Territories-I say, inferior to any of them,
and not only inferior but far inferior." Wigmore,
A Critique of the Federal Court Rules Draft, 22
A.B.A.J. 811, 813 (1936).
17See R. McCoRslCIc, EVIDENCE xi (1954);
Cleary, What's Wrong with the Rules of Evi-
dence, 15 ARK. L. REV. 11 (1960-61); Green, To
What Extent May the Court Under the Ruleinak-
ing Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence, 26
A.B.A.J. 482 (1940); Ladd, A Modern Code of
Evidence, 27 IowA L. REv. 213 (1942) ; Morgan,
Practical Difficulties Impeding Reform in the Law
of Evidence, 14 VAND. L. REv. 725 (1961).
18 COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVIS-
ABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM
to name an Advisory Committee on Rules of
Evidence.19
As a result of comments from both the
bench and the bar, the preliminary draft of the
rules of March 1969,20 was reconsidered, re-
vised, published as the revised draft of
March 1971,21 and again circulated, although
to a smaller segment of the bar. The Supreme
Court returned the draft for further considera-
tion; final revisions were made, and on No-
vember 20, 1972, the Supreme Court promul-
gated the Federal Rules of Evidence, reporting
them to Congress on February 5, 1973, with
an effective date of July 1, 1973.22
The basic philosophy of the rules is that all
relevant evidence is admissible unless constitu-
tional, statutory, or strong public policy con-
siderations dictate that the relevant evidence
should be excluded.2 3 The rules therefore place
the burden on the one who seeks to exclude
relevant evidence to demonstrate to the court
that exclusion is dictated by such weighty con-
siderations. In addition, the sine qua non of
the rules is uniformity, described by one mem-
ber of the Advisory Committee as "one of the
most, if not the most compelling reason for
promulgation of uniform Federal Rules of
RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES Dis-
TRICT COURTS, 30 F.R.D. 73, 114 (1962).
19 The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Ev-
idence was composed of: Albert E. Jenner, Jr.,
Esq., Chairman; Judge Simon E. Sobeloff; Judge
Joe Ewing Estes; Judge Robert Van Pelt; Pro-
fessor Thomas F. Green; Professor (now Judge)
Charles W. Joiner; Professor (now Judge) Jack
B. Weinstein; David Berger, Esq.; Hicks Epton,
Esq.; Robert S. Erdahl, Esq.; Egbert L. Hay-
wood, Esq.; Frank G. Raichle, Esq.; Herman F.
Selvin, Esq.; Craig Spangenberg, Esq.; Edward
Bennett Williams, Esq.; Professor Edward W.
Cleary, Reporter.
20 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evi-
dence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969).
21 Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence
for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51
F.R.D. 315 (1964).
22 PROPOSED RULES, supra note 9, at 183-86.
23 All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, by act of Congress, by these rules,
or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible. FED. R. Ev. 402.
[Vol. 66
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Evidence." 24 One result is that the rules, in
attempting to reach those goals, either
modified25 or abolished outright26 well-estab-
lished common law rules. In part because of
this, congressional opposition forced an initial
delay27 which finally -turned into quite drastic
legislative action requiring affirmative congres-
sional approval of the rules before they could
go into effect.281 In fact, the rules of evidence
would be congressionally formulated rather
than the judicially formulated rules which the
Supreme Court originally sent to Congress.
29
Over the next twenty-one months, significant
revisions of many rules, or subdivisions of
rules, occurred as the bill moved first through
the House, then the Senate, and finally the
House-Senate Conference.- In the process,
though one-half the rules remained "substan-
tially unchanged," 31 retaining their basic style
and form, the central thrust of the rules was
deflected. As proposed, the rules were cau-
tiously innovative; as passed, they are little
more than a codification of the common law
rules of evidence.
24Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Special
Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminial Laws of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. at 89 (1973) (statement of Albert E. Jenner,
Jr.) [Hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 5463].25 See FED. R. Ev. 607: Who May Impeach.
This is a departure from the rule in many states
in that it eliminates the prohibition against im-
peaching one's own witness.
206 See PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 9, at 240, art.
V, Privileges: Rule 504, Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege. The rules as promulgated by the Supreme
Court eliminated the physician-patient privilege
substituting a psychotherapist-patient privilege in
its stead.
27 S. Res. 583, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)
would merely have postponed the effective date.
28 The House of Representatives amended S.
Res. 583, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), in H.R.
4958, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), to require af-
firmative Congressional approval. The Senate ap-
proved this on March 19, 1973, and President
Nixon signed it into law on March 30, 1973. Act
of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
29 The House of Representatives decided after
an initial set of hearings that there should be an
evidence code, but that because the rules of evi-
dence were largely substantive in nature or impact,
they were not within the scope of the enabling
acts authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of practice and procedure. 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 66 [hereinafter cited as RuLs-
LEGIs, HisT.] Accord PROPOSED RULES, supra note
9, at 185 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
30 RULEs-LELis. HisT., supra note 29, at 41.
31 Id. at 66.
THE HEARSAY RULE AND THE NEW FEDERAL
RULEs OF EVIDENCE
Much of the controversy centered on article
VIII, Hearsay. 2 The Advisory Committee in
its attempt to bring some order to a bulky,
complex, and overly rigid aspect of evidence at
common law, had prepared a number of inno-
vations aimed at providing greater flexibility in
dealing with hearsay evidence. The committee
began by setting out a few basic premises.
First, the factors of perception, memory, and
narration must be considered in evaluating a
witness' testimony. Second, Anglo-American
law, in order to test out these factors, devel-
oped three conditions under which witnesses
will ideally be required to testify: (1) under
oath; (2) in the personal presence of the fact-
finder; and (3) subject to cross-examination5 2
Third, even though the logic of the preceding
discussion suggests that no evidence be admit-
ted unless fully complying with these three
conditions, no one advocates that position. In
fact, given the choice between evidence which
is less than "ideal," and no evidence at all, it
would be ridiculous to dictate across the board
exclusion when such evidence is often inher-
ently superior to evidence given under the
ideal conditions." The problem is one of reach-
ing "a sensible accommodation between these
considerations and the desirability of giving
testimony under the ideal conditions." 35
Therefore, the committee, in developing the
federal hearsay rules, examined three possible
alternatives, rejected the first two and chose
the third. The committee decided not to abolish
32 Hearings on H.R. 5463, supra note 24, Supp.
at 68, 88, 91, 125. This is not surprising considering
that it has been estimated that over one-third of
all evidence problems in court involve hearsay. See,
Note, Erosion of the Hearsay Rule, 3 U. RICHMOND
L. REv. 89, 92 (1968).
32 Today, emphasis centers on the condition of
cross-examination which Dean Wigmore has char-
acterized as "beyond doubt the greatest legal en-
gine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 J.
WiGmORE, EvmzxcE § 1367, at 29 (1940). It has
become, to say the least, a vital part of our legal
system.
34 Even if, in any given case, the hearsay evi-
dence is not inherently superior, it is "in the ordi-
nary affairs of life ... a well recognized source of
information, not of course to be implicitly depended
upon but often helpful as one of the signs in an
investigation:" A. OsBoRN, THE MIND OF THE
JuRoR 52 (1973).
35 PROPOSED RULES, supra note 9, at 289.
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the hearsay rule3 6 primarily because this would
mean an abandonment of the traditional re-
quirement of some particular assurance of
credibility as a condition to admitting the
hearsay declaration, and also because there
would be an undesirable split between civil and
criminal evidence due to the sixth amendment
right of confrontation in the latter.37 More
practically, such efforts in the past had met
with scant success. Not a single jurisdiction
adopted the Model Code of Evidence which
abolished the hearsay rule outright,38 and only
a few jurisdictions have adopted the more cau-
tious and conventional Uniform Rules of
Evidence.
3 9
36 See, Comment, Abolish the Rule Against
Hearsay, 35 U. PiTT. L. REV. 609 (1974). The au-
thor proposes to abolish the hearsay rule because
in its present form it is overly complicated and
difficult to apply and does not distinguish effec-
tively between reliable and unreliable evidence.
Rather, receipt of hearsay evidence should be de-
termined on a case by case method with adequate
safeguards applied. This is similar to a thesis put
forward by Professor Weinstein. See Weinstein,
Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV. 331
(1961).
37 PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 9, 289-90.
38 Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissi-
ble if the judge finds that the declarant (a) is un-
available as a witness, or (b) is present and sub-
ject to cross-examination. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
rule 503 (1942).
Dean Wigmore was a consultant on the project;
the code was considered too radical and though no
jurisdiction accepted it, it had its effect on the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D.
161, 173-81 (1969). For a general discussion of the
model code see Broderick & Broden, Future of the
Model Code of Evidence, 23 NoTRE DAmE LAW.
226-32 (1948); Davis, Cox, & Marion, Discus-
sions of ALl's Model Code of Evidence, 21 Tax.
L. REV. 13-41 (1943); McCORMICK, The New
Code of Evidence of the American Law Insti-
tute, 20 TEx. L. Rav. 661 (1942).
39 Evidence of a statement which is made other
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is
hearsay evidence and inadmissible except:
(1) Previous Statements of Persons Present
and Subject to Cross-examination. A
statement previously made by a person
who is present at the hearing and avail-
able for cross-examination with respect to
the statement and its subject matter, pro-
vided the statement would be admissible if
made by Declarant while testifying as a
witness.
UNIFORm Ruia OF EVIDENCE 63(1).
The Uniform Code of Evidence contained seven-
ty-two rules and basically codified existing cases
save for two important changes: prior inconsistent
or consistent statements made out of court were
The committee also rejected the alternative
of case-by-case analysis, even though accom-
panied by procedural safeguards. Admissibility
would be determined by weighing the evi-
dence's probative force against the possibility
of prejudice, waste of time, or availability of
better evidence. The committee considered that
too much judicial discretion would be required,
and the problems of predictability of rulings
and the difficulty in trial preparation would
only be magnified.
40
Instead, the committee chose to follow the
general outlines of the common law approach:
a general rule excluding hearsay followed by
two rules delineating the basic exceptions-one
where the availability of the declarant is imma-
terial,4' and the other where the unavailability
of the declarant is a condition of the admission
of the hearsay.42 The traditional exceptions to
the hearsay rule provide the content of these
two rules. In addition, each rule concludes
with an "other exceptions" clause affording ad-
mission of particular hearsay not encompassed
by any of the specifically enumerated excep-
tions, yet offering similar guarantees of relia-
bility and trustworthiness.
43
Finally, the Advisory Committee expressly
excluded from the definition of hearsay several
types of statements, including prior identifica-
tion, which otherwise would literally fall
within it."4 The committee is somewhat cryp-
now admissible as substantive evidence, and state-
ments of recent perception were recognized. The
uniform rules have been enacted in Kansas
(KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.401-470 (Cum. Supp.
1973)), the Virgin Islands (V. I. CODE ANN. tit.
5 88 771-956 (1967)), and the Canal Zone (C. Z.
CODE tit. 5 §§ 2731-2996 (1963)). California
(CAL. Evm. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1605 (West 1966)
and New Jersey (N. J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A: 84-A-
1 to 47 Cum. Supp. 1973)), borrow heavily from
the uniform rules.
40 PROPOSED RuL~s, supra note 9, at 290.
4" Id. at 300 (Rule 803. Hearseay exceptions;
availability of defendant immaterial).
42 Id. at 320 (Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; de-
clarant unavailable).
43 Other exceptions. A statement not specifically
covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having comparable circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 9, at
303, 322 (Rules 803 (24) and 803 (6)).44 See PROPSa RULEs, supra note 9, at 293.
(Rule 801 (d)).
The statements would be classical hearsay if of-
fered for the truth of the matter asserted therein
because they were not made under oath, in the




tic in setting forth its reasoning here and the
basic question of whether or not prior identifi-
cation evidence should be admitted at all needs
to be explored in greater depth than the cur-
sory treatment given it in the Advisory Com-
mittee's notes. 5
THE RELIABILITY OF A PRIOR IDENTIFICATION
There is no consensus as to whether a prior
identification should be admitted as substantive
evidence, or whether it should be admitted at
all. A number of writers have taken the posi-
tion that a prior out of court identification is
more reliable than one made in court because
it contains characteristics making it inherently
trustworthy, and thus there is some necessity
for the admission of the hearsay evidence.
46
The theory is that, unlike most hearsay evi-
dence, the risks of lack of memory, mispercep-
tion and the problem of misinterpretation are
not present, especially where the witness and
the declarant are the same.47 Such identifica-
tions are made nearer in time to the criminal
event involved when the recollection of the
witness is fresher and less likely to have been
influenced by distracting external influences,
not the least of which is that inherent in the
courtroom environment. 4 Such surroundings
are quite suggestive of affirmative identification,
increasing the danger that the courtroom iden-
tification is based on the impression made at
the time of the prior identification rather than
on an impression made at the time of the
offense.
49
The principal objection to admitting prior
identifications either collaterally (as corrobora-
tion or as rebuttal) or as substantive evidence
is the lack of opportunity to cross-examine at
45 See PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 9, at 26-97.
-464 J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1130, at 210 (3d
ed. 1940); Brown, An Experience in Identification
Testimony, 25 J. CI m. L.C. & P.S. 62 (1934);
Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Wit-
nesses, 18 CONN. L.Q. 391 (1933); Hutchins &
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evi-
dence 41 H.Av. L. REv. (1928).
47 See notes 53-57 and accompanying text infra.4sWigmore denigrated the in-court identifica-
tion because of the "violently suggestive" condi-
tions existing there. 4 J. WIGmORE EIDENCE §
1130, at 210 (3d ed. 1940).
49 Wigmore hypothesized that after all the time
that has intervened between the initial, prior iden-
tification and the in-court identification it would
seldom happen that the witness would not come to
believe in the person's identification. 4 J. IVIGMORE,
EvIDENCE § 1130. at 210 (3d ed. 194M .
the time the identification was made. However,
proponents of admission counter that where
the declarant is available as a witness, cross-
examination is available at the trial and is an
adequate safeguard of reliability.50 In addition,
legal and psychological authority, coupled with
experimental data, are often used to demon-
strate that the statement made nearer in time
to the offense is generally more reliable.5'
On the other hand, the more modern trend
has been to criticize as erroneous the long-
standing assumption about the reliability of
human perception and memory upon which ad-
mission of prior identification testimony has
been based.5 2 In addition, the situation in
which such identifications are obtained, lineups
and showups in general, have come under in-
creasing attack as being prejudicial and
suggestive.53 Considering that no evidence,
other than an outright confession, probably
carries as much weight, not only with lay ju-
rors but with many law enforcement officials as
well, such criticisms are by no means
academic.
5 4
The principal thrust of the attack centers on
the questionable reliability of human percep-
tions and memory necessary to making any
identification, especially in the stress-filled en-
vironment in which the victim or witness of a
5oSee McCormick, The Turncoat Witness:
Previous Statements or Substantive Evidence, 25
Tmx. L. Rv. 573 (1947).
51 See the discussion and authorities cited in
R. McComicK, EVIDENCE § 251 (2d ed. 1972). See
also Vickery & Brooks, Time-Spaced Reporting of
a "Crime" Witnessed by College Girls, 24 J. CnRi.
L.C. & P.S. 371 (1938).
52 Beaver & Biggs, Attending Witnesses' Prior
Declarations as Evidence: Theory v. Realty, 3
IND. LEGAL F. 309 (1970); Buckhart, Eyewitness
Testimony, ScN'rrn~c AmmucAN, Dec. 1974, at 23
[hereinafter cited as ScixEnrc AmcAN] ; Levine
& Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification:
Rxv. 1079 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Psy-Cm.
IDENT.]; Rothstein, The Proposed Amendment to
the Federal Rides of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 125
(1973) ; Steward, Perception, Memory and Hearsay:
A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAHi L. REv. 1
[hereinafter cited as PERCEPTION-MEMORY] ; Com-
ment, Due Process in Extra-ludicial Identifications,
24 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 107 (1967).
53 See Sobel, Assailing the Impermissible Sug-
gestion: Evolving Limitations on the Almse of
Pre-Trial Criminal Identification Methods, 38
BROoxLYN L. Rav. 261 (1971); Comment, Erro-
neous Eyewitness Identification at Lineup-The
Problem and the Cure, 5 U.S.F.L. REv. 85 (1970).
54 PsY-CRIM. IDENT., supra note 52, at 1081.
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crime finds himself or herself. Too often, crit-
ics charge, the law appears disproportionately
concerned with deliberate falsification as com-
pared with its concern over honest errors in
perception and memory produced by the "nor-
mal" operation of our five senses. Until re-
cently, the assumptions underlying testimonial
reliability were based on little more than a
subjective and unsystematic study of human
testimony based upon a "highly rationalistic view
of man." 55 But, with more scientific studies it
is urged that the observer is an active recorder
rather than a passive or photographic recor-
der; the eye, the ear, and the other sense or-
gans are "social" organs as well as physical
organs. Perception and memory, in effect, are
decision-making, not copying processes and are
therefore subject to error. The observer, inun-
dated with an overabundance of information, is
influenced by a principle of economy into per-
ceiving and remembering by formulating a
general over-all impression. The result is that
stereotypes exert an important influence,56 and
people may in the end testify to the occurrence
of events or the identity of a person that they
have not in fact witnessed.57
Robert Buckhart has written in Scientific
American of the sources of unreliability. Some
are implicit in the original situation, including,
for example, the insignificance-at the time
and to the observer--of the events, the length
of time of observation, and the less than ideal
observation conditions which generally apply
(distance, poor lighting, fast movement, or
crowds). 5s The witness himself is a major
source of unreliability, due to the effect of ob-
serving under stress (especially applicable in
the case of observers who are the victims as
well), or often to defects in physical condition
such as age, sickness, or fatigue.
59
Finally, critics of the validity of prior iden-
tification evidence challenge the identification
process itself. If the lineup, showup, or photo-
graphic array are conducted unfairly either be-
cause of suggestion, hints, or pressure by the
law enforcement authorities, or because they
5 5 
PERCEPTION-MEMORY, supra note 52, at 8.
56 Id. at 17. See also SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, supra
note 52, at 25-26.
57 Brown, An Experience in Identification Testi-
inony, 25 J. CRm. L.C. & P.S. 62 (1935).
58 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, supra note 52, at 24-25.
59 Id. at 75.
are carelessly conducted or even rigged,60 the
trustworthiness of the observer's identification
correspondingly suffers.
The federal courts, like the commentators,
are divided in the admission of this evidence,
with varying positions being taken by the
circuits.6' Most frequently, prior identification
evidence has been admitted to rehabilitate a
witness' in-court identification which has been
impeached as the product of recent contriv-
ance. 2 Less frequently, it has been admitted to
corroborate the witness' in-court identification
prior to any impeachment of the witness.6 3 The
Ninth Circuit, in a 1938 case, rejected as too
prejudicial the use of prior identification evi-
dence.64 The Second Circuit, however, has
taken the lead in allowing the use of prior
identification testimony in the prosecution's
case in chief when the person making the
-prior identification is present and testifying.65
No circuit, though, has admitted as substantive
6OPalmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir.
1966) ; People v. Boney, 28 Ill. 2d 505, 192 N.E.2d
920 (1963).
61 See 4 J. WIGm OE § 1130 (3d ed. 1940) for a
complete citation of federal and state cases and the
difference between jurisdictions on this point.
G Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d
Cir. 1925).
63 Williams v. United States, 338 F.2d 530 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) ; United States v. Forzano, 190 F.2d 687
(2d Cir. 1951) ; Winniger v. United States, 77 F2d
678 (8th Cir. 1935); Boiling v. United States, 18
F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1927).
64 Poole v. United States, 97 F2d 423 (9th Cir.
1938). In Poole, the person making the identifica-
tion, a co-defendant, was seated in the same room
as the defendant and a number of other people; the
defendant had his back to her. In response to a
question by government agents, she identified the
defendant who then denied the accusation. The
prosecution argued that protesting without know-
ing that he was the one accused was some evidence
of guilt on the defendant's part. Given the age and
particular facts of this case and the trend in the
other circuits away from across the board, out-
right rejection, the precedential value of this case
is doubtful.
615 United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d
Cir. 1964). The defendant was convicted of hijack-
ing a truckload of imported goods. The appellate
court, speaking through Judge Friendly, held that a
prior sworn identification of the defendant by the
truck driver before a grand jury and at a former
trial, and an unsworn identification therein adopted,
were admissible as substantive evidence, and with
other evidence, sustained his conviction despite
doubts as to his identity expressed by the driver
on cross-examination. However, the holding in De
Sisto has been rejected in Boyd v. United States,
342 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and United States v.
Crowder, 346 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 909 (1965).
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evidence the testimony of a third person who
observed an unavailable declarant's out-of-
court identification.
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND PRIOR
IDENTIFICATIONS
In its exclusion of prior identification evi-
dence from the hearsay rule, the Advisory
Committee's -proposed rules of evidence would
have in effect allowed its use in the prosecu-
tion's case in chief and would therefore have
been in line with the Second Circuit's rule,
and the view of those in favor of in-court
use of prior identifications as substantive
evidence. 66 The Advisory Committee in its
brief notes on the subject did not discuss the
arguments for and against the use of such evi-
dence, but rather assumed the Wigmore theory
that court room identifications are "generally
unsatisfactory and inconclusive" as compared
to previous out of court declarations made
under "less suggestive conditions." 67 Earlier,
in the notes dealing with "prior statements by
witness," the committee addressed the argu-
ments put forth for treating prior statements
in general as hearsay, that: "[The] conditions
of oath, cross-examination, and demeanor obser-
vation did not prevail when the statement was
first made and cannot adequately be supplied
by the later examination." 68 The Advisory
Committee in the notes minimized the problem
of the lack of oath; its mere presence had
never been sufficient to remove a statement
from hearsay, and only the hearsay exception
for prior testimony requires the hearsay utter-
ance to have been made under oath.6 9 Indeed,
it would seem highly unlikely that the original
sanction of the oath, the wrath of God, would
have much vitality in the present day and age.
Even though it may be granted that the penal-
ties for perjury carry weight, it is surely de-
batable as to just how much weight.
7 0
66See notes 44-49 and 63 and accompanying
text supra.
67 PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 9, at 296-97.
68 Id. at 295.
69 R. McCoRmiCx, EVIDENCE § 251 (2d ed. 1972) ;
6 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1827, 1831 (3d ed. 1940) ;
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of
the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
70 See generally Black, A Report on Perjury,
49 hIL. B.J. 574 (1961); McClintock, What Hap-
pew to Perjurers, 24 MINN. L. REv. 727 (1940);
McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous
Likewise, the committee concludes that the
problem of the lack of opportunity to observe
the witness' demeanor at the time he made the
identification is more apparent than real. As
judge Learned Hand had stated many years
before:
If from all that the jury see of the witness,
they conclude that what he says now is not
the truth, but what he said before, they are
nonetheless deciding from what they see and
hear of that person in court. There is no
mythical necessity that the case must be
decided only in accordance with the truth of
words uttered under oath in court.
71
The committee concludes its cursory treatment
of the subject matter with the conclusion that
even though there appears to be a stand-off be-
tween the case law and the commentators over
the use as substantive evidence of prior state-
ments, and that the committee is generally un-
willing to allow such statements to be so used:
"particular circumstances call for a contrary
result. The judgment is one more of experi-
ence than of logic." 72
The committee dismisses the problem of sub-
sequently conducting a successful cross-exami-
nation in rather bold fashion by declaring that
the "decisions contending most vigorously for
its inadequacy in fact demonstrate quite thor-
ough exploration of the weaknesses and doubts
attending the earlier statement." 73 Lurking in
the background is the problem of -the conflict
between the sixth amendment rights of coun-
sel and confrontation, and the now expanded
admissibility of hearsay in general under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The law is in a
state of flux in this area; thus ascertaining the
constitutional dimensions of the confrontation-
Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 Tzx. L.
REv. 573, 576 (1947); Purrington, Frequency of
Perjury, 8 CoLum. L. REv. 67 (1908); Whitman,
A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Perjury
in Our Courts, 59 Dicx. L. REV. 127 (1968);
Comment, Perjury: The Forgotten Offense, 65 J.
CRim. L. & C. 361 (1974).
71 Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368
(2d Cir. 1925).
72 PROPOSED RuLES, supra note 9, at 296.
73205 Minn. 358, 285 N.W. 898 (1939). See
also People v. Johnson, 68 Cal.2d 646, 441 P.2d
111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968) ; Ruhala v. Roby, 379
Mich. 102, 150 N.W.2d 146 (1967). All three
cases deal with prior inconsistent statements and




Iearsay aggregate is somewhat difficult.7 4
Under earlier decisions the confrontation
-clause may simply have been the constitutional
-counterpart of the hearsay rule, but recent
-decisions clearly indicate the impact of the
,clause goes beyond the application of rules of
exclusion and in the direction of curbing unde-
sirable prosecutorial behavior.7 5 Decisions in
United States v. Wade,7 6 and Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia,7 7 turned on practices used by law en-
forcement agencies to identify accused persons
prior to trial. The Court held the prior identi-
fication to be such a decisive aspect of the case
that the accused, as a matter of right, should
have counsel present as a prerequisite for
"meaningful confrontation at trial." 7 s How-
ever, in Gilbert, though the witness testified to
an earlier identification in such a manner that
the decision was susceptible of being decided
on hearsay grounds, 79 the Court refrained from
excluding the testimony with respect to the
lineup identification on the ground that it vio-
lated the hearsay rule or confrontation right
because not made under oath, subject to imme-
74 Until recently, decisions involving the con-
frontation clause were few, partly because the
clause did not apply to the states until Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and in part because
the hearsay rule occupied much of the same
ground. The pattern of the earlier criminal cases
is generally that of the hearsay rule: the accused
has a right to have witnesses against him testify
under oath, in the presence of himself and the fact-
finder, and subject to cross-examination. Excep-
tions to the hearsay rule applied, though. For ex-
ample, prior testimony of an unavailable declarant
was admissible in a later proceeding. Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). Beginning
with Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934),
confrontation became part of procedural due proc-
ess; its applicability to state cases and federal civil
cases was extended, through that mechanism.
PROPOSEn RULES, supra note 9, at 291.
75 In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965),
a confession implicating the accused was presented
to the jury by mailing parts of it to the witness
and then inquiring whether he had made the state-
ment. When the witness refused to answer, the
Court ruled this was a denial of cross-examination
and thus confrontation. Though the confession can
be seen as hearsay, the opinion is more aptly ex-
plained as curbing highly questionable behavior by
the prosecutor.
, 6388 U.S. 218 (1967).
77 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
78 388 U.S. at 236.
79 It should be noted that Wade did not involve
any evidence of the fact of a prior identification
and therefore is not conducive to a decision on
hearsay grounds.
diate cross-examination and in the presence of
the fact-finder. Instead, the exclusion was re-
quired because the accused had not had the
assistance of counsel. The Court then observed:
There is a split among the States concern-
ing the admissibility of prior extra judicial
identifications, as independent evidence of
identity, both by the witness and third parties
present at the prior identification. See 71
ALR 2d 449. It has been held that the prior
identification is hearsay, and, when admitted
through the testimony of the identifier, is
merely a prior consistent statement. The
recent trend, however, is to admit the prior
identification under the exception that admits
as substantive evidence a prior communication
by a witness who is available for cross-exami-
nation at trial. See 5 ALR 2d Later Case
Service 1225-1228. . .. 80
Thus, the committee, recognizing the distinc-
tion between the hearsay rule and confronta-
tion clause, and to avoid "inviting collisions"
between them, or between the hearsay rule and
other exclusionary principles, stated the exclu-
sion of prior identification evidence and the
,8 388 U.S. 263, In the aftermath of Wade, lower
federal courts tended to apply its teachings regard-
less of whether or not the defendant had been in-
dicted. See Quinn, In the Wake of Wade: The
Dimensions of the Eyewitness Identification Cases,
42 U. CoLo. L. Rxv. 135, 143-44 (1970). However,
a number of lower federal courts seemed to admit
just about anything, given external factors indicat-
ing the identification was correct. See Note,
Pretrial Identification Procedures-Wade to Gil-
bert to Stovall: Lower Courts Bobble the Ball, 55
MINN. L. Rav. 779 (1971). Nonetheless, the Su-
preme Court in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972), brought a halt to the Wade-Gilbert line of
cases by ruling that the right to counsel does not
attach at a pre-indictment hearing, which would
include prior identification. The case opened up a
loophole that all but enveloped the Wade ruling,
reducing what effect it did have to the minimum.
Logically, this distinction makes absolutely no
sense and one is tempted to ascribe it to the
change in personnel in the Court more than any-
thing else.
The third case in the Wade trilogy, Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), does provide a par-
tial remedy. The case was decided on fourteenth
amendment due process grounds in which the total
context of the circumstances must be considered
when testing the identification situation against
due process standards of essential fairness. The
due process approach is more pervasive than the
sixth amendment confrontation rationale which
only reaches weakness arising from want of the




other exceptions to the hearsay rule, "in terms
of exemption from the general exclusionary
mandate of the hearsay rule rather than in
positive terms of admissibility." 8'
Given the division of authority among com-
mentators and among the circuits of the fed-
eral court system, and the potential problems
with the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment, nevertheless prior identification
evidence should be admissible into evidence in
the prosecution's case in chief especially where
the person making the prior identification is
present and available to testify.8 2 This is not to
ignore the very real problems inherent in prior
identification evidence, but rather to emphasize
that not all such evidence is unreliable. In part
this is a reflection of the fundamental purpose
of a trial. It is not only a search for truth but
an attempt as well to reach the most satisfac-
tory solution in the most reasonable amount of
time. This, in turn, requires the admission of
the most relevant evidence possible, given ap-
propriate circumstances. Wigmore strongly be-
lieved that the rule against admitting hearsay
should not be taken to mean exclusion per se,
but rather exclusion so long as better evi-
dence exists83 If better evidence does not exist
and the hearsay evidence, here the prior identi-
fication, is sufficiently relevant and probative of
the issue, it should be admitted to take its
place with the other evidence to be given the
weight it deserves by the fact-finder. Applica-
tion of mechanical rules that automatically lead
to exclusion is not the best way to sort out the
unreliable evidence from the reliable evidence.
Nor is this any less true because it is a crim-
inal and not a civil trial. Insistence upon relia-
ble evidence as the basis of adjudication is of
the highest priority in our legal system's effort
to achieve the ideal that no innocent person be
punished. At the same time, our legal system
seeks to ensure that those who are guilty are
brought to justice. The following suggestions
are put forth to achieve these two goals.
The conduct of lineups, showups, or photo-
graphic arrays by law enforcement agencies
81 PROPOSED RUiLs, supra note 9, at 292.
82 With respect to the receipt in evidence of tes-
timony by a third person observing an identifica-
tion being made. See text accompanying notes
98-105 infra.83 See 1 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 8(c) at 278 (3d
ed. 1940).
must be coupled with adequate safeguards8'
which are rigorously applied to ensure fairness
and to avoid any prejudicial suggestion by
word or action.85 Courts have not and should
not be reluctant, therefore, to exclude prior
identification evidence if improperly obtained.88
In addition, there is little evidence to show
that judges are incapable of assessing the pro-
bative force of such hearsay or its potential for
prejudice. And jurors, on the whole better ed-
ucated and informed than their predecessors,
are capable of assessing the hearsay evidence
without giving it undue weight; Granted that
testimony with respect to prior identification
may be as damaging as an outright confession,
a forceful and effective defense counsel, 7 and
proper judicial caution from the bench should
furnish sufficient guidance to the jury. Finally,
Professor Weinstein, in an article on the pro-
bative force of hearsay,88 urged the following
84 Professor Jon Waltz has given a version of
the ideal lineup: at least six participants who
closely resemble each other in height, physical
characteristics, and attire; presented simultane-
ously to the witness(es) with no undue attention
drawn to any particular participant. Although wit-
nesses would request participants to repeat a bod-
ily movement or words of the criminal, all lineup
participants would do so; finally, witness reactions
would be conveyed to law enforcement officials
separately with the question being: "Is the crimi-
nal in the lineup?" and not: "Which lineup mem-
ber is the criminal?" J. WA.rz, CiMINAL
EvENcE 161 (1975). See also 4 DEFENDER NEws-
LETTER 55 (1967) (Clark County, Nevada guide-
lines), and the ALI MODEL CODE oF PRE-ARRAiGN-
MENT PROCEDURE § A 5.09 (Study Draft No. 1,
1968).
85 Note that in a jurisdiction where the prior
identification evidence is hearsay, there is little
pressure on law enforcement officials or the prose-
cutor to conduct fair identification procedures, be-
cause whether fair or not, the evidence is not ad-
missible in the case in brief. Where the hearsay
objection is overruled, the court can then consider
the circumstances surrounding the identification.
Comment, Prior Identification. Evidence and the
Hearsay Objection, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 332, 338
(1958).
8 See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 237 N.E. 2d 653
(C.P. Ohio 1968).
87 Considering the criticism that the legal pro-
fession has received from some of its own mem-
bers, notably Chief Justice Warren E. Burger,
over the low aptitude of lawyers in the courtroom
situation, forceful and effective counsel may not be
enough.
ss Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46
IowA L. REv. 331 (1961). Professor Weinstein's
article is well-reasoned and readable. He argues for
admissibility based on probativeness with certain
procedural safeguards to insure fairness. His thesis.
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procedural safeguards. In addition to judicial
comment on the evidence, greater control by the
trial court over the jury, and greater discretion
by the trial judge in determining whether or
not to admit such evidence, he proposed that
there be notice to opposing counsel of the in-
tention to use the hearsay and more rigorous
review on the part of the appellate courts.
ADMISSION OF PRIOR IDENTIFICATION
EVIDENCE : ALTERNATIVES
Proposed rule 801(d)(1)(C) in essence
strives to compromise these competing consid-
erations, striking a balance between the unpre-
pared but possibly suggestive out-of-court iden-
tification and the unemotional but probably
prepared and possibly coached in-court identi-
tfication.8 9 Congress originally deleted in quite
concise fashion the prior identification exception
because it feared that too many innocent people
:might be convicted if such evidence is intro-
,duced as substantive evidence bearing directly
on the issue in controversy.90 However, in
amending the rules and thereby again ex-
pressly exempting prior identifications from
the hearsay rule, Congress merely reversed it-
self, adopting the Advisory Committee's rea-
soning as its own.9 1
The rule, however, suffers from a number of
defects. Basically, the rule as it now stands
may allow the admission of prior identification
evidence which is unreliable because it does
not expressly provide for certain safeguards.
First, corroboration of the prior identification
involves, in essence, a case-by-case approach with
heavy emphasis on judicial discretion.
S9 Rule 801(d) (1) (C), it is noted, does not
apply to the testimony given by a third party who
observed the identification being made. But, given
that the declarant is present and testifies to the
prior identification, there would seem to be little
problem with the hearsay risks to receipt of the
third person-observer's testimony; however, it
might be challenged as cumulative.
90 RULEs-LEGIs. HIST., supra note 29, at 53.
The only reason given for the deletion of the
prior identification exception appeared in the Sen-
ate Report; the House had not changed the sec-
tion at all. More important, this is a concern more
naturally associated with the problem of the
weight to be given to the evidence rather than
whether or not it is admissible.
91 121 CONG. REc. 7128-29 (daily ed. Apr. 30,
1,975) (remarks of Senator Hruska). One gets the
idea that the provision was first deleted and then
put back in more as the result of congressional
:politics than anything else.
should be required as a type of check on the
conduct of the prior identification and to en-
sure that the fact-finder in weighing the prior
identification has before it all relevant informa-
tion concerning the circumstances surrounding
it Who would provide the corroboration is the
next question. Rather than the law enforce-
ment officials alone, who may be conducting
the prior identification situation, this would be
a role which the defense attorney, who is pres-
ent at a post-indictment lineup under the
Wade rule, might also assume.92 In addition,
the rule should provide, or Congress should at
least indicate in the legislative history of the
amendment, that there could be no conviction
based on prior identification alone. The point
is that while a prior identification may prop-
erly be admitted so that it may take its place
with other evidence to be weighed by the fact-
finder, to allow conviction on such evidence
alone would be to give it too much weight,
given the problems of reliability already dis-
cussed. Thus, the solution requires a more deli-
cate balance than the one created by Congress.
Three possible alternatives exist which
might have allowed admission of prior identifi-
cation evidence had Congress not acted to ex-
empt such evidence from the hearsay rule.
However, in terms of providing the safeguards
which rule 801(d) (1) (C) lacks, only the first
alternative could effectively meet that defi-
ciency. The three possible alternatives were:
(1) under the "other exceptions," or resid-
ual clauses of either rule 803 or rule 804,
as amended by Congress ;93
92 See notes 72-79 and accompanying text
supra. Professor James Strazzela has written an
article in which he discusses the possible roles
which identification counsel might play. Strazzella,
Ineffective Identification Counsel: Cognizability
Under the Exclusionary Rule, 48 TEMP. L. Q. 241,
253-58 (1975).
To make this safeguard effective, however,
would require that Kirby v. Illinois be overturned
so that the right to counsel would attach at a
pre-indictment hearing as well. This is a major
obstacle since neither the Supreme Court nor Con-
gress appears inclined to make such a change.
93 See note 11 supra. This is an example of
poor draftsmanship on the part of the Advisory
Committee. It would have been better to eliminate
rules 803 (24) and 804 (5) and promulgate a sep-
arate rule for the "other exceptions." As it is
now, a lawyer would be foolish to seek to have
evidence received under 804 (5), where he must
show the unavailability of the declarant, when he
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(2) under rule 801(d) (1) (A) or (B) ;94
(3) under the "present sense" exception of
rule 80395 (for testimony by a third per-
son-observer of an identification).
Under the first alternative, prior identifica-
tion evidence might have been admitted,
though with less predictability, through the
"other exception" clauses of either rule 803 or
rule 804.98 Under the proposed rules, evidence
could be admitted under the "other exceptions"
clause if not specifically covered in any of the
enumerated exceptions but having comparable
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.97
The Congress felt that this was too open-ended
and narrowed the residual clauses through var-
ious amendments.98 In addition, the Senate re-
port cautioned that the "other exceptions"
clauses should be used but rarely and "only in
exceptional circumstances," 99 quite frankly
asserting that the residual exceptions clause
was not meant to authorize major judicial re-
visions of the hearsay rule; "such revisions are
best accomplished by legislative action."'' z°
can utilize the exact same procedure in 803 (24),
where the availability of the declarant is immater-
ial.
94 See note 12 supra.
5 See note 13 supra.
96 See note 11 mtpra.
97 Congress changed "comparable circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" to "equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." It is
questionable whether there is any measurable
difference between the two; more likely, it is a
manifestation of the desire of Congress that judi-
cial discretion not be exercised too freely.
98 In the Senate report, the members expressed
strong disapproval of the wording of the proposed
drafts of proposed rules 803(24) and 804(6)
[804(5) as amended], arguing that it was so
broad as to emasculate the rule or vitiate the ra-
tionale behind the whole codification effort. Ru.Es-
LEais. HIST., supra note 29, at 56.
"... Congress must ensure that the rule-mak-
ing process is not delegated to the unbridled
discretion of the courts-not because of any
distrust of the courts but because of the dic-
tates of sound government.
RULEs-LEGIS. HisT., supra note 29, at 45.
This was certainly an understatement, and might
reflect the concern with the activist bent of the
Warren Court often expressed by some congress-
men. Some members of Congress felt that the Su-
preme Court and the judicial branch were "legis-
lating" in the rules. See Hearings on H.R. 5463,
supra note 24, at 5: "Congress alone has the right
to set rules or specifically delegate authority to set
rules." (Testimony of Congressman Podell).
1o In order to establish a well-defined juris-
diction, the specific facts and circumstances
Aside from giving effect to congressional in-
tentions, the cautious and conservative nature
of the judiciary would itself have inhibited free
use of this exception. It should not be expected
that forty years' experience in dealing with
such evidence in one way would evaporate
overnight.
In addition, the "other exceptions" clause
might have, in operation, required safeguards,
e.g., corroboration, which are stiffer than the
present rule 801(d) (1) (C). There would be
no reason not to admit it. If the prosecution
could demonstrate to the court's satisfaction
that the prior identification statement would
meet the requirements of rules 803(24) or
804(5), and the requirements of any other
applicable exclusionary rule, the evidence should
be admitted to take its place with the other
evidence.
Admission of prior identifications under ei-
ther 801(d) (1) (A) or (B) would actually be
of only partial value. Under subsection (A), it
could only be admitted if inconsistent with the
in-court identification and if it had been given
under oath. Under (B), if the prior identifica-
tion would be consistent with the in-court
identification, it could be admitted only to
rebut a charge of recent fabrication or impro-
per influence or motive. Thus, in either case
the prior identification statement could be of-
fered in the prosecution's case in chief as sub-
stantive evidence only to impeach or to reha-
bilitate the in-court identification. In addition,
the requirement of the oath in subsection (A)
would make that avenue all but useless. Theo-
retically, it would be possible to meet the oath
requirement at a staged prior identification
conducted by a law enforcement agency. But,
the probable cost would be so prohibitive that
it is unlikely to occur in any event.
Perhaps the most novel alternative would be
to use the "present sense" exception under
rule 803.3-0 Statements describing an event
which in the court's judgment, indicate that
the statement has a sufficient degree of trust-
worthiness and necessity to justify its admis-
sion should be stated on the record. It is ex-
pected that the court will give the opposing
party a full and adequate opportunity to con-
test the admission of any statement sought to
be introduced under these subsections.
RuLs-LEais. HIsT., supra note 29, at 56.101 See note 12 supra.
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made while, or immediately after, the declarant
was perceiving the event may be admitted de-
spite their hearsay nature. This is a relatively
new exception to the hearsay rule, whose ori-
gin lies in the murky fringes of res gestae.
10 2
Professor Morgan strongly endorsed it103
while Dean Wigmore was probably its most
notable critic.104 In the case of a prior identifi-
cation, the "event" is the identification situa-
tion, generally a lineup, 105 and the "statement"
is the declarant's verbalization of the identifi-
cation: "It is the second man on the left. He's
the one who stole my bag."
Certain requirements must be met before a
statement will qualify under the exception.
First, the event described must be relevant.
This does not pose unusual problems since it is
the baseline requirement for the receipt of all
evidence. Second, the statement must be de-
scriptive of, and not merely relate to, the
event. Third, the statement must be made con-
temporaneously with the perception of the
event, or immediately thereafter. This insures
freedom from any error of memory and pro-
vides protection against calculated misstate-
ment. Fourth, the declaration should be made
in the presence of at least one other person
who would be in a position to observe the situ-
ation himself and thus provide a check on the
102 Initially res gestae denoted the words which
accompanied the principal litigated fact; such as
the robbery, murder, or accident which was the
subject of the action.
Res gestae has enjoyed a long and varied career
in the history of evidence, but its imprecision and
vagueness, which served it well in the beginning,
is more a source of confusion today than anything
else. McCormick suggested that it be jettisoned
with due acknowledgement for its contribution.
R. McCoRmIcK, EVIDENCE § 288 (2d ed. 1972).
103 Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WASH. L. R~v. 91
(1937); Morgan, A Suggested Classification of
Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.
J. 229, 236-38, (1922).
1046 J. WIGMORE, EviDEmcE §§ 1745-57 (3d ed.
1940). Dean Wigmore saw not the contempora-
neousness but the nervous excitement produced by
exposure to the exciting event as providing for the
requisite reliability.
105 However, the identification situation may
also occur immediately after the criminal event if,
in "hot pursuit" the police apprehend the accused
and the victim at the time makes the identification.
This would be similar to a showup in the sense
that a single person is being presented to the wit-
ness.
accuracy of the declarant's statement. 10 6 In the
case of staged prior identifications, the observ-
ers will almost always be law enforcement
officials in attendance.
The declarant may or may not be available
to testify and be cross-examined, but under
rule 803 the availability of the declarant is im-
material. Theoretically, therefore, it would be
possible for one of two observers (here, law
enforcement officials) to describe the "event"
-an unavailable declarant's identification of
the accused-with the other observer acting as
a check. However, in a criminal case, other
considerations are brought to bear, including
the problem of lack of confrontation and
cross-examination by the accused and the po-
tential for abuse through the manipulation, or
even manufacture of the prior identification. In
such a situation where the declarant would be
unavailable and the only testimony with re-
spect to the prior identification would be that
of an observer or observers, the testimony
should be excluded.
There would be additional problems with re-
ceipt of prior identification evidence under the
present sense exception. In the first place,
though the statement ("That's him, that's the
one who terrified me.") is contemporaneous
with the "event" (the identification situation),
it is not contemporaneous with the event which
the fact-finder would be primarily interested in
-the robbery or rape, for example. In such a
situation, the problems of memory and percep-
tion, to the extent they are relevant, would still
exist and would have to be dealt with. The po-
tential for calculated misstatement would also
be greater in the identification situation. In ad-
dition, the "observer" would probably be a law
enforcement officer or officers, and the identifi-
cation situation would probably be one which
those same officers control. The problems in-
herent in such situations are obvious and
courts have not been reluctant to exclude such
evidence if the circumstances warrant it.107
106 Note, R. McCoR.icx, EVIDENCE § 298, at 710
(2d ed. 1972) ; Note, Spmtaneous Exclamations in
the Absence of a Startling Event, 46 COLUm. L.
REv. 430 (1946).
o107 See note 60 supra. In addition, see J. WALTz,
CRImINAL EVIDeNcE 153 (1975), and WESTON
& WELLS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 204-07 (2d
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With regard to present sense impressions, such
observers might not provide the sort of impar-
tial, unbiased check on accuracy which the ex-
ception must require in order to be seriously
considered in any criminal trial. Finally, be-
cause the present sense exception is a rela-
tively new phenomenon, only one jurisdiction,
Texas, has specifically recognized it and ap-
plied it.108 In sum, the present sense exception
would prove to be of limited utility both be-
cause of problems inherent in its application to
the criminal side, and because of its lack of ac-
ceptance within the legal community.
In conclusion, prior identification evidence,
once seemingly subject to absolute exclusion
under the hearsay rule is now admissible as
evidence, not only as corroboration or as re-
buttal, but as substantive evidence bearing di-
rectly on the issue involved. As passed by
Congress, however, the rule lacks necessary
safeguards, including corroboration of the prior
identification and a requirement that no con-
viction be based solely on a prior identifica-
tion. Congress did not distinguish itself in fail-
ing to explore adequately the problems and
potential of rule 801(d) (1) (C) and in failing
to provide these safeguards in the rule. But,
rule-making is a job for which Congress is not
suited either by experience or expertise.
There is no doubt, of course, that Congress
by statute109 does, and should, play a general
supervisory role in the promulgation of federal
rules. If Congress was not satisfied with the
Federal Rules of Evidence as promulgated,
however, it should have made its view known
ed. 1974), for examples of lineups that did not pass
muster on review.
108 Only the Texas courts have specifically rec-
ognized this exception, though other courts have
admitted evidence of the type under res gestae lan-
guage. See R. McCoRMIcx, EVIDENCE § 298, at 710
n.70 (2d ed. 1972). The leading case is Houston
Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474
(1942), in which the witness' testimony that "they
must have been drunk, that we would find them
somewhere on the road wrecked if they kept that
rate of speed up" was admitted. The Texas
Supreme Court said, "[The statement] is sufficiently
spontaneous to save it from the suspicion of being
manufactured evidence. There was no time for a
calculated statement." Id. at 6, 161 S.W.2d at 476.
109 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). In addition, the
Congress limited the Supreme Court's rule pro-
mulgation power in passing 28 U.S.C. § 2076
and then sent the rules back to the Judicial
Conference and the Advisory Committee for
revision." 0 Instead, Congress undertook to
make the revisions itself with mixed results.
In the process, the Congress has created
needless problems for the lower courts who
must attempt to thread their way between the
cryptic Congressional desires on the one hand,
and seemingly opposite action by the Supreme
Court on the other. Twice the Supreme Court
has indicated its view on the question of prior
identification evidence. First, and most impor-
tant, in sending the rules to the Congress, it
placed its imprimatur on them.:"' Second, in
Gilbert v. California, 2 the Court noted the
modem trend in admitting prior identification
evidence substantively.
Alternatively, admission into evidence might
have been achieved through the "other excep-
tions," or residual clause of either rule 803 or
rule 804, most probably the latter. Despite the
fact that considerable controversy surrounds
prior identification testimony, with proper safe-
guards adhered to such evidence should take
its place among the other evidence to be given
the weight it deserves by the fact-finder. Those
safeguards include fair and impartial conduct
by law enforcement officials in conducting line-
ups and an alert judiciary ready to exclude
prior identification evidence obtained from an
improperly conducted lineup. In addition,
forceful and effective defense counsel and
whereby an extended period of study is allowed to
the Congress (180 days) in which either House
or Senate may by resolution defer the effective
date of any amendment or disapprove of any
amendment. Any rule whether proposed or in
force may be amended by act of Congress. In the
past, only in rare circumstances has Congress seri-
ously amended rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court. See Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence
and Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (1974);
Moore & Schaeffer, Congress and the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 MEmpmIs ST. U.L.
REv. 1 (1973); Rothstein, The Proposed Amend-
mnents to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62
GEO. L.J. 125 (1973).
:10 Moore & Bendix, Congress, Evidence and
Rulemaking, 84 YALE L.J. 1 (1974).
311 Justice Douglas specifically noted this in his
dissent to the promulgation of the rules. PRoosED
RuIEs, supra note 9, at 185. The point is well
taken in the sense that the Supreme Court's role in
writing or supervising the writing of the rules was
at best de minimus.
-12 388 U.S. 263, 272 n.3 (1967).
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proper judicial caution from the bench should commit. At the same time, the legal system has
furnish sufficient guidance to the jury. sought to ensure that the guilty are not al-
The primary goal of the American legal sys- lowed to go free. The proposed rule of the Su-
tern has been, and should be, that no innocent preme Court and the alternatives outlined in
man be convicted of a crime which he did not this comment seek to fulfill those two goals.
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THE "CRIME" OF MENTAL ILLNESS: EXTENSION
OF "CRIMINAL" PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
TO INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENTS
INTRODUCTION
American society traditionally has dealt with
its mentally ill population on the basis of expe-
diency. A person classified as mentally ill was
simply removed from society as efficiently as
possible and placed in an institution designed
both to keep him in custody and to provide him
with minimal care. In recent years the con-
frontation between expediency and constitu-
tional rights has led to -the extension of what
are commonly assumed to be criminal proce-
dural safeguards to involuntary civil commit-
ment procedures. The historical foundation and
present status of the extension will be analyzed
in this comment.
Government intervention into the affairs of
the mentally ill historically has been based on
two foundations:' the doctrine of parens
palriae2 and/or the police power of the sover-
eign to protect the health, safety, welfare, and
morals of its citizens.3 In England, the King,
as parens patriae, had long been regarded the
"general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lu-
natics" and was responsible for the care and
custody of "all persons who had lost their in-
' See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) ; Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated & remanded on other
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (per curiam), modified, 379
F. Supp. 1376 (1974).
2 The use of parens patriae to detain the men-
tally ill is said to stem from In re Oakes, 8 Law
Rep. 122 (Mass. 1845). However, the Oakes rea-
soning seems more applicable to the police power
rationale for confinement of the mentally ill. See
notes 4-12 and accompanying text infra. For a
discussion of the parens patriae concept as applied
to the mentally ill see N. KzTrriE, THE RIGHT TO
BE DIFFERENT 2-23 (1971); Developments in the
Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1207-1222 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Developments]. The distinction between the
parens patriae and police power rationales may be
more clearly seen if the former is viewed as the
state's moral responsibility and the latter is cast as
the state's duty.
3 The state's police power has been described as
the "inherent power to protect the public." Devel-
opments, supra note 2, at 1222. See notes 13-14
and accompanying text infra.
tellects and become . . . incompetent to take
care of themselves." 4 With the state now as-
suming sovereign responsibilities, the doctrine
refers to the "inherent power and authority of
the state -to provide protection of the person
and property of a person non si ju ris." 5 The
state, as parens patriae, becomes a benevolent
benefactor with a moral responsibility to pro-
tect and care for mentally ill persons and their
property.
6
Historically, the concept of parens patriae
had an economic basis. The King was only in-
terested in protecting the person and property
of those persons who could afford to be cared
for; persons without means of support were
left to fend for themselves. 7 Over time the doc-
trine expanded to include the protection and
care of a person without property or other
means.8 Under the modern concept, the state
may, within constitutional limitations, enact
statutory provisions for the protection of all
mentally ill persons. 9 Such provisions have
4Beverley's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 118, 1125-26
(K.B. 1603).
5 Warner Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 31 Cal. 2d 766,
192 P.2d 949 (1948) (statutory provision enables
minor to disaffirm contract). Non sid juris means
"not his own master" and is the phrase used to
refer to the legal status of a mentally ill person.
6 Shapley v. Cohoon, 258 F. 752 (D. Mass.
1918) (habeas corpus action seeking release from
commitment); In re Sariyanis, 19 N.Y.S.2d 431,
173 Misc. 881 (1940) (right of state to secure
welfare of foreign-born incompetent within the
state's borders).
7 A. DEUTScu, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA
40-41 (1949) [hereinafter cited as DEUTSCH];
AmF.RICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW 3 (rev. ed. S. Brakel &
R. Rock 1971) [hereinafter cited as BRAxEL &
RocK].
8 The provisions relating to those persons with-
out means of support usually dictated confinement
in a prison or poor house. This was true at least
until the development of institutions designed spe-
cifically for the mentally ill, and these were not
great improvements over the former institutions.
See DEUTSCH, supra note 7, at 41-54; BRAKEL &
ROCK, supra note 7, at 5-8.
9 In re Andrews, 192 N.Y. 514, 85 N.E. 699
(1908) (authority of state to enact guardianship
provision for incompetent person).
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typically amounted to procedures for involun-
tary commitment to a mental health facility for
treatment or care and custody.' 0 This authority
to commit is not unbridled but must have a
reasonable regard for the rights of the persons
zo See, e.g., It re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 658-59
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (dictum); R. Rocx, M. JACOB-
SON & R. JANOPAUL, HOSPITALIZATION AND Dis-
CHARGE OF THE MENTALLY ILL 5-8 (1968).
State standards for commitment vary depending
on the possible consequences of mental illness.
Some state statutes allow commitment if the men-
tal illness renders the individual in need of care or
treatment or makes him a subject fit for hospitali-
zation: ALA. CODE tit. 45, § 210 (1958); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 334-53 (1968); IOWA CODE § 229.19
(1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 202.797, .807
(Vernon 1972); NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-328
(1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-23 (Supp.
1974); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 31.01
(McKinney Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50,
§ 4406 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 26-2-8
to -12 (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1973); VA.
CODE: ANN. § 37.1-1 (1970); Wis. STAT. § 51.02
(1971), as amended (Supp. 1974).
The following states allow commitment to pro-
tect the welfare of the individual or the welfare of
others: COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-102
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-176 (Supp.
1975); IND. CODE § 16-14-9-1 (1973); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 253A.07 (Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43A, § 3 (Supp. 1974); Tax. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5547-52 (1958).
These states provide for commitment if the men-
tally ill person is dangerous and/or is in need of
mental treatment: ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.070 (1971) ;
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-408 (1971); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 5125 (Cum. Supp. 1970); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 394.467 (1975); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-2902 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 202.135 (1972) ; Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-21-13, -23 (1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-
2-5 (Supp. 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-11
(Supp. 1973); OnIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.01
(Baldwin 1974) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-963 (1962) ;
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 27-7-18 (1967),
§ 27.7A-1 (Supp. 1974) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-
604 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36
(Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7607
(1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-4 (Supp.
1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 25-60 (1967).
The following states authorize commitment if
the person is mentally ill and dangerous to himself
or others, or unable to care for his physical needs:
ARIz. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 36-524 (1974); CAL.
WEr.F. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5260, 5300 (West
1972); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545 (1973); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 88-506.1 (1971); IDAHO CODE §
56-237 (Supp. 1974); ILL. Rrv. STAT. ch. 911/, §
1-11 (1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28:52-53
(West Supp. 1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §
2334 (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 3
(Cum. Supp. 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
123, §§ 1, 8 (1972); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
14.800(401) (Supp. 1975) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 38-208 (Supp. 1974) ; NEv. REv. STAT. § 433.695
and property affected." It is this latter aspect
of commitment in which dramatic change has
occurred over the past decade as procedural
due process safeguards have been applied to
the commitment process.'
2
The other foundation for involuntary com-
mitment is the police power of the state.
13
Here the state seeks to protect societal inter-
ests rather than the interests of the mentally ill
individual.' 4 The sovereign body historically
has had the authority to deal with the "vio-
lently insane." The few public provisions that
existed in colonial times with respect to the
mentally ill were usually directed toward the
safe disposition of violent individuals.' 5 Reli-
ance on means similar to those employed for
criminals constituted the most common ap-
proach to care during this period.' 6 Repression
of unwanted elements of society was the theme
underlying early legislation. The first Massa-
chusetts statute dealing specifically with the
"insane," enacted in 1676, provided, for exam-
ple:
Whereas, There are distracted persons in
some tounes, that are unruly, whereby not
only the familyes wherein they are, but others
suffer much damage by them, it is ordered by
this Court and the authoritye thereof, that the
selectmen in all tounes where such persons are
(1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135-B :26 (Supp.
1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-58.1 (Supp. 1974);
ORE. Rav. STAT. § 426.005 (1973); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(2) (1975).
"See, e.g., State v. Craig, 176 N.C. 740, 97
S.E. 400 (1918) (defendant acquitted on basis of
insanity defense must be released because court
has no authority for continued detention).
12 See, e.g., Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp.
384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See
also notes 85-137 and accompanying text infra.
1 See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972). This case includes an excellent
judicial summary of the police power in the com-
mitment process.
14 For discussions in the legal literature of the
police power concept as applied to the civil com-
mitment process see Postel, Civil Commitment:
A Functional Analysis, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1,
28-29 (1971) ; Ross, Commitment of the Mentally
Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L.
REv. 945, 956 (1959); Note, Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1288, 1293 (1966); Developments,
supra note 2, at 1222-45.
35 DEUTsCH, supra note 7, at 41.
16 Id.
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hereby empowered and injoyned to take care
of all such persons, that they doe not damnify
others.'
7
During the early colonial period the sover-
eign police power provided the authority to
regulate the dangerous mentally ill person.'
The doctrine of parens patriae authorized the
state to care for those nonviolent mentally ill
unable to care for themselves, although as
stated above, initially this doctrine was seldom
applied to mentally ill persons without visible
means of support.' 9 As colonial society devel-
oped and became more structured and self-sup-
portive, care for mentally ill persons expanded
and institutions were established for their care
and custody.20 Commitment to these institu-
tions was easily initiated upon the request of a
relative, friend, or other interested party made
to a member of the institution's staff. The
order for admission was quite informal, con-
sisting of little more than a piece of paper con-
taining a few scribbled words. 2 ' Today the
procedures may be somewhat more complex,
but the basic rationales for commitment remain
the same. Contemporary legislation commonly
provides for involuntary commitment if the
person is dangerous to others, 22 dangerous to
himself,2  or unable to care for himself.
24
The first of these justifications for commit-
ment, danger to others, is a traditional utiliza-
tion of the state's police power, while the latter
two, pertaining to the individual's person, stem
.7 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF THE MASSACHU-
snrfs BAY, vol. 5, p. 80.
18 BRAxcL & Rocx, supra note 7, at 34.
'9 Id. at 4-5 ; DEUTSCH, supra note 7, at 43.2 0 In 1751, at the petition of Benjamin Franklin,
the Pennsylvania Assembly established the first
general hospital in America which was in part
mandated to receive the mentally ill. DEUTscH,
supra note 7, at 58-65. The first institution de-
voted solely to the care of mentally ill persons
was established in Williamsburg, Virginia in 1773.
Id. at 66-71.
21 DEUTSCH, supra note 7, at 62, 420. It seems
that commitment was a convenient method for get-
ting rid of the unwanted persons in the community
during this time period--or at least there was a
danger that commitment proceedings could be used
for this purpose.
22 Protection of members of society against a
threat to their persons or property is the primary
justification for flexing the police power. See, e.g.,
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25
(1905). See also statutes cited in note 10 supra.
23 See statutes cited in note 10 supra.
24 Id.
from a mixture of the police power and the
doctrine of parens patriae.25 Some commenta-
tors have asserted that advances of psychiatric
science in the areas of diagnosis and treatment
make the distinctions between the reasons for
commitment unimportant because regardless of
the basis for commitment, a person will receive
the care and treatment needed for rehabilita-
tion. Unlike the past where commitment meant
institutionalization for custodial purposes, the
committed person now receives beneficial serv-
ices which help him along the "road to recov-
ery." To these commentators the state is not
only a benevolent benefactor, but also a suc-
cessful benevolent benefactor .2 The assumption
that society is capable of providing care and
treatment by means of psychiatric services is
ill-founded, however. Although techniques have
improved, these more effective methods have
not been successfully implemented on a mass
scale. Indeed, some committed persons may
have a better chance of improving their condi-
tion if left alone. The end result of commit-
ment now is similar to the care and custody
25 In these two standards the police power over-
laps with the state's parens patriae authority since
both are concerned with the individual's health and
welfare. The state's interest in protecting its citi-
zens from a mentally ill person is fairly clear, but
controversy exists as to whether a state should
have the authority to protect a person from him-
self or to care for him against his wishes. Some
critics argue that a state is never justified in com-
mitting a person under either of the latter ration-
ales for the same reasons a state cannot force a
physically ill person to accept medical treatment.
Cf. Developments, supra note 2, at 1223-28. Other
critics assert that a state is justified in committing
a mentally ill person under such circumstances so
long as he is provided with sufficient procedural
safeguards to protect his interests. See, e.g., Com-
ment, A Constitutional Right to Court Appointed
Counsel for the Involuntarily Committed Mentally
Ill: Beyond the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 5
Sarox HALL L. Rxv. 64, 71-75 (1973). The judi-
ciary does not seem ready to accept the radical
leap required by the former approach which would
do away with most involuntary commitment proce-
dures. The latter represents the present trend,
which is a definite improvement over past practice.
See, e.g., Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384
F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
26 Cf. Goldstein & Katz, Dangerumsness & Men-
tal Illness: Some Observations on the Decision to
Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity,
70 Y E L.J. 225, 237 (1960); Livermore,
Malmquist, & Meehl, On the Justifications for
Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 92-95
(1968).
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provided a century ago; conditions are simply
more comfortable.
2 7
Recently, some commentators have argued
that affording care and custody to a mentally
ill person may not, in itself, be sufficient justi-
fication for. the deprivation of that person's
liberty.28 Even acting as a benevolent benefac-
tor, the state may not deprive an individual of
his rights and liberty provided by our constitu-
tional framework without affording him due
process of law.29 Under this premise, the com-
mitment of a person alleged to be mentally ill
by civil process is similar to the incarceration
of a person accused of a crime under the crim-
inal law. In both situations, the person is stig-
matized, making his re-entry into society (if
given the opportunity) difficult at best.3 0 Fur-
thermore, he faces the loss of liberty to come
and go as he pleases, to do what he wants, and
to exercise the rights traditionally guaranteed
a citizen. 3'
Civil commitment and criminal incarceration
are thus not significantly different in their re-
sult, but they do differ in the process leading
to that result. In the criminal system a person
who faces deprivation of his fundamental right
to liberty is afforded the Constitution's due
27 Some commentators assert that advances in
psychiatric science are still far short of providing
successful treatment, and thus commitment remains
essentially custodial. See, e.g., Katz, The Right
To Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36
U. CHI. L. REV. 755 (1969). At the same time,
many persons considered mentally ill improve by
spontaneous remission without any intervention
whatsoever, which means that their chances of im-
provement would be as good uncommitted as com-
mitted. See S. RACHMAN, THE EFFEcTs OF PsY-
cHoTHERAPy 7-18, 40-41, 108-09 (1971).
28 B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY;
MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS, AND THE LAW
214 (1972); N. Ki-rRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIF-
FERENT 97-101 (1971); T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY,
AND PsYcHIATRY 58 (1963).
29 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084
(E.D. Wis. 1927).
30 See, e.g., Farina & Ring, The Influence of
Perceived Mental Illness on Interpersonal Rela-
tions, 70 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 47 (1965);
Sarbin & Mancuso, Failure of a Moral Enterprise:
Attitudes of the Public Towards Mental Illness,
35 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 159
(1970).31 See Developments, supra note 2, at
1198-1200, where the authors point out that civil
commitment in the past has resulted in the "loss
of custody of one's children, loss of rights to vote,
be a candidate for public office, serve on a jury,
practice a profession, obtain a driver's license, and
make a contract or will . . ." (footnotes omitted).
process safeguards ;32 a person facing loss of
liberty by civil commitment is not always af-
forded similar protection.3 3 The injustice of
this anomaly has led to a slow but steady ex-
tension of procedural safeguards to civil com-
mitment of the mentally ill, s4 and it can be
safely said that the civil system has begun to





In early colonial times no legislative proce-
dures existed to regulate formal commitment of
mentally ill persons, probably because there
were no institutions or hospitals to which such
persons could be sent for care or custody.
36 In
the absence of legislation, common law prac-
tices determined procedures, allowing restraint
under the police power of a mentally ill person
32 See, e.g., the applications of the fourth, fifth,
and sixth amendment guarantees in the following:
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right
to appointed counsel in all criminal prosecutions
involving a deprivation of liberty); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury
trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213
(1967) (right to speedy trial) ; Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses) ; Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege against self-
incrimination).
33See generally Kittrie, Compulsory Mental
Treatment & the Requirements of "Due Process;"
21 OHIO ST. L.J. 28 (1960); Kutner, Illusion of
Due Process it Commitment Proceedings, 57 Nw.
U.L. REV. 383 (1962); Comment, A Constitu-
tional Right to Court Appointed Counsel, supra
note 25; Note, Due Process and the Development
of "Crminal" Safeguards in Civil Commin tent
Adjudications, 42 FORDHAm L. REv. 611 (1974).
3 4 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084
(E.D. Wis. 1972).
35 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ; fi re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault, the Supreme
Court rejected the criminal-civil distinction in
holding that due process safeguards apply to a
civil juvenile commitment proceeding in which an
individual's liberty was at stake, since the adoles-
cent involved was sent to an institution for juve-
nile delinquents. In Winship, the Court relied on
the Gault rationale to hold that due process re-
quires that the standard of proof of beyond a rea-
sonable doubt be applied to civil juvenile proceed-
ings as well as to criminal cases. These two
holdings, more than any others, demonstrate the
extension of due process safeguards into non-crim-
inal proceedings.
36 See note 20 supra.
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without legal process when imminent danger to
persons or property in the community was
present.37 This practice was codified shortly
after the American Revolution,38 and subse-
quent legislation added the provision that con-
finement of the mentally ill was incidental to,
and necessary for, proper medical treatment,39
thereby embodying the parens patriae concept
that the state was actually confining the person
for his own good, as well as for the good of
society. This attitude that the state is a "be-
nevolent benefactor" acting on the individual's
behalf has remained the basic assumption un-
derlying most of the legislation since that pe-
riod. This assumption led logically, if not real-
istically, to the rationale that a person
protected by the state did not need legal safe-
guards to protect himself from the state.40
Confinement acquired a curative purpose in ad-
dition to its traditional goals of protection and
custody,41 although at the time, the knowledge
of etiology and treatment of psychiatric disor-
ders was much less extensive than it is today.
42
The "benevolent benefactor" role was coupled
with the assertion that the mental state of the
mentally ill individual was such -that he could
not be deprived of any rights he might possess
because he was not capable of understanding
he possessed those rights in the first place.
This argument could be appropriately labelled
3 7 Ba As= & RociK, supra note 7, at 36 n.16 ;
Flaschner, Analysis of the Legal & Medical Con-
siderations in Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 56
YArm L.U. 1178, 1185 (1947).
Ys See, e.g., ch. 31, [1788] N.Y. Sess. Laws.
" See, e.g., ch. 135, §§ 18-23, [1842] N.Y. Sess.
Laws.
40 This argument is based on the assumption
that since the objective of a commitment proceed-
ing is ostensibly therapeutic, all parties to the pro-
ceeding have a common purpose and thus there is
no need for an adversary process; indeed, there is
not even a deprivation of liberty. See Prochaska v.
Brinegar, 251 Iowa 834, 102 N.W.2d 870 (1960).
41 The prevailing moral, social and economic cli-
mate influences which of these three goals is
stressed most at any particular time. See BRAEI.
& RocK, supra note 7, at 39.
42 As stated in note 27, supra, many contempo-
rary critics argue that the state of psychiatry
today is insufficient to justify deprivation of an in-
dividual's liberty. Since efforts at treatment are
only minimally successful, state confinement of a
person for treatment still remains essentially cus-
todial as patients are not rehabilitated but merely
cared for. See Suchotliff, Steinfeld & Tolchin, The
Struggle for Patients' Rights in a State Hospital,
54 MENTAL HYGIENE 230 (1970).
the "vegetable -theory" of civil rights and con-
tinues to appear in more subtle forms today.
43
The development of legislative criteria for
involuntary commitment has been grounded on
such general assumptions. As stated earlier, the
parens patriae notion is embodied in those
codifications which allow commitment of a
mentally ill person who is unable to care for
himself as the result of his mental condition. 4 '
The traditional police power notion of "dan-
gerousness" or likelihood of harm due to men-
tal illness is also present in some form in most
state codes.45 The difficulty in using these cri-
teria, however, is that they are based on a.
concept of mental illness which has not signifi-
cantly changed since the seventeenth century4 6-
and which has been found to be of little use
today in the determination of whether any par-
ticular criteria applies.47 Many states have
solved this problem by stating that mental ill-
ness is a condition justifying commitment andt
then legislating that mentally ill persons can be
committed.48 This circular solution hardly alle-
viates the confusion and makes all the more
mandatory the provision of sufficient safe-
guards. If the determination of mental illness
is based on an ambiguous foundation, some-
means are necessary to ensure only appropriate
43 See Howard v. Howard, 87 Ky. 616, 623, 9-
S.W. 411, 413 (1888) ; In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep.
122, 125 (Mass. 1845). See generally Comment,
Liberty and Required Mental Health Treatment,
114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1067 (1966). Such arguments-
fail to realize that even the incapacitated mentally
ill may "not be indifferent to their physical free-
dom or to the environment in which they live."
Developments, supra note 2, at 1211.
44 See statutes cited note 10 supra.
45 Id.
46 Blackstone said that a mentally ill person,
then referred to as a lunatic or non compos men-
tis, is "one who hath had understanding, but by
disease, grief, or other accident hath lost the use
of his reason." 1 BLAc :sToEz, ComaENTARIES
*304 Lord Coke's decision in Beverley's Case, 76
Eng. Rep. 1118 (K.B. 1603) gives a detailed de-
scription of the development of the common law
and early legislation relating to the guardianship
of the mentally disabled and the protection of their
property.
47 See, e.g., T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSY-
CHIATRY 46 (1963). Szasz is recognized as one of
the most outspoken critics of the deprivation of in-
dividual rights and liberty based on psychiatric in-
tervention. Among other things, he asserts that the
concept of mental illness is far too ambiguous irr
terms of its predictive ability to justify such depri-
vation.4sDevelopments, supra note 2, at 1202. n.5.
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persons are subjected to commitment proceed-
ings.
The statutory commitment procedures them-
selves have been divided into various catego-
ries depending upon their manner of implementa-
tion. 49 One basic distinction is made between
emergency and non-emergency procedures.
Emergency procedures allow for the rapid con-
finement of an individual after an ad hoc deter-
mination of dangerousness.50 These procedures
tend to be summary and the standard usually
employed requires that impending harm to
self or others be either more likely or more
serious than would be the case under a non-
emergency procedure.5' Often emergency de-
49 See BRAKEL & ROcK, supra note 7, at 41-59.
50 Id. at 43. The following are some of the var-
ious state statutory provisions dealing with emer-
gency commitment: ALA. CODE tit. 45, § 205(4)
(Supp. 1971); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.030 (1971);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-524 (1974); ARx.
STAT. ANN. § 59--406 (1971); CAL. WELF. &
INST'NS CODE § 5150 (West Supp. 1974); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-104 (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-183 (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 5122 (Cum. Supp. 1970); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 21-521 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
394-463 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-504.2
(1971); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 334-54 (1968), as
,amended, (Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 56-237
(Supp. 1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/, § 7-1
(1973); IND. CODE § 16-14-9-22 (1973); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59-2908, -2912 (Cum. Supp.
1974); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202.027 (1972);
LA. REy. STAT. ANN. § 28:57 (1969); ME. RExV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 34, §§ 2333, 2333-A (Supp. 1974);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 22 (Cum. Supp. 1974);
MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 123, § 12 (1972); MicH.
STAT. ANN. § 14.800(438) (Supp. 1975); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 253A.04 (Supp. 1974); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 202.800, .803 (Vernon 1972);
MONT. RAY. CODES ANN. § 38-208.1 (Supp.
1974) ; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 433.671, .673 (1973);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135-B :19 (Supp. 1973);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-26.3 (Supp. 1974); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 34-2-18 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. MEN-
TAL HYGIENE LAW §§ 31.39, .41 (McKinney Supp.
1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122-58.3, -58.4, -58.18
(Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03-08
(1970); OrO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.08 (Bald-
win 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 55
(Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 426.175, .215
(1973) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4405 (1969);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-956 (1962); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 33-603 (Supp. 1974); TaX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5547-28 (Supp. 1974); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 64-7-34 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7504, 05 (1968), as amended,
(Supp. 1975) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.150
(1975); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-5-2 (Supp.
1974); Wis. STAT. § 51.04 (1971), as amended,
(Supp. 1974); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 75-58 (1967).
51All of the above statutes except those for
Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, and
tention will be for a pre-determined period of
time for purposes of observation and diagnosis,
followed by further non-emergency proce-
dures.52 The non-emergency procedures are
generally based on dangerousness (although
not as imminent as that involved in emergency
detention), or need for mental treatment, or
lack of ability to care for one's self. These pro-
cedures may take the form of a non-judicial
determination 53 or a judicial hearing, 54 although
the two are not necessarily exclusive. 55
Until recently, the enactment of statutes au-
thorizing commitment far out-paced the enact-
ment of safeguards protecting the person
whose liberty is threatened.5 6 A much cited il-
lustration of the lack of safeguards is the 1960
Duzynski incident. Mr. and Mrs. Duzynski
Montana restrict emergency commitment to men-
tally ill individuals who appear to be dangerous to
themselves or others. The following jurisdictions
require that the threat of harm be immediate:
Arizona, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.
52 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-325 (1971);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.150 (1975).
53 BRAKEL, & ROCK, supra note 7, at 42. Nonju-
dicial determinations tend to be based either on
administrative hearings held by specially estab-
lished mental health boards or medical certificates
signed by one or two physicians stating that the
person concerned is mentally ill and should be
hospitalized. In some states, the physician's signa-
ture alone is sufficient grounds for commitment.
rd.
54 Id.
55 In some states a person may be committed on
a non-judicial basis but is afforded a right to a
judicial hearing if he or his representative chooses
to set judicial proceedings in motion. See, e.g., ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 911, § 6-3 (1973) (admission on
certificate of physician).
56 This is somewhat of an anomaly and can be
explained only by pointing out that state legisla-
tures have been reluctant to provide across-the-
board procedural safeguards in the commitment
process. What they have done instead is to urge
the use of voluntary procedures whenever possible.
However, the element of subtle coercion existent
in this recourse has been illustrated in Gilboy &
Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Men-
tally Ill, 66 Nw. U.L. REV. 429 (1971), where
the authors demonstrated that voluntary admis-
sions are rarely truly "voluntary." Usually a po-
tential admittee is faced with the choice of signing
in voluntarily or facing the rigors of a court hear-
ing. The latter alternative is made to look punitive
and undesirable, so the person really does not have
much of a choice.
[Vol. 66
SAFEGUARDS FOR INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENTS
were Polish emigrants living in Chicago, una-
ble to speak English. One day Mrs. Duzynski
discovered $380 missing from their apartment
and demanded the stolen money from the jani-
tor whom she suspected because he had a spare
key. The janitor called the police, complaining
that both Mr. and Mrs. Duzynski were insane,
whereupon the two were seized without further
examination and taken to the Cook County
Mental Health Clinic in handcuffs. Once there,
the two were unable to answer any of the
questions put to them in English, were pro-
nounced mentally ill, and were committed to
Chicago State Hospital. Six weeks later Mr.
Duzynski hanged himself in desperation; Mrs.
Duzynski was released the next day.
57
Some legislatures, reacting to criticism con-
cerning the inequity of legally confining a per-
son without minimum legal safeguards, 58 have
made some effort to reform commitment proce-
dures to afford due process safeguards. 59 The
safeguards provided are the ones typically af-
forded defendants in criminal proceedings: no-
tice,60 hearing,61 counsel,6 2 trial by jury,63
57 Kutner, supra note 33, at 384.
58 See, e.g., articles cited in note 33 supra.
59 California and Massachusetts are generally
considered two of the states most liberal in ex-
tending procedural safeguards to involuntary civil
commitment. See CAL. WELF. & INsT'Ns CODE
§§ 5000-401 (West 1972); MASs. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 123, §§ 1-37 (Supp. 1974).
60 Notice is a fundamental element of procedure
in criminal cases. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. amend.
VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation"). See notes
86-92 and accompanying text infra.
61 Hearings provide safeguards at several levels
in the criminal system. One is the right to a pre-
liminary hearing in the absence of a grand jury
indictment to establish probable cause to continue
further pretrial detention required by FED. R.
CRIM. P. 5(a), (c). See Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Ex Parte Schuber,
68 Cal.App.2d 424, 156 P2d 944 (1945). See notes
93-109 and accompanying text infra.
At other levels are the right to a full hearing
and the right to be present at that hearing. Every
state provides for an individual to be heard at
some point in the commitment process. See
BmK-. & Rocy, supra note 7, at 80, Table 3.3.
Yet not every state allows the individual to be
present at his commitment hearing. This right is
guaranteed in criminal proceedings by the sixth
amendment to the Constitution and extended to the
states by the fourteenth amendment. See Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). The right is not
absolute, however, and can be lost by disruptive
behavior. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43
(1970).
standard of proof,6 4 and privilege against self-
incrimination.65 The states vary tremendously,
however, on the extent to which they require
these or other safeguards in their statutory
procedures.66
62 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. See also Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See notes 110-115
and accompanying text infra.
63 The Supreme Court has ruled that the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial applies to all state
criminal cases which would fall within that right
in a federal court. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149 (1968).
64 The Supreme Court noted that proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is an element of due process in
criminal cases in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970). See notes 122-131 and accompanying text
infra. See also The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84
HARv. L. Rxv. 30, 156 (1970).
65 U.S. CONST. amend. V. See notes 134-137
and accompanying text infra.
66 By comparing the tables contained in AMERI-
CAN BAR FOUNDATION, MENTALLY DISABLED AND
THE LAW (F. Lindman & D. McIntyre 1961)
and BRAxEL & Rocx, supra note 7, one can see
some of the legislative changes that occurred in
the decade between the two American Bar Foun-
dation reports. The tables on "Hearing and Post-
hearing Procedures" in judicial hospitalization
(AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, Table Il-C, 56-62;
BRAEL & Rocx, Table 3.3, 80-87) reveal that in
the ten-year period between the studies, California,
Kansas, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Ver-
mont provided for a mandatory hearing in com-
mitment proceedings where no such provision had
existed before. In 1971, all states and the District
of Columbia had some provision providing a hear-
ing at some point in the process. The same tables
demonstrate that states varied in their position
with respect to allowing individuals to be present
at their commitment hearings. For example, in
California in 1961, the individual's presence was
mandatory, CAL. WELF. & INSTNS CODE § 5054
(Deering Supp. 1957) ; whereas in 1971, the indi-
vidual was to be kept in custody but represented
by counsel, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 5302,
5303 (West Supp. 1968).
The right to a jury trial was made mandatory
upon demand in California and Wyoming in the
ten-year period, but as of the 1971 Brakel & Rock
report, thirty-five states had no provision for a jury
trial. A comparison of the tables on "Legal Coun-
sel in Hospitalization Proceedings" (AmEmcAN
BAR FOUNDATioN, Table II-N-2, 100-03; BRAKEL
& Rock, Table 3.12, 125-28) shows that five states,
Illinois, Maine, New York, Tennessee, and Wyom-
ing, developed a right to counsel, with court-
appointed counsel mandatory if the individual is
not represented; California, Utah, and the District
of Columbia made their already present discre-
tionary right to counsel mandatory if the individual
lacks representation; Nevada developed a discre-
tionary right to counsel. As of the Brakel & Rock
report, all but eight states included a right to be
represented in their commitment proceedings. Of




The courts have contributed to the impetus
for extension of procedural safeguards to civil
commitment proceedings, although judicial ad-
vocacy of such an expansion is sporadic and
less than uniform. Many courts have been re-
luctant to extend what they consider to be crim-
inal safeguards to a civil proceeding. The basis
for this hesitancy is usually the "benevolent
benefactor" theory-the state is not seeking to
punish the mentally ill person but merely to
provide him with the protection and care ne-
cessitated by his condition.67 An Iowa court
could thus state:
[Where a person is deprived of his liberty in
a mental hospitall such restraint is not in the
way of punishment, but for his own protection
and welfare as well as for the benefit of
society. Such loss of liberty is not such liberty
as is within the meaning of the constitutional
provision that "no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process
of law." 68
In the same vein, another court could assert:
[P]ersons may be deprived of their liberty for
the good of society or themselves. This is not
a deprivation of due process of law, but a
temporary restraint on liberty, based on the
extent of the illness, the need for treatment
and hospitalization, as well as the protection
of society.69
Such reasoning is far from universal and
would now be considered regressive by some.
necessarily make it effective because in many in-
stances representation is only for purposes of dis-
play. See Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and
the Commitment of the Mentally Il1, 44 TEx. L.
Rxv. 424 (1966).
67 The Supreme Court discussed the criminal-
civil distinction with respect to states' reasoning in
support of their use of the parens patriae concept
in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) and found the
distinction moot. See note 35 supra.
68 Prochaska v. Brinegar, 251 Iowa 834, 838,
102 N.W.2d 870, 872 (1960) (plaintiff not denied
due process merely because representing attorney
did not meet and consult with the plaintiff prior to
hearing).
69 State v. Sanchez, 457 P.2d 370, 373 (N.M.
1969) (within constitutional bounds, enacting judi-
cial method of determining a person mentally ill
and regulating the custody and control of that per-
son and his property is a proper legislative func-
tion).
In Denton v. Commonwealth,7 0 for example, the
state supreme court held that a lunacy inquest
was a quasi-criminal proceeding which, "al-
though not concerned with criminal intent or
criminal acts," may nonetheless result in the
deprivation of an individual's liberty or prop-
erty. Such a deprivation should only be effected
under due process guarantees. Accordingly,
"when a proceeding may lead to the loss of per-
sonal liberty, the defendant in that proceeding
should be afforded the same constitutional pro-
tection as is given to the accused in a criminal
prosecution." 71
The major erosion of the civil-criminal dis-
tinction occurred in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in In re Gault,7 2 a case involving a
fifteen-year-old civilly committed to a juvenile
institution as a delinquent for making obscene
telephone calls. The Court's opinion asserted
that the juvenile commitment involved was a
"deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration
against one's will, whether it is called 'crimi-
nal' or 'civil.'" 73 Stating that the distinction
between a civil and criminal proceeding is
moot when an individual's fundamental right
to liberty is at stake, the Court held that the
exercise by the state of its parens patriae
power was not unlimited.7 4 Due process safe-
guards must be applied when a civil proceed-
ing endangers that right to liberty.
75
Unable to ignore the similarity, commenta-
tors swiftly made the analogy between civil
commitment proceedings of juveniles and civil
commitment proceedings of mentally ill
persons.76 The ice was broken and some courts
70383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964) (the burden of
proof, manner of proceeding, and rules of evidence
in a lunacy inquest should be the same as those in
any criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding).
7 Id. at 682.
7? 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
7 3 Id. at 50.
74 Id. at 30, citing Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541 (1966).
75 Id. at 30-31.
76 Since the decision in Gault, innumerable arti-
cles and comments have appeared extending its
rationale to various areas of civil commitment,
analogizing the relationship between juvenile
delinquents and the state to the relationship be-
tween the mentally ill and the state. See, e.g., An-
dalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Per-
sons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a
Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43
(1974) ; Combs, Burden of Proof and Vagueness
in Civil Commitmient Proceedings, 2 Am. J. Caml.
LAw 47 (1973); Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental
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seized the analogy and extended due process
safeguards to civil commitment proceedings of
the mentally ill on the basis of Gault.77 A fed-
eral district court in Wisconsin formulated the
most expansive decision on this subject in Les-
sard v. Schmidt,78 a class action contesting the
validity of the Wisconsin civil commitment
procedures. However, much of the court's rea-
soning is applicable to the commitment proce-
dures of other states as well. The court noted
that a committed individual is not only de-
prived of his liberty but also loses numerous
civil rights79 and is imprinted with a stigma
which reduces future opportunities.8 0 It then
stated :
The power of the state to deprive a person of
the fundamental liberty to go unimpeded about
his or her affairs must rest on a consideration
that society has a compelling interest in such
deprivation. In criminal cases, this authority is
derived from the police power, granted
because of the necessity of protecting society
from anti-social actions. This power is tem-
pered with stringent procedural safeguards
designed to protect the rights of one accused
Illness, 7 CGm. L. BUL. 101 (1971) ; Reisner,
Psychiatric Hospitalization and the Constitution:
Some Observations on Emerging Trends, 1973 U.
ILL. L.F. 9; Project-The Administration of Psy-
chiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona,
13 ARiz. L. Rxv. 1 (1971); Developments, supra
note 2; Comment, Compulsory Commitment: The
Rights of the Incarcerated Mentally Ill, 1969
Duim L.J. 677; Note, Application of the Fifth
Amendnent Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
to the Civil Conmmitment Proceeding, 1973 DuxE
L.J. 729; Note, Lessard v. Schmidt: Due Process
and Involuntarily Civil Commitment, 68 Nw. U.L.
Rxv. 585 (1973).
77 See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393
(10th Cir. 1968); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp.
378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County
Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974) ;
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis.
1972), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 414
U.S. 473 (per curiam), modified, 379 F. Supp. 1376
(E.D. Wis. 1974); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325
F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971); in re Fisher, 39
Ohio 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974); Quesnell v.
State, 83 Wash. 2d 224, 517 P.2d 568 (1974) ; In
re Levias, 83 Wash. 2d 253, 517 P.2d 588 (1974).
78 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated
& remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473
(1974) (per curiam), modified, 379 F. Supp. 1376
(E.D. Wis. 1974).
79 Id. at 1088.
so Id. at 1089.
of crime.... In civil commitment proceedings
the same fundamental liberties are at stake.
State commitment procedures have not, how-
ever, traditionally assured the due process
safeguards against unjustified deprivation of
liberty that are accorded those accused of
crime .... 83
In response to the argument that due process
safeguards were unnecessary because an al-
leged mentally ill person was being committed
for rehabilitative rather than punitive reasons,
the court asserted:
[T]he argument in favor of relaxed procedures
on the basis of a subsequent right to treatment
ignores the fact that unless constitutionally
prescribed procedural due process requirements
for involuntary commitment are met, no person
should be subjected to "treatment" against his
will.8
2
The court went on to discuss the procedural
due process safeguards applicable to civil com-
mitment proceedings.8 3 The reasoning of Les-
sard has been applied and extended by other
courts to similar purpose.8 4
APPLICABLE DUE PROCESS SAFEGUARDS
The recognition that involuntary civil com-
mitment procedures may result in the depriva-
tion of a person's fundamental right to. liberty
and greatly influence the course of his future
life has led to the incorporation of the follow-
ing due process safeguards in some jurisdic-
tions.85 At the present time, all of these safe-
guards are not recognized in all jurisdictions.
Although many are still minority views, their
acceptance is desirable to ensure adequate pro-
tection of individuals affected by the commit-
ment process.
81 Id. at 1084.
82 Id. at 1087.
83 See notes 85-137 and accompanying text infra.
s4 See cases cited note 77 supra.
85 See generally Kittrie, Compulsory Mental
Treatment and the Requirement of "Due Process,"
21 OHio ST. L.J. 28 (1960) ; Developments, supra
note 2, 1271-1316; Comment, Mental Illness and
Due Process: Involuntary Commitment in New
York, 16 N.B.L.F. 165 (1970) ; Comment, A Critical
Look into Involuntary Civil Commitment Proce-
dure, 10 WASHBURN L.J. 237 (1971); Comment,
Progress in Involuntary Commitment, 49 WASH.
L. REv. 617 (1974) ; Note, Civil Commitment of




One basic element of due process is the "de-
fendant's" right to notification of the nature of
the charges against him to enable him to pre-
pare his defense. This right to notice is well
established in both civil and criminal proceed-
ings.8 6 Yet, some state commitment statutes
either fail to require such notice or require that
only minimal information be provided.87 One
recent trend is to discard this approach. A few
courts have held that although due process
may not be offended by a temporary confine-
ment without notice where immediate action is
necessary for the protection of society or the
person,88 such confinement cannot be continued
without notice to the individual of other avail-
able rights, such as the right to a hearing or
the right to counsel. Moreover, regardless of
whether temporary or indefinite commitment is
at issue, the alleged mentally ill person must be
provided adequate and timely notice of the
action before such commitment proceeding can
commence.8 9 According to the court in Lessard,
notice of an impending commitment proceeding
must be sufficient in terms of information pro-
vided-not just the date, time and place; but
also the basis for detention, the right to counsel
s8 See note 60 supra. See also Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950); State ex rel. Hussman v. Hursh, 253
Minn. 578, 580-81, 92 N.W.2d 673, 675-76
(1958) (per curiam) ; In re Wellman, 3 Kan. App.
100, 103, 45 P. 726, 727 (1896); Developments,
supra note 2, 1973-75; Note, Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1288, 1291 (1966).
87 Nebraska, for example, provides that the
county board of mental health may issue a war-
rant for the individual only after an application
for commitment is filed. NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 83-325
(1971). See Table 3.2, "Judicial Hospitalization of
the Mentally Ill-Prehearing Procedures," in
BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 7, at 72-79, for statu-
tory provisions relating to notice as of 1971.
88 See, e.g., State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 364
Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954) (The court stated
that the state could provide for the summary de-
tention of an individual without notice until the
truth of the charges could be investigated. The
court went on to hold the Missouri statute uncon-
stitutional, however. After the decision, the emer-
gency commitment statute was amended to require
notice to the probate court of any emergency com-
mitment within ten days of the detention. Then, if
proceedings are not begun within five days after
the probate court is so notified, the judge must
release the patient. Mo. REV. STAT. § 202.805 (Supp.
1970)).
89 See cases cited note 77 supra.
and to a jury trial, the standard upon which
the individual may be detained, the names of
the examining physicians and all others who
may testify in favor of continued detention,
and the substance of the proposed testimony. 90
Critics of affording such preliminary notice
assert that this type of provision could 'be det-
rimental to the individual involved because its
traumatic impact would further unbalance his
precarious mental state.9' This criticism is
grounded on the "vegetable theory" mentioned
above-the person -is not capable of responding
to rights guaranteed other citizens so he
should not receive those rights. The argument
also ignores the traumatic impact on a person
of suddenly finding himself in a mental institu-
tion without knowing why and feeling power-
less to influence a situation seemingly beyond
his control. In refuting the criticism, commen-
tators have asserted that notice may be benefi-
cial rather than traumatic because it provides
the concerned individual with the information
needed to understand his situation and to exert
some influence on the proceeding. The individ-
ual may respond to being treated like a citizen
possessing dignity and value rather than like a




In Lessard the court held that, except in
emergency situations where the state has a
compelling interest in preventing injury, depri-
vation of liberty without a preliminary hearing
is impermissable under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment 93 and that such
90 349 F. Supp. at 1092. See also In re Gault,
387 U.S. at 33.
91 See M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSY-
CHIATRY AND THE LAW 295-98 (1952); Hearings
on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of
the Senate Comnm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 72 (1961) (statement of Dr. F. J. Brace-
land); GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHI-
ATRY, COMMITMENT PROCEDURES (REPORT No. 4,
April 1949).
92 Confinement in a mental institution without
notice can be just as traumatic as the notice re-
ceived, if not more. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d
648, 667, n.69 (D.C. Cir. 1973) for judicial atten-
tion to this point.
93 349 F. Supp. at 1091. The court, pointing to
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)
(individual must be given an opportunity for a
hearing before he can be deprived of any siguifi-
[Vol. 66
SAFEGUARDS FOR INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENTS
hearing must be held within forty-eight hours of
the initial detention. 4 This preliminary hearing
is designed to determine whether probable cause
exists for continued detention of the person
and is directly analagous to the probable cause
hearing in the criminal process.95 The safe-
guard is especially necessary for emergency
detention statutes in which an individual may
be held for a prolonged period of time without
either a right to a full hearing96 or provision
for a mandatory hearing.9 7 Some courts have
refused to recognize this right on the grounds
that prehearing detention is acceptable under
emergency situations as long as the person af-
fected is afforded judicial review within a
"reasonable" period of time, which may
amount to several months.9s This determina-
tion allows a person to be deprived of his lib-
erty on the assumption that he falls within the
standards justifying emergency detention with-
out the state being required to prove that such
an assumption is warranted.9 9 A right to a
cant property interest), reasoned that a person's
interest in liberty is an even more fundamental
right than the right to property discussed in that
case and therefore a hearing must be afforded in
this instance as well.
94 349 F. Supp. at 1091.
95 See note 66 supra.9OFor example, in Logan v. Arafeb, 346 F.
Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1972), aff'd tnern. sib. twin.
Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973), the dis-
trict court approved a statute allowing confinement
for up to forty-five days without a hearing. CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-183 (Supp. 1975).
07 Not every state requires a mandatory hear-
ing; in some states a hearing is held only if re-
quested. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW §§
31.31(a), .33-.35, .39(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
o8 See Logan v. Arafeb, 346 F. Supp. at 1268;
Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 353-54, 278
N.E.2d 615, 617, 328 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396, cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972). In Fhagen, the New
York Court of Appeals held that the emergency
and medical sections of the New York mental hy-
giene law authorizing temporary commitment of
mentally ill persons without a pre-admission or
post-admission hearing were not a deprivation of a
person's liberty without due process, even though
no requirement of violence or dangerousness was
present. The rationale for this holding was that
persons are afforded an opportunity to litigate the
question of mental illness shortly after commit-
ment. This determination ignores that deprivation
of liberty until that adjudication may be unjustifi-
able and thus result in irreparable stigma and
loss of rights.
09 In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1961), the Supreme Court intimated that it
would be unconstitutional "to make it a criminal
preliminary hearing would impose this require-
ment.
The right to a full hearing is a constitu-
tionally recognized guarantee afforded the de-
fendant in a criminal proceeding because it
allows the accused individual to confront his
accusers through the adversary process. As
stated earlier, in many respects the alleged
mentally ill person is in the same position as
the alleged criminal; both may be deprived of
their liberty and stigmatized as social deviants
with dramatic consequences to their future
opportunities. 00 Accordingly, the right to a
full hearing to determine the actual need for
commitment should be extended to civil com-
mitment proceedings. This right and the con-
frontation it affords have been recognized by
both courts' 0 ' and legislatures.
1
02
A controversial issue included within the
right to a hearing is the right of the alleged
mentally ill person to be present at that
hearing. 0 3 A tentative objection to the exten-
sion of this right is the argument that the per-
son's presence at the hearing may be traumatic
and detrimental to his well-being because of
the information he would hear. 04 This objec-
tion has been rejected by some courts. In Bell
v. Wayne County General Hospital,0 5 the court
admitted that an alleged mentally ill person might
be removed from a commitment proceeding when
his conduct is "so disruptive that the proceed-
ing cannot continue in any reasonable man-
ner." But the court .went on to hold that a
Michigan statute, 00 allowing removal of the
offense for a person to be mentally ill. . .
Id. at 666. The crux of the decision is that a
person cannot be punished simply because he fits
into a certain category or status. Accordingly, one
could argue that simply because a person may fall
within the category of persons who are mentally
ill, he should not be deprived of his liberty with-
out due process, if he is to be restrained at all.
Such detention is all too often a presumption of
"guilt" rather than "innocence," or, more explic-
itly, illness rather than health. The state should
have to bear the burden of proving illness.
100 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at
1088-89.
101 See cases cited note 77 stupra.
102 See BRAxEL & Rocx, supra note 7, at 52.
103 Id. at 53.
104 Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally ll,
31 N.C.L. Rxv. 274 (1952-53).
05 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
206 MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 33021 (Supp.
1973).
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patient from the hearing on the certificate of
the medical superintendent of the detention fa-
cility or the certificate of two physicians, was
a violation of due process. The court reasoned,
on the basis of the overriding principle of con-
frontation in the adversary process, that a
committing court may not decide in advance,
on the basis of a physician's opinion, that an
alleged mentally ill person should not be al-
lowed to appear. Before total exclusion of the
person from the hearing may be allowed, some
alternative, such as holding the hearing in the
mental facility, must first be attempted.10i The
person must be afforded every opportunity to
be present at his hearing in order to assist in
his defense.
Another related trend is the requirement of
a full record of commitment proceedings, ade-
quate for review, to be compiled and main-
tained by the examining court."01 In the past,
such records have not always been kept, often
to the individual's detriment. With a right to a
record, the alleged mentally ill person is guar-
anteed an adequate record for appeal should he
or his representative choose that course.10 9
Counsel
The right to counsel is also an established
aspect of constitutional law in criminal
proceedings" 0 and was extended to civil juve-
nile delinquency proceedings by the Supreme
Court in In re Gault.:'" The rationale in Gault
can be extended to civil commitment proceed-
ings of mentally ill persons as well, again
keeping in mind that individual liberty and fu-
ture opportunity are at stake in both instances.
Accordingly, an alleged mentally ill person
should have the right to effective legal repre-
sentation at all significant stages of the com-
mitment process, and he should be advised of
107 384 F. Supp. at 1094. Cf. BRAXEL & Rocx,
supra note 7, at 53.
108 See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378
(M.D. Ala. 1974).
109 The right of appeal is another procedural
safeguard often bypassed, yet it is through such
appeals that many of the substantive revisions in
mental health law have been generated. Where all
else fails, a habeas corpus proceeding is available
by statute in many states. See, e.g., ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 913/, § 10-6 (1973).
110 See note 62 supra.
111 387 U.S. at 41.
that right.112 Recent developments suggest that
the right to representation must be made avail-
able at the earliest stage of the commitment
proceeding in accordance with the individual's
need for timely preparation of either a defense
or an argument for alternative modes of
treatment.
11
A serious debate exists concerning whether
counsel's presence should be allowed at any
psychiatric interview prior to the commitment
proceedings.1 4 Although this point is not
easily answerable, counsel should at least have
access to all reports and the results of exami-
nations introduced at the commitment hearings
on the basis that such information is necessary
to prepare an informed defense."15
Trial by Jury
In criminal proceedings the right to a trial
by jury is guaranteed by the sixth
amendment."1 6 The right to jury trial for the
determination of mental illness existed in
Blackstone's time but then disappeared.11 The
present approach to whether a jury trial
should be allowed in a civil commitment pro-
ceeding balances the advantages to the individ-
ual of a jury trial and the costs to the state in
terms of the detrimental effect on the commit-
ment system.118 In weighing the opposing con-
112 See, e.g., In re Fisher, 39 Ohio 2d 71, 313
N.E.2d 851 (1974) (holding that an individual
confronted with civil commitment proceeding is
entitled to representation by counsel at all signifi-
cant stages of that proceeding).
113 One should recognize that mere provision of
counsel does not necessarily provide adequate rep-
resentation. For this, counsel must effectively in-
tervene in the patient's best interest. See ANDAL-
MAN & CHAMBERS, supra note 76, at 50; COHEN,
supra note 66, at 460-66; KI=rrR, supra note 2, at
91-95.
114 See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp-
at 1100. The court recognized that some critics as-
sert an attorney's presence would effectively elimi-
nate the psychiatrist's acquisition of desired infor-
mation.
115 Id. at 1100; Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp.
at 389, citing Sarzan v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076,
1085 (1st Cir. 1973).
116 See note 63 supra.
117 According to Blackstone, the method of
proving a person non compos nentis was very
similar to the inquest of idiocy by the writ de idi-
ota inquirendo, in which the person was tried by a
jury of 12 men. 1 BE.AcxsToNE, COmMENTARIES
*305.
11S See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 52&
(1971). Examining the right to a jury trial as ap-
plied to juvenile proceedings, the Court found that
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siderations, one must consider the roles of the
jury to prevent "arbitrariness and oppression
by the interposition of a jury verdict between
the state and the defendant," 1 9 and to mediate
the decision-making process with community
values.320 Both of these factors play an impor-
tant part in protecting the individual's interests
in a commitment proceeding. The role of the
jury as the mediator or arbitrator of the evi-
dence is especially important in the determina-
tion of whether the state has met the burden of
proof required to commit an individual.'121 Ac-
cordingly, the right to jury trial should be
provided upon demand in the civil commitment
process, especially when the alleged mentally ill
person or his attorney desires community input
into the decision.
Standard pf Proof
Three different standards of proof have been
applied to civil commitment proceedings. The
first is the usual "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard used in most civil proceedings
where only damages are sought ;122 the applica-
tion of this standard to commitment proceed-
ings has been rejected by many courts because
an individual's liberty is at stake and the
deprivation of this basic right should require a
more stringent standard than that applied in
damage actions.123 Some courts have opted for
such a right was not constitutionally required
since such a requirement would impair the state's
interest in informality by making the juvenile pro-
ceeding fully adversarial, by introducing delay, and
by impeding experimentation of new procedures.
110See Developments, supra note 2, at 1293,
titing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
551 (White, J., concurring). See also Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151, 155-56 (1968).
120 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509-10
(1972). See also Developments, supra note 2,
1219-25. An allegedly mentally ill person may
prefer a jury, for example, when expert testimony
is blatantly inconclusive and/or contradictory, thus
undermining the expert's position in the eyes of
the jury.
221 If an individual who appears lucid and co-
herent requests a jury trial, he is likely to be re-
leased because of the difficulty of proving the case
before a jury. Hearings on Constitutional Rights
of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 245 (1970).
122See, e.g., Christiansen v. Weston, 36 Ariz.
200, 284 P. 149 (1930) (preponderance of evidence
proper standard in commitment proceeding).
1
2 3 1 n re Ballay, 482 F2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis.
1972).
a compromise position with "clear and con-
vincing evidence" as the standard, reasoning
that the issue involved is not the occurrence of
an event, as in a criminal proceeding, but
rather an individual's mental condition and
propensity to act, issues which are more diffi-
cult to prove.' 2 4 The justifications for the pre-
ceding two standards ignore that a person's
liberty is at stake and that in such an instance,
as in the criminal law, the state should have to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person
meets the required standards for commit-
ment.1 25 As the court pointed out in It re
Ballay, due process depends upon the relative
interests involved and the nature of the pro-
cedure and the function it performs:
[T]he standard of proof reflects the risk of
winning or losing a given adversary proceed-
ing, or, stated differently, the certainty with
which the party bearing the standard of proof
must convince the factfinder... [I]n situations
where the various interests of society ace
pitted against restrictions on the liberty of the
individual, a more demanding standard is fre-
quently imposed .... -2
6
Since in civil commitment proceedings the
interests of society are pitted against the indi-
vidual's fundamental right to liberty, some
courts, weighing the balance, have ruled that
the standard of proof should be that of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.'127 This standard is
more appropriate for several reasons. First,
there is a substantial and fundamental interest
of society in assuring accuracy in the proceed-
ings in order to build public confidence.'
28
Second, since the proceedings are already simi-
lar in many respects to a criminal trial, the
imposition of a higher standard of proof is un-
likely to have any discernible effect upon the
proceedings themselves. 29 And finally, based
on the inconclusive nature of the evidence, the
positive aspect of the standard is clearly visible
-a strict standard of proof assures that per-
124 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d
606 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ; In re Levias, 83 Wash. 2d
253, 517 P.2d 588 (1974); People v. Sansone, 18
Ill. App. 3d 315, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1974).
1
2 5 See note 64 supra.
126 it re Ballay, 482 F.2d at 662.
1
2 7 Id. at 669; Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
128 In re Ballay, 482 F.2d at 657.
129 Id. at 663.
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sons will not be unnecessarily deprived of their
liberty on the basis of an ambiguous founda-
tion, given the unsatisfactory nature of expert
testimony and the problematic prediction of
dangerousness.130
There also seems to be a recent shift in
what must be proved in order to involuntarily
commit an individual. Both courts and legisla-
tures are moving more towards the police
power concept of "dangerousness" as a ground
for commitment and away from the parens pa-
triae concepts of "unable to care for self" or
"in need of mental treatment," because a depri-
vation of liberty is a serious curtailment of
personal rights and should only be imposed
when absolutely necessary. 13 Since society has
a definite stake in protecting its citizens, the
police power provides a much more solid foun-
dation for depriving an individual of his lib-
erty since the likelihood of injury is involved
when a person is found to be dangerous to
himself or others.
Admissible Evidence
Some courts are also beginning to apply tra-
ditional rules of evidence to commitment pro-
ceedings. This extension, too, seems to be in
keeping with the acknowledgement of civil
commitment as a procedure by which an indi-
vidual may be confined at the cost of his lib-
erty, his rights and his reputation. In Lessard,
the court could find no sound policy reason for
admitting hearsay evidence, excludable in other
proceedings, into a commitment hearing and
held that traditional hearsay rules would apply
130 Id. at 667. The effectiveness of psychiatric
testimony as a basis for commitment has recently
come under fire. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974);
Roth, Dayley & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiat-
ric Reliability and Emergency Commitment Stat-
utes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 400 (1973).
1131 For judicial opinion on this matter see Bell
v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp.
1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974) ; Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). For statutory
criteria for hospitalization of the mentally ill see
Table 32, "Judicial Hospitalization of the Mentally
Il-Prehearing Issues," BRAKEL & ROCx, supra
note 7, at 72-79, and Table 3.11, "Emergency
Detention," id., at 118-24. See also, Combs, supra
note 76 ;Friedman & Daly, Civil Commitment & the
Doctrine of Balance: A Critical Analysis, 13
SANTA CLARA LAW. 503 (1973).
in the latter as well. 3  Moreover, the right of
each party to be apprised of all evidence upon
which an issue is to be decided, along with the
opportunity to examine, explain or rebut such
evidence, and the right to cross-examine wit-
nesses have all been extended by courts to civil
commitment proceedings.133 Previous reasoning
had been that normal evidentiary rules would
not apply to a commitment proceeding because
the state was acting in the best interests of the
individual; protections normally afforded per-
sons in other types of litigation were therefore
not needed in this informal setting. With the
waning of the "benevolent benefactor" ration-
ale, these protections have become assimilated
into the commitment proceeding.
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
In Lessard v. Schmidt the court approached
the conflicting interests of protecting individ-
ual rights and preventing a seriously ill person
from obtaining needed treatment and decided
that individual rights were paramount and in-
dividuals cannot, consistent with due process,
be committed on the basis of their statements
to psychiatrists "in the absence of a showing
that the statements were made with 'knowl-
edge' that the individual was not obliged to
speak." 134 The court went on to hold that
statements made to a psychiatrist cannot be the
basis for commitment unless voluntarily given
after notice of the possible consequences of the
statements. 3 5
This approach has been both accepted and
rejected by other courts and commentators.
Criticism rests on the argument that the state
is left in an almost powerless position if re-
quired to meet a stringent burden of proof
without being allowed to examine the alleged
mentally ill person without his permission. The
balance of interests between individual and
state is thereby upset and the state's ability to
achieve the valid goals of civil commitment
132Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1103,
But see Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir.
1964) (admitting extensive hearsay over objec-
tion).
133 Ennis & Litwack, supra note 130.
134 349 F. Supp. at 1101.
135 Id. at 1102. Of course, this would not mean
that an examining psychiatrist would have to pro-
vide the examinee with a full "Miranda"-type
warning.
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undermined. 3 The countervailing argument
questions the validity and reliability of psychi-
atric examinations and testimony and asserts
that the privilege is necessary to contravene
misinterpretation and faulty diagnosis.137
Given the stakes involved, the more cautious
-approach of the latter argument is the more
-acceptable.
PRESENT STATE OF CIVIL COMMITMENT
Many of the above positions on rights appli-
-cable to the civil commitment process reflect
minority views and have not been accepted by
most state legislatures or judiciaries. Nonethe-
less, as inroads are made into the benevolent
'benefactor doctrine of parens patriae, the trend
-towards implementation of stricter due process
.guidelines will become apparent."38 Two fac-
tors underlie the erosion of this long-standing
,doctrine. The first is the shift in the balancing
-approach to due process between the funda-
'mental right to individual liberty and the
-state's interest in providing care and treat-
ment. Courts and commentators now consider
the right to liberty to be paramount and re-
.quire greater justification than being labeled
336 See Developments, supra note 2, at 1306-13.
137 See, e.g., Aronson, Should the Privilege
.Against Self-Incrimination Apply to Compelled
.Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 55
(1973); Fielding, Compulsory Psychiatric Exami-
nation in Civil Commitment and the Privilege
.Against Self-Incrimination, 9 GONZAGA L. REv. 117
(1973); Comment, Defective Delinquent Commit-
ment Proceedings and the Constitution: The Privi-
.lege Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to
Counsel at the Examination Stage, 22 Am, U.L.
REV. 619 (1972); Note, Application of the Fifth
.Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to
the Civil Commitient Proceeding, 1973 DuKE L.J.
729.
For a full discussion of the invalidity and unre-
liability of psychiatric testimony in general see
Ennis & Litwack, supra note 130. These authors
demonstrate that psychiatrists should not be al-
lowed to testify as "experts" in commitment pro-
ceedings because psychiatric judgments are not
sufficiently reliable or valid to justify their admis-
sibility under traditional rules of evidence, and
such judgments fail to convey meaningful or oth-
erwise unavailable information about issues rele-
vant to a commitment proceeding. Accordingly, the
admission of psychiatric opinion could be a denial
of due process.
138 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Bell v.
Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085
(E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
"mentally ill" to deprive an individual of his
freedom."39
The second factor is the recognition that in-
voluntary civil commitment may not be the op-
timal means of achieving the state's goals of
providing care and treatment to a person una-
ble to care for himself, and/or treating a
dangerous person or person in need of mental
treatment. A person who refuses treatment is
difficult to rehabilitate. Furthermore, at least
one court has recognized that the state may
not be upholding its part of the bargain by
providing services to the person deprived of
his liberty to receive those services. 40 Mental
institutions, although perhaps more comfortable
today, are still basically the same custodial in-
stitutions they were a century ago. From this
recognition stems the trend toward the "least
restrictive alternative" developed by some
courts and legislatures '4' and the right to treat-
ment that is also slowly being implemented.'
4
2
The state's parens patriae care of the mentally
ill is not considered unjustified in all instances
by this position; rather such care may not
warrant the deprivation of liberty in a few
extreme cases.
At the same time, the duty of the state to
protect its citizens through utilization of the
139 Cases cited note 138 supra; Lake v. Cam-
eron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also,
Friedman & Daly, supra note 131; Reisner, supra
note 76.
140 See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp.
373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified sub non. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
'41See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C.
Cir. 1966). See generally Developments, supra
note 2, at 1245-73. The "least restrictive alterna-
tive" doctrine asserts that inpatient hospitalization
should be used as a last resort and that every at-
tempt should be made to place the patient in a less
restricted setting, such as an outpatient clinic. See
Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitn-
tional Imperatives, 70 Micn. L. REv. 1108 (1972).
'142 See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373.
See also Bailey & Pyfer, Deprivation of Liberty
and the Right to Treatment, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 519 (1974); Schwitzgebel, Right to Treat-
ment for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for
Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8
HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. Lm. L. REv. 513
(1973) ; S3nnposiun---The Right to Treatment, 57
GEo. LJ. 673 (1969); Symposium-The Mentally
Ill and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REv.
742 (1969) ; Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the
Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to




police power remains. 14 3 Here, the state's inter-
est in depriving an individual of his liberty is
greater than when it merely seeks to provide
care. The state has a legitimate interest in
seeing that a mentally ill person does not in-
jure himself or others, or the property of oth-
ers. Such protection is within the traditional
purview of the health, safety, welfare, and
moral aspects of the police power.144 However,
the doctrines of the "least restrictive alterna-
tive" and the right to treatment are again ap-
plicable, since the state should neither unneces-
sarily deprive a person of his liberty, nor fail
to provide adequate treatment when such treat-
ment was the purpose for that deprivation.
145
Finally, in light of the present state of the art
of mental health, the individual's right to lib-
erty is entitled to the most stringent proce-
dural safeguards available, despite contentions
by mental health practitioners that such safe-
guards impede their ability to get persons




This comment has illustrated the trend in
the area of involuntary civil commitment to-
ward the protection of the fundamental right
of liberty by the extension of stringent "crimi-
nal" procedural safeguards to the civil commit-
ment process. Some critics reject this exten-
sion because they feel it makes the process too
similar to a criminal trial;147 yet in so doing,
they fail to recognize that in many ways the
results of a civil commitment proceeding and a
143 Combs, supra note 76, at 55-59, argues that
"dangerousness" criteria used under the police
power doctrine are unconstitutionally vague and
invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
See also Developments, supra note 2, at 1222-45.
144 See notes 11-13 supra.
145 See notes 139-42 supra.
146 See, e.g., Slovenko, Civil Commitment in
Perspective, 20 J. PUBLIC L. 3 (1971) (arguing
against stricter due process safeguards). Slovenko
feels informality is essential to aid the state in
achieving a result in the best interests of the indi-
vidual. The individual's wishes are irrelevant.
147 Id.
criminal trial are excruciatingly similar. Per-
sons subjected to each proceeding face the pos-
sibility of losing their liberty and their civil
rights, as well as receiving a stigma which
they will have to carry the rest of their
lives.' 48 If persons are to be confined against
their wishes, while this may be a result consist-
ent with the police power of the state in cer-
tain instances, they should be afforded as many
safeguards as are available to ensure that their
detention is justified. 49
Although the analogy between civil
commitment and criminal incarceration has
been made throughout this comment, society,
with its benevolent attitude, is unwilling to
classify mental illness as a crime. Indeed, in
Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court in-
timated that to do so would be unconstitu-
tional.'50 Nonetheless, persons labelled mentally
ill are deprived of their liberty and stripped of
their rights and dignity in a process with few
of the safeguards which would be available if
their condition were considered criminal. In-
voluntary civil commitment, because of its
sometimes indefinite period of confinement and
its harsh social stigma, may be a worse fate
than criminal incarceration. An ex-convict has
a better chance of success after release than an
ex-mental patient in terms of acceptance by the
community.15' In the final analysis, even
though mental illness may not be a crime, the
end result of being confined as mentally ill
without legal process may well be the same.
The application of due process safeguards to
commitment hearings is not only warranted to
prevent this unconstitutional procedure, it is
long overdue.
148 Hence the similarity between the criminal
process and the commitment process. Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1088-89.
149 See Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classi-
fications?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974), arguing that
classification on the basis of mental illness is con-
stitutionally suspect and therefore the traditional
review procedures associated with such classifica-
tions should apply.
150 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1961).
151 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1089.
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CONSUMER PROTECTION: NEW HOPE FOLLOWING
FAILURE OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL REMEDIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumers are frequently victimized by un-
lawful business practices.' Although legal re-
dress for injury suffered is often available in
theory, practical experience has shown that
consumers are unable to effectively use tradi-
tional remedies.2 The search for an adequate
consumer remedy has focused on both the
criminal and civil areas. Criminal laws, from
the early Printers' Ink statutes3 to modem
Truth-in-Lending legislation,4  have been
largely ignored by law enforcement agencies.
On the other hand, individual consumers have
been unable to bring civil actions because of a
number of practical limitations on such suits.5
Even the powerful class action, once thought
to be the ultimate consumer weapon, 6 has lost
much of its vitality through recent Supreme
Court decisions.
7
In order to develop an adequate consumer
remedy, the goals sought to be achieved should
be clearly envisaged. Both compensation and
deterrence must be provided to fully protect
the consuming public. Compensation for loss
suffered has been the primary aim of most
plaintiffs damaged by the commercial practices
I See generally, D. CAPLovrrz, THE POOR PAY
MoRE (1963); W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE
DAshx SIDE OF THE MAiRE LACE (1968).
2 See text accompanying notes 12-20 infra.
3 These statutes, based on the "Printers' Ink
Model Statute" drafted by the Printers' Ink jour-
nal, were designed to punish "'untrue, deceptive, or
misleading' advertising." Note, The Regulation of
Advertising, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 1018, 1058 (1956).
For the text of the statute see note 65 infra.
4 The Truth-in-Lending legislation authorizes a
fine of not more than $5000 and/or imprisonment
of not more than one year for one who "willfully
and knowingly" fails to comply with the Act's re-
quirements. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1611 (1970).
5 See text accompanying notes 12-20 infra.
6 See Eovaldi, Private Consumer Substantive
and Procedural Remedies Under State Law, 15
ANTITUST BULL. 255 (1970); Starrs, The Con-
sumer Class Action--Part II: Considerations of
Procedure, 49 B.U.L. Rxv. 407 (1969).
7 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156 (1974); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414
U.S. 291 (1973) ; Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969).
of others. In the consumer setting, this goal is
frustrated by small losses, ignorance of legal
rights, and fear of the legal process. Yet the
impact of unlawful practices on the consumer
makes compensation imperative. It has been es-
timated that consumers are cheated out of
more than a billion dollars each year.8 Fur-
thermore, low-income consumers, who can least
afford such losses, are the most frequent vic-
tims of fraudulent and deceptive business
practices.9 The Kerner Commission reported
that frustration with sales and credit practices
of neighborhood merchants was a major factor
leading to the ghetto riots of the 1960's3 The
law's inability to adequately compensate the
consumer has thus led not only to a diminution
of consumer buying power but also to deep-
rooted feelings of injustice and discontent in
major segments of our society.
Many merchants consider the occasional
compensation they must pay the consumer to
be a cost of doing business and will continue
an unlawful practice so long as it remains
profitable. A legal remedy must therefore be
stringent enough, either as a single legal ac-
tion or as an aggregation of separate actions,
to deter the merchant from unlawful commer-
cial activities. In this connection, it is helpful
to view the consumer as both an individual
and a member of a class.'1 While an individual
consumer may occasionally be able to get a
judgment through a civil action, the entire
class of consumers would benefit substantially
8 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FRAUDS AND MIS-
REPRESENTATION AFFECTING THE ELDERLY OF SENATE
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 89TH CONG., IST SESS.,
REPORT ON FRAUDS AND DECEPTIONS AFFECTING
THE ELDERLY 8 (Comm. Print 1965).
9 D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 171
(1963).
30 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON CiviL DISORDERS (1969).
1 Professor Rice, in a comprehensive survey of
consumer remedies, emphasized that consumer
transaction problems must be analyzed not only in
their individual context but also as a class. Rice,
Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Dual-
ity of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U.L.
REv. 559, 560-67 (1968).
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if merchants could be deterred from even initi-
ating unlawful activity.
This comment will examine several con-
sumer remedies to determine their effectiveness
in meeting the goals of compensation and de-
terrence. No attempt will be made to compile a
comprehensive survey of available statutory
and common law remedies. Rather, various
types of remedies will be analyzed in light of
their strengths and weaknesses. It will be seen
that while traditional remedies have been inad-
equate, new remedies dependent on public
officials for enforcement may at last bring jus-
tice to consumers in the market place.
II. PRivATE REMEDIES
An action for compensatory damages would
intuitively appear to be the appropriate answer
for the consumer who has lost money at the
hands of a sharp merchant. Yet, this common
remedy neither compensates nor deters. Many
factors account for the failure of the individual
action for damages. At a threshold level, many
consumers do not even know when they have
been cheated. For example, it is almost impos-
sible for the average consumer to know that he
has been overcharged on an automobile repair
bill or that the mileage has been set back on a
used car.
Even if the consumer knows he has been
cheated, he often does not realize a legal rem-
edy is available. 12 Lack of knowledge of one's
legal rights is prevalent among low-income
buyers but is also common among the more
affluent.' 3 The greatest bar to legal action,
however, is not a lack of knowledge but the
prohibitively high cost of litigation and profes-
sional help. Most consumer claims are for
small amounts and do not justify the cost in-
curred in attaining redress.14 It was estimated
12 Id. at 567; CAPLOVITz, supra note 1, at 172.
13 See Rice, supra note 11, at 567. Low-income
consumers often do not know where to turn for
help if cheated by a merchant. In a 1960 survey,
64 per cent of low-income consumers said they
would not know where to go if cheated. The Better
Business Bureau was most often named by those
who could name at least one source of help. Only
three per cent said they would seek out a private
lawyer. Caplovitz, Consumer Problems, 23 LEGAL
AID BRIEF CASE 147 (1965).
14 The availability of small claims courts in
many states allows many consumers to bring ac-
tions which would not be feasible in other courts.
Attorneys are usually barred in small claims court,
in 196815 that even a $200 loss was insufficient
to make legal action worthwhile-the threshold
figure for profitable litigation is certainly much
greater now. Most unscrupulous merchants
confine their cheating to small amounts because
they realize that "'no one bilked out of fifty
dollars is going to pay a lawyer to get his
money back." 1
To alleviate the problem of cost, modern
consumer legislation often provides for attor-
ney's fees and/or an additional recovery above
and beyond actual damages for a consumer
who successfully pursues legal action. The fed-
eral Truth-in-Lending Act, which requires
creditors to make certain disclosures of credit
terms, provides for a "reasonable attorney's
fee" to be awarded the plaintiff if successful
plus a recovery of twice the finance charge
with a minimum recovery of $100 and a maxi-
mum of $1000.17 The federal Fair Credit Re-
porting Act, which regulates the activities of
credit information agencies, provides for a re-
covery of actual damages suffered and author-
izes the award of attorney's fees for a success-
ful action.' s At the state level, the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA),
promulgated by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, pro-
vides for attorney's fees if the merchant "has
willfully engaged in the trade practice knowing
it to be deceptive." 3o But the UDTPA, in pro-
and the parties, following informal rules of proce-
dure and evidence, present their own claims and
defenses. However, many low-income consumers
do not know of the existence of these courts or
are skeptical or afraid of using them. Cf. Note,
infra note 16, at 436-38.
15 Rice, supra note 11, at 567 n.29.
16 Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived
Consumers into Effective Programns for Protection,
114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 409 (1966).
17 Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a) (1970).
81 Id. § 1681 (o).
19 UNIFORM DEcsrrvI TRADE PRAcrcEs Acr §
3. In addition, the Act authorizes the award of at-
torney's fees to "the prevailing party if the party
complaining of a deceptive trade practice has
brought an action which he knew to be groundless.
." Id. This section should prevent a consumer
from bringing a suit simply to harass a disliked
merchant. The UDTPA prohibits twelve specific
types of deceptive trade practices. By 1970 it had
been adopted in nine states. For a comprehensive
study of the Act see Dole, Merchant and Con-
stoner Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, 76 YALE L. J. 485 (1967).
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viding for injunctive relief only, does nothing
for the consumer who wants his money back.
20
To bring civil suits within reach of the av-
erage consumer's pocketbook, provision must
be made for attorney's fees and/or multiple
damage awards. If, as is the modern trend,
such terms are included in consumer protection
statutes, the consumer will have more incentive
to seek redress. Yet, taxing the cost of both
parties' professional services to a losing de-
fendant will not help the consumer who does
not realize he has been cheated, who does not
know a legal claim exists, or who does not
know where to turn to get help. If only the in-
dividual action for compensation is actively
pursued, the rare consumer who successfully
presses his legal claim will be far outnumbered
by those who do not. The merchant may ac-
tually be left with a net profit after making
payments to a few consumers, and these pay-
ments will come to be considered a cost of
doing business. The merchant, in turn, will
pass along the higher cost to other consumers.
Thus, the merchant will not be deterred from
fraudulent and deceptive commercial practices
by the remedies outlined above.
An issue sparking substantial comment is
whether an individual consumer has standing
to sue to enjoin unlawful commercial acts.
2 1
Injunctions have traditionally been reserved
for parties faced with an inadequate remedy at
law.2 2 The consumer usually cannot utilize the
injunction because the availability of a suit for
compensatory damages is considered an "ade-
quate" remedy at law (despite the special prob-
lems the consumer encounters as noted above).
However, the Uniform Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act specifically allows any "person likely
to be damaged" to bring an injunction, the
Act's sole remedy.23 Whether or not this lan-
guage eliminates the traditional restraints on
20 UDTPA § 3.
21 See Dole, supra note 19, at 498-500; Eovaldi,
supra note 6, at 303-06; Note, Consumer Protec-
tion in Florida: Inadequate Legislative Treatment
of Conswmer Frauds, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 528,
540-41 (1971).
22 See Rice, supra note 11, at 576. For a good
discussion of what is considered an "adequate"
remedy see Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-
Part I: Considerations of Equity, 49 B.U.L. REv.
211, 224-33 (1969).23 UDTPA § 3.
equitable remedies is unclear, especially since
an injunction is to be granted "under the prin-
ciples of equity and on terms that the court
considers reasonable." 24
The major hurdle a consumer faces on the
standing issue under the UDTPA is whether
he is "likely to be damaged" once he learns of
the deceptive practice. The phrase seems to
contemplate a person who will suffer future
damage. Yet, a consumer, who does not realize
he has suffered a loss until after the fact, will
surely not patronize the same merchant and
thus is not threatened with future injury. On
the other hand, the UDTPA is well-suited to
govern disputes between merchants. For exam-
ple, if merchant A "passes off" his inferior
goods as those of merchant B, merchant B is
"likely to be damaged" by A's acts even after
B learns of the practice (unless A gives relia-
ble assurances that he will end the unlawful
activity). Merchant B's suit for an injunction
also complies with traditional notions of equity
in that equity seeks to avoid the multitude of
suits at law which would be necessary to com-
pensate B for A's continuing illegal practice.
No court is known to have squarely con-
fronted the issue of consumer standing under
the UDTPA.2 5 But the Second Circuit inter-
preted similar language under the Lanham
Trademark Act to deny standing to an injured
consumer.2 6 The Lanham Act states that one
who falsely describes the origin of any goods
or services may be liable to another "who be-
lieves that he is or is likely to be damaged" by
the false description. 27 This language was in-
terpreted to deny standing to injured consum-
ers in Colligan v. Activities Club of New
York, Ltd . 2 The court relied on the statement
24 Id.
25 An Illinois circuit court sidestepped the issue
in Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co., CCH
PovERTY LAW REP. § 9652 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Ill.
Mar. 11, 1969).26 Colligan v. Activities Club of New York,
Ltd., 442 F2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971).
27 Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1970). "Any person who shall affix . . . in
connection with any goods or services . . .a false
designation of origin . . . shall be liable to a civil
action by any person . . . who believes that he is
or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such
false description or representation." Id.




of purpose contained in the Act that "[t]he in-
tent of this chapter . . . is to protect persons
engaged in such commerce against unfair
competition" 29 and interpreted this statement
to mean that "the Act's purpose .. . is ex-
clusively to protect the interests of a purely
commercial class against unscrupulous commer-
cial conduct." 30 Two considerations arise upon
drawing comparisons between the Lanham Act
and the UDTPA. First, since the Lanham Act
applies to anyone who is damaged, its scope is
not merely prospective but also applies to past
injury. This would appear to be a stronger
case for allowing consumer standing since con-
sumers need not show a likelihood of future
injury as under the UDTPA but can simply
rely upon the past injury for standing. Yet,
since consumers are denied standing to sue
under the Lanham Act, a fortiori, they lack
standing under the UDTPA criteria. On the
other hand, the Colligan court also relied upon
an explicit purpose stated in the Lanham Act
to protect "persons engaged in such
commerce." '31 Since the UDTPA does not
contain similar language, perhaps the unfavor-
able impact of jolligan and the comparison
with the Lanham Act is somewhat vitiated.
Despite the unsuitability of the UDTPA as
a consumer remedy, one commentator has
argued that public policy dictates that consum-
ers should have standing to sue under the
UDTPA because the social policy of protecting
uninformed consumers overrides the theoretical
legal problems posed by consumer standing."
A California statute has bypassed the issue en-
tirely by allowing "any person acting for the
interests of itself, its members or the general
public" to enjoin fraudulent and deceptive
practices.33 If consumers are to have access to
the UDTPA, the ultimate solution will have to
29 Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1970).
30 442 F.2d at 692.
38 The court's interpretation that merchants, but
not consumers, are "engaged in such commerce" is
subject to question on a literal reading of the stat-
ute. Consumers are certainly as integral a part of
the commercial flow of goods and services as are
merchants. Nonetheless, the court's reading of
Congress' purpose is probably correct. See Stand-
ard Brands, Inc., v. Smidler, 151 F2d 34, 37-43
(2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring).
32 Dole, supra note 19, at 500.
33 CAL. CiV. CODE § 3369(5) (West 1970).
be explicit legislative approval as under the
California statute.34
Even if an effective injunctive tool could be
devised for consumer use, the injunction is not
itself an adequate consumer remedy. First, it
provides no compensatory damages. This factor
would probably dissuade most consumers from
seeking an injunction because they are more
concerned with recouping their losses than
with protecting future victims of fraudulent
practices. The second goal, deterrence, would
also not be met because the merchant would
know that he is free to reap high profits until
some consumer should happen to bring suit
against him. Since a defendant is entitled to
specificity in the injunctive decree to give him
fair notice of what conduct is proscribed, 35 he
may be able to easily devise another unlawful
profiteering scheme which falls outside the
narrow equitable decree. To be an effective
remedy, the injunction must be joined with an-
other remedy which will both compensate the
consumer and deter the merchant.
The class action suit, once thought to be the
ultimate consumer weapon, has been rendered
almost useless by recent Supreme Court deci-
sions. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which outlines the requirements for
initiating a class action in the federal courts,
seems to allow large numbers of plaintiffs who
have sustained minor damages to aggregate
their claims so as to make a lawsuit worth-
while. From the consumer's standpoint, the
remedy would be ideal. One injured consumer
representative could sue on behalf of all others
similarly wronged. The aggregation of claims
would make it worthwhile to hire an attorney
and undertake litigation. The class action
would adequately compensate all aggrieved
consumers in the class as well as deter the
-3 It has also been suggested that deceptive
practices could be classified as public nuisances
and private citizens allowed to enjoin the public
nuisance. Comment, Commercial Nuisance: A
Theory of Consmner Protection, 33 U. CHL. L.
REv. 590 (1966). The major difficulty with this
theory is that public nuisances, as distinguished
from private nuisances, could traditionally be en-
joined only by public officials on behalf of the
public unless the private citizen seeking to sue
could show a threat of special damage. See Rice,
supra note 11, at 578.
35 Developments in the Law--Injunctions, 78
HARV. L. REv. 994, 1064-67 (1965).
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merchant from future illegal activity by elimi-
nating his profit.
The first blow to the consumer class action
came in 1968 when the Supreme Court ruled
in Snyder v. Harris36 that class members could
not aggregate their claims to meet the $10,000
jurisdictional requirement for diversity suits in
federal courts. Since no single member of the
class in Snyder alleged damages in excess of
the jurisdictional amount,37 it was hoped that
if at least one member of the class had in-
curred injury in an amount greater than
$10,000, other members with less damages
could "piggy-back" their way into court. While
few ordinary consumers would ever sustain
such large losses,38 local governments are often
sizeable consumers of goods and services and
could often meet the jurisdictional amount.39
However, the possibility of "piggy-back" or
"ancillary" jurisdiction was ruled out by the
Supreme Court in Zahn v. International Paper
Co.40 The representative in Zahn claimed dam-
ages in excess of $10,000 while other members
of the class alleged damages of less than
$10,000.-' The Court ruled that each member
of the class must meet the $10,000 amount.
42
Since few consumers incur even $200 in dam-
ages,4 3 $10,000 in damages would be extraordi-
nary.
Diversity jurisdiction, to which Snyder and
Zahn dealt devastating blows, is not the only
avenue to federal court jurisdiction over class
36 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
37 Id. at 333. See also Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 298-99 (1973).
38 The average loss in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin was $3.90. Schuck & Cohen, The Consumer
Class Action: An Endangered Species, 12 SAN
Dmo L. REv. 39, 63 (1974).
39 See, e.g., Consumer Federation of America v.
Wyeth Laboratories, Civil No. 306-702 (D.D.C.,
Oct. 19, 1972).
40 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
41 Id. at 292.
42 The Supreme Court came out differently on
an analogous issue in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur
v. Cauble 255 U.S. 356 (1921). The Court there
held that if the named members of a class satisfy
diversity requirements, the claims of unnamed
plaintiffs of non-diverse citizenship can also be ad-
judicated. The dissent in Zahn felt that this ap-
proach to "ancillary jurisdiction" for diversity re-
quirements should be followed for the monetary
amount issue to allow parties with less than
$10,000 to have their claims adjudicated also. Id.
at 309 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
actions. Many class actions can be brought
under federal question jurisdiction and often
do not need to meet the $10,000 jurisdictional
amount." For instance, claims based on such
specific statutes as the Truth-in-Lending Act,45
the Fair Credit Reporting Act,46 and the
antitrust 47 and securities4s laws do not require
a minimum amount. Although federal con-
sumer statutes do not provide nearly as com-
prehensive coverage as do some state stat-
utes,4 9 it seemed possible that a significant
number of consumer class actions based on
federal question jurisdiction could yet be
brought in federal court after Snyder and
Zahn. The 1974 Supreme Court decision in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin50  effectively
eliminated even this possibility.
The plaintiff in Eisen based his suit on sec-
tions one and two of the Sherman Act,51 al-
leging that the defendants, two brokerage
firms, monopolized odd-lot trading on the New
York Stock Exchange and charged unreasona-
ble fees as part of the monopoly. Because the
suit was based on the Sherman Act, the plain-
tiffs did not have to meet a jurisdictional
amount. However, the Court strictly inter-
preted rule 23 and held that individual notice
must be sent to all members of the class who
could be identified through reasonable efforts.
Furthermore, no part of the notification cost
could be borne by the defendant, as the lower
4428 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) reads: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action ... arising under any Act of Congress reg-
ulating commerce. .. ." Id. This section has been
interpreted to confer jurisdiction on federal courts
without regard to an amount in controversy in
cases involving regulation of commerce. Spring-
field Television, Inc., v. City of Springfield, Mis-
souri, 428 F2d 1375 (8th Cir. 1970); Caulfield v.
United States Department of Agriculture, 293 F.2d
217 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 858
(1962). This section was explicitly recognized as
the jurisdictional base of a Truth-in-Lending case
involving damages of less than $10,000. Sosa v.
Fite, 465 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1972), revd and
reinuned on rehearing, 498 F.2d 114, 117 n.2 (1974).
45 Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1601-65 (1970).4 6 Id. at §§ 1681-8(t).
47 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-40 (1970).
48 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-78(lll) (1970).4 9 See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1212, §§
157.13-157.41, 261-317, 381-92, 401-17, 501-33
(Supp. 1974).
50 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
51 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
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court had suggested, even though he could
have more easily borne the cost.
52
Since the cost of notice in Eisen was esti-
mated to be a minimum of $225,000,- 3 the
plaintiff would be understandably reluctant, or
perhaps even unable, to bear this expense. The
rationale behind the requirement of notification
is to allow a class member to either opt out of
the class to sue on his own or to intervene in
the class suit itself. Yet, since plaintiffs with
small claims would not seriously entertain ei-
ther choice, individual notice should not be a
prerequisite to a class suit on their behalf.
Perhaps the only viable alternative to the
Snyder, Zahn, and Eisen decisions is further
federal legislation specifically changing the
class action requirements. This was evidently
the approach in the newly-enacted Federal
Consumer Product Warranties Act.5 4 Section
110(d) of the Act allows a class suit where no
individual claim is less than $25, the aggregate
amount -is greater than $50,000, and there are
more than 100 members in the class.55 The
House Report,56 whose version of the class ac-
tion provision was ultimately adopted in the
Senate Conference Report, 57 emphasized that a
practical approach should be taken to section
110(d) :
[Y]our Committee would emphasize that this
section is remedial in nature and is designed
to facilitate relief which would otherwise not
be available as a practical matter for individ-
ual consumers . . . [Y]our Committee does
not believe that the requirement of individual
notice to each potential class member should
be invoked to preclude a class action where
the identification and notification of the class
members is not possible after reasonable effort
by the plaintiff. In considering whether identi-
fication and notification of all members of the
class is possible with reasonable effort, the
particular circumstances of the plaintiff or
plaintiffs should be carefully evaluated by the
52 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253,
271-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
53 Schuck & Cohen, supra note 38, at 58.
54 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, ch. 15, tit. II, §
205, 88 Stat. 2188 (1975).
551d. § 110(d).
56 H. R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1974).
57 S. REP. No. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
court, including the question of whether the
financial burden of such identification and
notification would be likely to deny them
relief.58
Section 110(d) may be an indication that a
more generalized class action section liberaliz-
ing the notice requirements of rule 23 is a
possibility for the future.
Most state class action provisions are not
amenable to consumer suits either. New York's
class action statute, typical of many states, al-
lows a class suit when the "question is one of
a common or general interest of many persons
or where the persons who might be made par-
ties are very numerous and it may be imprac-
ticable to bring them all before the court. ... " 5
Two interrelated problems have developed
with respect to this and similar statutes. The
disjunctive "or" would, if taken literally, war-
rant class treatment when either numerous
parties or a common interest among individu-
als exists. Yet, the courts have often disre-
garded the distinction between the two clauses
with the result that "or" often is read "and." 60
The requirement that each class suit be one of
a "common or general interest" is further ex-
acerbated by the strict interpretation often
given that phrase. The New York courts have
construed it to mean that "separate wrongs
to separate persons, though committed by simi-
lar means and even pursuant to a single plan...
do not alone create a common or general
interest. "61 The stringent limitations
placed on state class action statutes of the New
York type are matched by judicial restrictions
imposed on common law class actions. The re-
quirement of a common interest is echoed and
amplified by Illinois, a jurisdiction with only
common law class actions. Illinois courts re-
quire that both a "community of interest" in
the subject matter and in the remedy must
exist before class treatment will be
5s Id.
-5 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 1005(a) (McKinney 1963)
(emphasis added).
60 See Homburger, State Class Actions and the
Federal Rule, 71 CoLum. L. Rxv. 609, 614 (1971).
See also Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-
Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U.L.
REv. 407 (1969).
61 Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 129,
256 N.Y.S.2d 584, 590, 204 N.E.2d 627, 631
(1965).
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authorized.6 2 Furthermore, the factors to be
considered in applying this test are:
(1) whether the claims of all members of the
class share a common question of law and
fact;
(2) whether each member's cause of action
arises from the same transaction;
(3) whether one party can adequately repre-
sent the rights and interests of all other
members;
(4) whether the number of possible class
members renders separate litigation
impossible or impracticable; and
(5) whether there exists a purely equitable
cause of action.63
These criteria demonstrate the hapless condi-
tion of the average consumer class action in Il-
linois. The New York and Illinois examples
are illustrative of similar constraints on class
actions in other states.64
Il. PUBLIc REmEDIES
With the decline of the class action, atten-
tion has shifted to the public sector in the
search for an adequate consumer remedy. One
old but seldom used remedy for unlawful com-
mercial activity is the criminal sanction. Print-
ers' Ink statutes, which criminalized untrue,
deceptive, and misleading advertising,
65 com-
bined with the crime of false pretenses to pro-
vide protection for the early consumer. These
statutes have been augmented by current statu-
62 DePhillips v. Mortgage Associates, Inc., 8 Ill.
App.3d 759, 291 N.E.2d 329 (1972); Moseid v.
McDonough, 103 Ill. App. 2d 23, 243 N.E.2d 394
(1968).
63 Id.
64 But see Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d
800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971). One
important liberalization in the California rules is
the authorization of publication notice if "personal
notification is unreasonably expensive .. " CAL.
Clv. CODE § 1781(d) (West 1973).
6 "Any person . . . who, with intent to sell ..
merchandise ... or anything offered by such per-
son . . .. directly or indirectly ...makes, pub-
lishes ... or places before the public ... in a
newspaper ... or other publication ... an adver-
tisement.., of any sort regarding merchandise...
or anything so offered ... to the public, which
advertisement contains an assertion . . . which is
untrue, deceptive, or misleading, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor." F. THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF
THE PRESS § 87, at 606 (3d ed. 1956). Some form
of this statute has been adopted in 43 states. Note,
The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLUm. L. REv.
1018, 1058 (1956).
tory enactments which often include provisions
penalizing especially egregious conduct. The
federal Truth-in-Lending Act punishes "willful
and knowing" violations with a fine of up to
$5000 and/or up to a year in jail.68 An em-
ployer who willfully violates Title II of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act regulating
employee garnishment is subject to a year in
jail and/or a $1000 fine.67 Similar provisions
appear in most other consumer protection stat-
utes.
Despite the availability of criminal penalties,
these sanctions are seldom invoked. Of the
nine cases in 1971 which were referred for
prosecution under the Truth-in-Lending Act,
five were dropped 'before the trial stage.68 The
Sherman Antitrust Act has likewise resulted in
few criminal convictions-from 1909 to 1965
only 394 defendants were incarcerated, serving
sentences ranging from four hours to one
year.69
One reason for the lack of enforcement of
criminal sanctions in the commercial sphere is
the judicial policy of strict construction of
criminal statutes. For example, theft by false
pretenses usually requires that there be a false
"assertion of an existing fact, not a promise to
perform some act in the future." 70 Thus, a
merchant who cheats a consumer out of his
money by promising something for the future,
never intending to fulfill the promise, is not
guilty of false pretenses. This distinction is
nicely illustrated in Commonwealth v.
Becker.71 The defendant had been convicted on
three counts of obtaining money under false
pretenses. On appeal, two counts were reversed
because the defendant had merely promised
that he would install a new roof but had not
yet begun work. The third count was affirmed
because the defendant represented that the
roof, upon which he had initiated work, was
66 Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1611 (1970).
67 Id. at § 1674(b) (1970).
6 8 NTATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONSUMER JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN CONsUmER LEGISLATION
379, 384 (1973).
69 Wright, Jail Sentences in Antitrust Cases, 37
F.R.D. 183 (1965).
70 Commonwealth v. Moore, 99 Pa. 570, 574
(1882). For a comprehensive discussion of the
false pretenses problem see Pearce, Theft by
False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 967 (1953).
71151 Pa. Super. 169, 30 A.2d 195 (1943).
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complete. Thus, the latter was an "assertion of an
existing fact (that the roof was presently com-
plete), not a promise to perform some act in
the future (promise to install a roof)." 72 The
rationale behind a strict construction of the
crime of false pretenses derives from the dan-
ger inherent in trying to distinguish between a
promise made without ever intending to per-
form and an innocent breach of contract.
73
Since intent is essentially the only distinction
between innocent and criminal conduct, the
possibility exists that
a debtor might be subjected to criminal penal-
ties if the prosecutor and jury were of the
view that at the time of borrowing he was
mentally a cheat. The risk of prosecuting one
who is guilty of nothing more than a failure
or inability to pay his debts is a very real
consideration. . . . [T]he way would be open
for every victim of a bad bargain to resort to
criminal proceedings to even the score with a
judgment proof adversary.7
4
California Chief Justice Traynor recognized
this problem in People v. Ashley75 but con-
cluded that the defendant was adequately safe-
guarded by two elements: (1) that the requi-
site intent could not be proven by mere
non-performance of the promise and (2) that
this intent must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.7 6 Justice Traynor felt that no greater
difficulty would be encountered in proving in-
tent in a false promise than in a misrepresen-
tation of an existing fact and therefore
ruled that the jury should be allowed to weigh
the evidence in the former case as well as the
latter.
7 7
A further safeguard for the innocent defend-
ant based on the intent requirement is that an
unlawful intent is normally required for com-
mercial crimes rather than a mere intent to do
the act. The resistance to imposing strict liabil-
ity on the defendant is evidenced by legislative
and judicial treatment of the Printers' Ink
statute. This statute was designed "to make the
72 Id. at 197, quoting Commonwealth v. Mauk,
79 Pa. Super. 153, 157 (1922).
73 See Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697,
698-99 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
74 Id. at 699.
75 42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271, cert. denied, 348
U.S. 900 (1954).7
6 Id. at 263-64, 267 P.2d at 284.
7 Id. at 263, 267 P.2d at 284.
advertiser absolutely liable for what he says,
without requiring the often difficult proof of...
intent to deceive, or actual knowledge of the
improper character of the advertisement by the
defendant." 78 Despite this intended purpose,
eleven state legislatures superimposed the re-
quirement that the advertiser know, or be rea-
sonably charged with knowledge of, the falsity
of his statements.75 The absolute liability ini-
tially desired has been even further eroded by
four states which require an "intent to de-
ceive." 80 Thus, a defendant may know that his
statements are false but nonetheless lack an "in-
tent to deceive." Since this type of intent
usually goes hand in hand with knowledge of
falsity, the distinction may not be of great
practical significance. The "intent to deceive"
element, if not explicit in the statute, is occa-
sionally read in by the judiciary.81
The reluctance to impose strict liability on
unintentional wrongdoers stems from the tra-
ditional notion that defendants who are not
morally blameworthy should not be subject to
the possibility of criminal sentences.8 2 On the
other hand, it has been argued that
the real question in protecting consumers is
not whether a person who carried on such a
scheme intended to defraud and therefore is a
criminal. The pertinent question is: should the
law allow a vast number of the public to be
seduced into misery-have their money stolen
and their lives demeaned-by the actions of
any soul-guided or misguided, bad-intentioned
or good-intentioned? 83
This approach is taken by the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act 4 which imposes crim-
inal liability without regard to personal knowl-
edge or intent. The provisions of the Act are
presumably more onerous because the injury
78 Note, supra note 65, at 1059.
79 Id. at 1060.
soId. at 1061.
81 People v. Austin, 301 Mich. 456, 3 N.W.2d
841 (1942).
82 See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
CoLuM. L. REv. 55 (1933).8
3 MAGNUSON, supra note 1, at 17.
84 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1970). See also United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (af-
firmed conviction of president of company which
shipped adulterated goods even though he had no
personal knowledge and the defect was not appar-
ent).
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inflicted by violation is to a consumer's health
rather than "merely" to his pocketbook.
In addition to the limitations imposed by the
scienter requirement, a variety of sociological
and practical problems combine to make the
criminal sanction even less effective. Both the
general public and law enforcement officials
embrace the attitude that merchants should not
be treated like "common criminals."8' 5 Thus,
prosecutors are reluctant to indict perpetrators
of commercial crimes. The official may justify
his policy of tolerance by reference to the
higher priority of prosecuting more egregious
crimes.86 Even if a case is brought to trial,
judges and juries are apt to treat the white
collar criminal leniently. Faced with these real-
ities, a prosecutor will tend to balance the pos-
sible penalty against the cost of prosecution.
8 7
The maximum penalty for a consumer crime is
often a short sentence or a relatively small
fine.88 Yet, the cost of prosecution may be sub-
stantially higher than any possible fine. Unless
enjoined, after the defendant pays his fine or
serves a short sentence, he will be free to con-
tinue his unlawful, but profitable, business ac-
tivities.
The greatest inadequacy of the criminal
sanction is its failure to provide compensation
for the aggrieved consumer. The victim does
not care, except perhaps for personal satisfac-
tion, whether his defrauder is penalized. He
simply wants his money returned. One means
of achieving this end is to coerce the defendant
into compensating his victim by making resti-
tution a condition of the defendant's proba-
85 See Note, supra note 16, at 426-27.
86 See Note, supra note 65, at 1064.
87 Two benefits from merely charging the de-
fendant, even if no conviction is attained, are that
the defendant's methods are exposed to the public
and he will face the embarrassment of answering
to a criminal prosecution. Even these considera-
tions will not deter some defendants.
88 Increased penalties for antitrust violations
were signed into law on December 21, 1974. Ch.
15, 88 Stat. 1708 (1974). Violations now are felo-
nies rather than misdemeanors; the one year jail
sentence was increased to three years; and the
maximum fine of $50,000 was increased to $1 mil-
lion for a corporation and $100,000 for individuals.
In light of the attitudes toward white-collar crime
discussed in the text, it is questionable whether the
increased criminal sanctions will actually result in
greater deterrence to the potential antitrust viola-
tor.
tion.8 9  One unresolved issue concerning
this remedy is whether the defendant is re-
quired to make restitution only to the victims
whose complaints initiated the prosecution or
also to all other parties he may have
defrauded. 90 The court in People v. Miller9 '
held that a defendant convicted of defrauding
one particular family was nonetheless required
to make restitution to all the families he de-
frauded. A contrary result was reached in Peo-
ple v. Becker9 2 where the court ruled that res-
titution could be imposed "only for the loss
caused by the very offense for which defendant
was tried and convicted." 93 The result in
Miller -is, of course, more desirable from the
consumer's standpoint.
To overcome difficulties inherent in the
criminal field, many states have enacted legis-
lation authorizing public authorities to seek in-
junctions against unlawful business practices.
In 1970, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform Laws published a final
version of the Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Law.94 The UTPCPL
89 An example of a statute providing for such
restitution is 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1970) :
While on probation . . . the defendant . . .
may be required to make restitution or repa-
ration to aggrieved parties for actual damages
or loss caused by the offense for which con-
victions was had....
90 See generally Laster, Criminal Restitution: A
Survey of its Past History and an Analysis of its
Present Usefulness, 5 U. RIcHMOND L. REv. 71
(1970).
91256 Cal. App. 2d 348, 64 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1967).
92 349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W2d 833 (1957).93 Id. at 486, 84 N.W.2d at 838.
94UNFAIR TmADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMIER
PRoTEcrToN LAw. Three alternative forms of un-
lawful acts are offered to the states by the
UTPCPL. Form No. 1, often characterized the
"Little FTC Act," adopts the language of the
Federal Trade Commission Act in prohibiting "un-
fair methods of competition and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices . . . ." By 1972, Hawaii,
Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina, South Car-
olina, Vermont and Washington had adopted this
approach. Form No. 2 is designed for states which
already adequately regulate unfair competition and
makes only "false, misleading or deceptive acts"
unlawful. By 1972, Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey,
and North Dakota had adopted Form No. 2. Form
No. 3 is borrowed almost verbatim from the
UDTPA in prohibiting thirteen specific types of
deceptive practices. Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island and Texas have adopted
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authorizes the attorney general to bring an ac-
tion for a temporary or permanent injunction
against a merchant when the attorney general
believes that the merchant "is using, has used,
or is about to use" a practice declared
unlawful. 95 Unlike most criminal statutes, proof
of intent is not required for an injunction
under the UTPCPL.96 Since an injunction
does not carry the opprobrium of a criminal
conviction, attorneys general and judges might
feel less reluctant to use this remedy against
businessmen. No cases have been found which
construe the statute's restrictions on use of the
injunctive remedy. The dearth of cases is due
in part to the recent promulgation of the
UTPCPL but probably also in part to under-
utilization of the statute by attorneys general.
As mentioned before, the problem with an
injunction is that it operates only prospec-
tively. No compensation is made to consumers
already injured-only future consumers are
protected.9 7 Since the merchant usually keeps
profits already earned and is -simply told to
discontinue the illegal practice, there is an in-
centive to initiate profitable and illegal activi-
ties and continue them as long as possible.
Although there have been many failures in
both the civil and criminal fields, two legisla-
tive enactments, one federal and one state, have
the potential to provide both compensation and
deterrence in the area of consumer protection.
Both remedies rely on public authorities for
enforcement so that an individual need not
bear the cost of litigation nor even be com-
Form No. 3. The UTPCPL does not share the
standing problem inherent in the UDTPA. Section
8 of the UTPCPL stipulates that "any person
who ... suffers any ascertainable loss ... as a
result of the use . . . of a method ... declared un-
lawful . . . may bring an action. . . ." Another
variation from the UDTPA is the addition of the
thirteenth deceptive practice, a catchall "any other
act or practice which is unfair or deceptive to the
consumer." For a thorough discussion of the
UTPCPL see Lovett, State Deceptive Trade
Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REv. 724 (1972).
95 UTPCPL § 5.
96 But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1620
(1964) (proof of intent required).
97 A few states allow restitution to be joined
with an injunction. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-8
(1964) ("The court may make such orders . . .as
may be necessary . . .to restore to any person in
interest any moneys . . . which may have been ac-
quired by means of any practice herein declared to
be unlawful.").
pletely versed as to what his legal rights are.
Both remedies also provide for full compensa-
tion to aggrieved consumers. These remedies
may inaugurate a new era for the victimized
consumer public.
IV. THE FTC AND STATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL:
PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF PRIVATE RIGHTS
The Federal Trade Commission Act gives
the Federal Trade Commission broad authority
to regulate "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices." 98 This sweeping language enables the
FTC to regulate a wide variety of different
types of deceptive practices. Enhancing its
broad scope, violations of the FTCA are some-
what easier to prove because intent to deceive
is not required-a mere likelihood of deception
is sufficient to invoke the FTC's authority.9
Nor does the FTC, in determining whether a
violation has occurred, use the standard of
whether a "reasonable man" is 'likely to be
deceived.' 00 Statements are prohibited if "the
representations . . . are likely to mislead an ap-
preciable . . . segment of the public." 101 That
the segment deceived need not be too large nor
intelligent is exemplified by Charles of the Ritz
Distributors Corp. v. FTC102 where the court
held that at least some people would believe
that a make-up cream named "Rejuvenescense"
would restore their skin to its youthful state.
Thus, representations made to induce this be-
lief were in violation of the Act.
Despite the comprehensive language of the
FTCA's substantive provisions, the FTC has
traditionally been severely restrained by proce-
dural limitations contained in the FTCA. Until
very recently, 03 the FTC's only means of en-
98 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1970). The Commis-
sion's jurisdiction extends to all "persons, partner-
ships, or corporations" except banks and certain
common carriers. Id. § 45(a) (6).
99 D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679 (7th Cir.
1942).
109 Charles of the Ritz Distribs. Corp. v. FTC,
143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
101 Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 892 n.19 (9th
Cir. 1960).
102 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
103 Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Fed-
eral Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975,
the FTC is empowered to seek civil fines. See
note 115 and accompanying text infra. Congress
authorized the FTC in 1973 to seek preliminary
injunctions and temporary restraining orders. 15
U.S.C. § 53(b) (1970) (Supp. III, 1973).
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forcement was the cease and desist order,
which could not be enforced until "final-
ized."o10 4 An order becomes "final" upon expi-
ration of the time period allowed for appeal
from the FTC decision or after the defendant
has exhausted his avenues of appeal.10 5 Since it
normally takes a year to issue a complaint,108
and three to five years to finalize a cease and
desist order,107 the FTC's efforts to halt un-
lawful practices have clearly been hampered.
An extreme example of the FTC's impotency is
illustrated by its efforts to halt the misdeeds of
the Holland Furnace Company.'08 The com-
pany initiated its fraudulent method of opera-
tion in the early 1930'so9 and agreed to an
FTC consent order in 1936.110 Although the
company continued its fraudulent practices,
the FTC did not issue a second complaint until
1954"' nor a cease and desist order until 1958
-which the company ignored."z2 Seven years
later the company was fined $100,000 for re-
fusing to obey a court order enforcing the
cease and desist order."13 Yet, in the twenty-
nine years the FTC was struggling to stop the
company's operation, the company had earned
as much as $30 million a year by deceiving
homeowners.11
4
On January 4, 1975, Congress enacted
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act.115 This Act
104 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (1970).
105 Id. § 45 (g).
'
0 6 See Suncoum. ON FR UDs AND MISrePRESEN-
TATION AFFECTiNG THE ELDzRLY, 89TH CONG., 1ST
SESS, REPORT ON FRAUDS AND DECEPTIONS AFFECT-
ING THE ELDERLY 81 (Comm. Print 1965).
107 Weston, Deceptive Practices and the Federal
Trade Commission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24
FED. B.J. 548, 561 (1964).
10 8 The company's modus operandi was for its
agents to misrepresent themselves as "furnace en-
gineers" and "safety engineers" in order to gain
access to a home furnace. The salesmen would
then dismantle a furnace, condemn it as hazardous,
and refuse to reassemble it because of the alleged
danger. Of course, the salesmen's primary motive
was to sell their own furnaces to the homeowner.
MAGNUSON, supra note 1, at 22-23.
109 Court Catches Up With Holland Furnace
Co., 48 CoxsummR BuLL., April 1965, at 25.
110 24 F.T.C. 1413-14 (1936).
"' In re Holland Furnace Co., 55 F.T.C. 55
(1958) aff'd, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1961).
112 55 F.T.C. at 90.
11 In re Holland Furnace Co., 341 F.2d 548
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965).
114 MAGNUSON, supra note 1, at 23.
15 Ch. 15, tit. 11, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).
contains important provisions which may en-
able the FTC to thwart frauds similar to the
one perpetrated by the Holland Furnace Com-
pany. The Act considerably enhances the
FTC's enforcement powers by authorizing the
agency to bring an action in federal district
court to impose civil penalties of up to $10,000
per violation. 10 Such actions can be brought
in two situations. First, the defendant is sub-
ject to this penalty if he engages in a practice
110 A portion of the section which relates to
civil penalties is set oul below. Special notice
should be taken of the language which stipulates
that each day the practice continues is considered
a separate violation.
(A) The Commission may commence a civil
action to recover a civil penalty in a dis-
trict court of the United States against
any person, partnership, or corporation
which violates. any rule under this Act
respecting unfair or deceptive acts or
practices (other than an interpretive rule,.
or a rule violation of which the .Commis-
sion has provided is not an unfair or de-
ceptive act or practice in violation of
subsection (a) (1)) with actual knowl-
edge or knowledge fairly implied on the
basis of objective circumstances that such
act is unfair or deceptive and is prohib-
ited by such rule. In such action, such
person, partnership, or corporation shall
be liable for a civil penalty of not more
than $10,000 for each violation.,
(B) If the Commission determines in a pro-
ceeding under subsection (b) that any
act or practice is unfair or deceptive, and
issues a final cease and desist order with
respect to such act or practice, then the
Commission may commence a civil action
to obtain a civil penalty in a district
court of the United States against any
person, partnership, or corporation which
engages in such act or practice-
(1) after such cease and desist order
becomes final (whether or not
such person, partnership, or corpo-
ration was subject to such cease
and desist order), and
(2) with actual knowledge that such
act or practice is unfair or decep-
tive and is unlawful under subsec-
tion (a) (1) of this section.
In such action, such person, partnership,
or corporation shall be liable for a civil
penalty of not more than $10,000 for
each violation.
(C) In the case of a violation through con-
tinuing failure to comply with a rule or
with section 5(a) (1), each day of con-
tinuance of such failure shall be treated
as a separate violation, for purposes of
subparagraphs (A) and (B). In deter-
mining the amount of such a civil pen-
alty, the court shall take into account the
degree of culpability, any history of prior
such conduct, ability to pay, effect on.
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which is prohibited by an FTC ruling,117
where he has "actual knowledge or knowledge
fairly implied on the basis of objective circum-
stances that such act is unfair or deceptive and
is prohibited by such rule."s 18 The major dif-
ficulty here is that the defendant must "know"
that his conduct is both improper and prohib-
ited by an FTC ruling. On this point, the Con-
ference Committee said:
In determining whether knowledge of a Com-
mission rule may be fairly implied, it is
intended that the courts hold a defendant
responsible where a reasonable and prudent
man under the circumstances would have
1known of the existence of the rule and that
the act or practice was in violation of its
provisions.1 1 9
The second situation which subjects a defend-
ant to liability is engaging in a practice which
-the FTC has determined in a cease and desist
proceeding to be unfair or deceptive. 120 The
ability to continue to do business, and
such other matters as justice may re-
quire.
Ch. 15, tit. II, § 205, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).
117 Before enactment of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act, the FTC's power to promulgate sub-
stantive rules of business conduct was under a
cloud. These rules, termed "Trade Regulation
Rules" by the FTC, greatly clarified the broad
standard of "unfair methods of competition" and
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices." Under its
old enforcement procedure, the FTC would issue a
cease and desist order against acts which violated
any rule. Now, however, the FTC can use the rul-
ings to impose civil penalties. See note 116 supra
and accompanying text. Notwithstanding the FTC's
long history of rule-making, there have been nu-
merous assertions that the agency did not possess
substantive rule-making authority. In 1972 the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia held, in the
"Octane Rating" case, that the FTC lacked au-
thority to promulgate these rules. National Petro-
leum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343
(D.D.C. 1972). Congressional hearings on the
issue were initiated. H.R. RE,., No. 1107, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1974). Although the district
court decision was later reversed (National Petro-
leum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C.
Cir. 1973)), Congress went ahead and explicitly
authorized rule-making in the new Magnuson-
Moss Act, ch. 15, tit. II, § 202, 88 Stat. 2183
(1975). Congress also outlined rule-making proce-
dures and the scope of judicial review. Id.
11s Id. § 205 (emphasis added).
119 S. REP. No. 1408, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40
(1974).
120 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
,Commission Improvement Act, ch. 15, tit. II, §
205, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975).
defendant himself need not have been the sub-
ject of the particular cease and desist order;
nonetheless, he must have "actual knowledge
that such act or practice is unfair or decep-
tive" and, as such, is unlawful under the
FTCA.' 21
Under both provisions, the defendant must
know that his behavior is violative of the
FTCA although he must have actual knowl-
edge in the latter while "knowledge fairly im-
plied" will suffice for the former. Balanced
against the less stringent intent element in the
former is the necessity of proving that the de-
fendant "knows" of the ruling prohibiting such
practices. In the latter section, with its "actual
knowledge" requirement, the defendant need
not be aware of the cease and desist order it-
self which prohibits such acts but merely that
the acts are unfair or deceptive and unlawful.
On balance, then, the task of making out a vi-
olation may be equally formidable in both
cases. Yet, the sanction of up to $10,000 per
violation per day 22 should provide a powerful
deterrent.
Another section of the new Act is of greater
interest to consumers. Under it, the FTC is
authorized to seek "such relief as the court
finds necessary to redress injuries to consum-
ers or other persons [including] rescission or
reformation of contracts, the refund of money
or return of property, the payment of damages,
and public notification .... ,, 123 Violation of an
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 The applicable language of the statute is set
out below:
(a) (1) If any person, partnership, or corpo-
ration violates any rule under this Act re-
specting unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices (other than an interpretive rule, or a
rule violation of which the Commission
has provided is not an unfair or deceptive
act or practice in violation of section
5(a)), then the Commission may com-
mence a civil action against such person,
partnership, or corporation for relief
under subsection (b) in a United States
district court or in any court of competent
jurisdiction of a State.
(2) If any person, partnership, or cor-
poration engages in any unfair or decep-
tive act or practice (within the meaning
of section 5(a) (1)) with respect to which
the Commission has issued a final cease
and desist order which is applicable to
such person, partnership, or corporation,
then the Commission may commence a
civil action against such person, partner-
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FTC ruling is the first circumstance under
which this section can be invoked. Unlike the
section imposing civil penalties, this provision
does not require that the defendant know that
he is violating a ruling or even that he is en-
gaging in unfair or deceptive acts, i.e., strict
liability is imposed for a rule violation. The
second means of invoking the broad remedies
quoted above is slightly unclear from the stat-
ute:
If any person . . . engages in any unfair or
deceptive act or practice . . . with respect to
which the Commission has issued a final cease
and desist order which is applicable to such
person . . . then the Commission may com-
mence a civil action against such person ...
If the Commission satisfies the court that the
act or practice to which the cease and desist
order relates is one which a reasonable man
would have known under the circumstances
was dishonest or fraudulent, the court may
grant relief [as described]. 124
A reasonable interpretation of the first sen-
tence of this section would be that only viola-
tions of a cease and desist order levied against
the defendant will trigger the remedies section.
In other words, so long as the defendant obeys
the order, the FTC cannot bring an action on
behalf of consumers against him. Yet, this in-
terpretation is inconsistent with the second
ship, or corporation in a United States
district court or in any court of competent
jurisdiction of a State. If the Commission
satisfies the court that the act or practice
to which the cease and desist order relates
is one which a reasonable man would
have known under the circumstances was
dishonest or fraudulent, the court may
grant relief under subsection (b).
(b) The court in an action under subsection
(a) shall have jurisdiction to grant such
relief as the court finds necessary to re-
dress injury to consumers or other per-
sons, partnerships, and corporations re-
sulting from the rule violation or the
unfair or deceptive act or practice, as the
case may be. Such relief may include, but
shall not be limited to, rescission or refor-
mation of contracts, the refund of money
or return of property, the payment of
damages, and public notification respecting
the rule violation or the unfair or decep-
tive act or practice, as the case may be;
except that nothing in this subsection is
intended to authorize the imposition of
any exemplary or punitive damages.
Id. § 206.
124 Id.
sentence which relates to the knowledge of the
defendant at the time he committed the acts.
Once a cease and desist order has issued
against a defendant, surely he will know that
such acts are "dishonest or fraudulent" so that
there should be no need to convince the court
of the defendant's state of mind. The second
sentence makes greater sense if the first is
read to permit the FTC to sue on behalf of
consumers for the acts which prompted the
cease and desist order. Thus, the FTC can
seek compensation for consumers for the un-
lawful acts which preceded the cease and desist
order if a reasonable person would have
known the acts were dishonest or fraudulent.
Evidence that this latter interpretation was ac-
tually Congress' intent is found in the Confer-
ence Report:
If any person . . . engages in an unfair or
deceptive act or practice resulting in the issu-
ance of a cease and desist order by the Com-
mission against such respondent, the Commis-
sion may commence an action for redress of
the injuries caused by such respondent's acts
or practice.1
25
Furthermore, the statutory standard of "known
under the circumstances [to be] dishonest or
fraudulent" appears to be a liberalization of the
standard seen in the prior section that the de-
fendant know his acts to be unlawful under the
FTCA. In sum, it should be substantially eas-
ier to invoke the consumer remedy section
with its liberalized intent requirements than
the stricter civil penalties section.
The FTC's new power to seek civil fines as
well as remedies on behalf of consumers signif-
icantly enhances its ability to be a potent con-
sumer protection agency. Under the new law,
consumers have an opportunity to fully recoup
losses sustained at the hands of dishonest mer-
chants. If strictly enforced by the FTC and
liberally construed by the judiciary, the possi-
bility of compensation coupled with large civil
fines should also deter such business practices
from pccurring in the first place.
Another effective consumer remedy which
has been around much longer than the Magnu-
son-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commis-
sion Improvement Act is the power granted by




many state statutes to state attorneys general
to sue on behalf of consumers. 26 One common
statutory provision, found in the Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Law, has
been available for a number of years but is
rarely used. Kugler v. Romain127 represents
one of the few instances where an attorney
general has taken advantage of this broad
power, and the results were laudable.
The defendant in Kugler was engaged in the
business of door-to-door selling of "educational
books" to low-income consumers. The books
and certain "bonuses" listed at wholesale for
$35 and $40 but were sold at $249.50 cash pay-
ment and $279.95 installment credit payment.
The maximum retail price of the books in the
regular market was about $110. To sell the
product at these exorbitant prices the defend-
ant's solicitors followed a practice of misrepre-
sentation and deception. The New Jersey At-
torney General instituted an action against the
defendant individually and as the Educational
Services Company. In addition to other relief,
the Attorney General sought compensation for
all persons who were induced to enter con-
tracts with the defendant. The Attorney Gen-
eral took his authorization from a statute
which is almost identical to the comparable
provision in the uniform Unfair Trade Prac-
tices and Consumer Protection Law."2 The
New Jersey act reads as follows:
Whenever it shall appear to the Attorney
General that a person has engaged in, is
engaging in or is about to engage in any prac-
tice declared to be unlawful by this act
126 States have often attempted to use their
common law power as parens patriae to sue on be-
half of their individual citizens. Hawaii v. Stand-
ard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Oklahoma v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, 220 U.S.
277 (1911); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108
U.S. 76 (1883). Yet, the Supreme Court has con-
sistently held that the pareiw patriae doctrine al-
lows a state to bring suit only to protect the com-
mon welfare of the people as a whole. Id. The
promotion of purely individual interests must be
left to individual initiative. Nonetheless, the legis-
latures are free to enact statutes which explicitly
grant the attorney general the power to act on be-
half of consumers which he lacks at common law.
See California v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 474 F.2d 774,
777 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
.2758 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971).
128 UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AN) CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAW.
[including the use of deception and misrepre-
sentation in connection with a sale] he may
seek and obtain in an action in the Superior
Court an injunction prohibiting such person
from continuing such practices . . .The court
may make such orders or judgment as may be
necessary . . . to restore to any person in
interest any moneys or property . . . which
may have been acquired by means of any
practice herein declared to be unlawful."29
Recovery was sought not only on behalf of the
twenty-four victims who testified at trial but
also for all others "similarly situated" who had
executed the same contract.
At trial, the Attorney General asserted that
the inflated contract price alone was uncons-
cionable under the Uniform Commercial
Code. : 30 If the price was unconscionable, he
argued that the Consumer Fraud Act was also
violated for all consumers who had been
charged the exorbitant price. However, the
trial court rejected the contention that the
price was unconscionable. The twenty-four
consumers who testified at trial gave proof of
the defendant's deceptive and fraudulent meth-
ods (other than the high price) and were thus
allowed to recover their losses.
The Attorney General appealed on behalf of
all consumers victimized by the defendant who
did not come under the trial court's decree. On
appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that relief should be accorded to all consumers
similarly situated as well as the original twen-
ty-four. The court recognized that this "class-
type" relief could not be maintained if the
claim of each individual consumer depended
upon a separate set of facts applicable only to
him. Since no effort had been made at trial to
show that all contracts were illegal because of
fraudulent and deceptive practices engaged in
each time a contract was executed, the court
analyzed the argument rejected by the trial
court. The Supreme Court accepted the view
that the exorbitant price itself was unconscion-
able and further indicated that "unconscion-
ability must be equated with the concepts of
deception, fraud, false pretense, misrepresen-
tation, concealment and the like which are
stamped unlawful under [the Consumer Fraud
129 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-8 (1960).
130 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A :2-302 (1960).
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Act]." 131 Once a violation of the Consumer
Fraud Act was found, the section authorizing
actions by the Attorney General on behalf of
consumers was triggered and, "since the price
unconscionability rendered the sales contract
invalid as to all consumers who executed it,
the Attorney General was entitled to a judg-
ment so holding as to the entire class of such
persons." 132
Despite the availability in a number of
stateS183 of the attorney general-initiated action
demonstrated in Kugler v. Romain, this rem-
edy is seldom used. 34 Yet, the limited staff
and resources allocated by states to consumer
protection activities make it imperative that an
attorney general or consumer fraud agency
lawyer seek remedies that are class-oriented
rather than individualistic. A 1973 publica-
tion' 3 5 of the National Association of Attorneys
General reported that out of forty-one states
polled, only five have more than ten attorneys
working full-time on consumer protection; five
other states have between four and ten; fif-
teen states have between two and four; eight
states have one; and eight states have no full-
time consumer protection attorneys. 3 6 The
small staffs of these agencies must handle
hundreds of complaints. The 1973 report indi-
cated that the average number of complaints
received by any one state was 5,050.137 The
generally small staff size coupled with the
large number of complaints received would
dictate that consumer protection agencies make
the most effective use of their limited resources.
Yet, must state agencies expend a major por-
tion of their limited resources and staff time on
the processing and mediation of individual com-
plaints to the point that one agency reported
13" Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 537, 279 A.2d
640, 652 (1971).
13
2 Id. at 539, 279 A.2d at 654.
.33 See note 94 supra.
1
3 4 Another example of an action brought by an
attorney general on behalf of consumers can be
found in People v. Wonder Ware Stainless Steel
Co., No. 67, ch. 3066 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County,
Ill., Aug. 2, 1967). However, the court there lim-
ited recovery to the cases then pending before the
consumer fraud agency rather than compensating
all consumers who had bought from the defendant.
135 National Association of Attorneys General,
Committee on the Office of Attorney General,
State Programs for Consumer Protection (Dec.
1973).
136 Id. at 12-13.
13 Id. at 16.
its "staff has been swamped with complaint
processing and [is] unable to give priority to
the filing of lawsuits."' 38
To make more effective use of their limited
resources, consumer protection agencies should
change the focus of their activity from individ-
ual mediation to class compensation. Class-ori-
ented remedies similar to the one instituted by
the New Jersey Attorney General in Kugler v.
Ronain would have the advantage of compen-
sating large numbers of consumers while not
requiring the time and effort of processing
and mediating a, myriad of individual com-
plaints. Perhaps the best function for individ-
ual complaints would be to determine when a
particular merchant's unlawful practices have
developed into a regular pattern or have be-
come sufficiently egregious to justify a full-
blown Kugler suit. Of course, the disadvantage
of setting priorities in this manner is that
many consumers who seek help from the con-
sumer protection agency will be denied it. Yet,
a great many consumers who do not seek help
for one reason or another but are similarly ag-
grieved will be compensated. Until consumer
protection agencies are sufficiently staffed to
handle both individual complaints and Kugler-
type suits, it is in the public interest to pass
over some consumer complaints.
V. CONcLusION
After a series of false hopes, tools are avail-
able which will enable the consumer to find
justice in the market place. In achieving the
long-sought goals of compensation and deter-
rence, these remedies have drawn from tradi-
tional private and public methods of enforce-
ment. Both the FTC and state attorney general
actions depend on public officials to champion
the rights of the consuming public. Both also
include the age-old remedy of compensatory
damages as an integral part of the available
sanctions. Once the merchant realizes that his
activities fall under the hopefully watchful eye
of the public agency rather than the powerless
consumer, he will be wary of engaging in un-
lawful business practices. If he does, he will be
liable not simply to an individual consumer but
to all consumers he has cheated. Upon elimina-
tion of the profit motive, the incentive to initi-
ate illegal acts disappears.
138 Id. at 20.
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SCHNECKLOTH v. BUSTAMONTE: THE QUESTION
OF NONCUSTODIAL AND CUSTODIAL
CONSENT SEARCHES
I. INTRODUCTION
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,' the United
States Supreme Court announced the criteria
for determining the validity of a search au-
thorized by voluntary consent. It held that
where the subject of a search is not in cus-
tody, the voluntariness of the consent is "a
question of fact to be determined from all the
circumstances."2 Furthermore, the Court de-
termined that ignorance of the right to with-
hold consent should not ipso facto render the
consent involuntary. Rather, a lack of such
knowledge should merely be one factor in de-
termining the existence of voluntariness.3 The
Court, however, limited the application of its
holding to noncustodial consent search
situations.4 It explicitly left unresolved the
question of whether demonstrated knowledge
of the right to refuse is required when the sub-
ject is in custody.5
This comment explores questions surround-
ing custodial and noncustodial consent searches.
First, it briefly examines consent searches as a
workable exception to the search warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment. It then
discusses and analyzes Bustamonte. Next, it
1412 U.S. 218 (1973).
2 Id. at 248-49.
3 Id. See also United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164 (1974) (approving the holding in Bista-
monte).
4 Our decision today is a narrow one. We
hold only that when the subject of a search
is not in custody and the State attempts to
justify a search on the basis of his consent,
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments re-
quire that it demonstrate that the consent was
in fact voluntarily given, and not the result
of duress or coercion, express or implied.
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be de-
termined from all the circumstances and while
the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse
is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecu-
tion is not required to demonstrate such knowl-
edge as a prerequisite to establishing a volun-
tary consent.
(412 U.S. at 248-49).
5 Id. at 240 n.29.
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examines the manner in which some federal
courts have handled the question left open by
Bustamonte-whether the prosecution must
show that the defendant was aware of his right
to refuse consent at the time he consented to
the search. The comment also analyzes whether
the federal courts which have addressed the is-
sue have done so consistently with Bustamonte
and Miranda v. Arizona.0 Finally, the comment
discusses some of the implications of Busta-
monte and its progeny.
II. LEGAL FOUNDATION
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasona-
ble searches and seizures.7 In doing so, it seeks
to safeguard the security and privacy of
individuals from arbitrary intrusions by gov-
ernmental officials.8 Moreover, the sanctions of
the fourth amendment bind both federal and
state governments.9 As a result, the most fa-
vored source of governmental authority to con-
duct a search is a warrant issued upon proba-
ble cause.' 0 In most cases, courts will presume
a search conducted without such a warrant to
6 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and all particularly describing the place
to be searched and the person or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
8 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966).
9 In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) the Supreme Court held that evidence
seized in violation of the fourth amendment could
not be used in a federal prosecution. In Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court overruled
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and held
that the fourteenth amendment incorporates full
fourth amendment safeguards for state citizens.
The Court also ruled in Mapp that the exclusion-
ary rule is necessary to guarantee the protections
of the fourth amendment.
10 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948).
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be unreasonable.:" They prefer the intervention
of a detached magistrate to insure that the
search proceeds upon adequate probable cause
and to properly limit the scope of the search.1
2
Despite the mandate that searches be con-
ducted pursuant to the warrant procedure, a
number of exceptions exist. Searches incident
to a lawful arrest,'3 searches conducted while
in hot pursuit of an offender,14 searches to
prevent destruction of evidence, 15 and consent
"'Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357
(1967).
'1-The point of the Fourth Amendment which
often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not
that it denies law enforcement the support of
the usual inferences which reasonable men
draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.... Crime, even in the privacy of one's
own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern
to society, and the law allows such crime to
be reached on proper showing. The right of
officers to thrust themselves into a home is
also a grave concern, not only to the individ-
ual but to a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveil-
lance. When the right of privacy must reason-
ably yield to the right of search is, as a rule,
to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a
policeman or by a government enforcement
agent.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948).
13See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973) (where there is a lawful custodial arrest,
full search of the subject is not only an exception
to the warrant requirement, but also is a "reason-
able" search under the fourth amendment) ; Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search incident
to lawful arrest is limited to the area within which
the arrestee can "reach" for a weapon, but if police
wish to search beyond the area in the immediate
control of the accused they must secure a warrant).
1
4 Warren v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (po-
lice in hot pursuit of a suspect may enter a home
without a warrant and look anywhere within
premises where offender may be hiding; moreover,
the fact that the suspect is not found inside will
not require the officers to overlook evidence in
"plain view" within the premises). Cf. Chappel v.
United States, 342 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(search in "hot pursuit" permitted).
15 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)
(warrantless search of vehicle permitted after po-
lice impounded it); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless search of a vehicle
upon probable cause that it contained contraband
was allowable because of vehicle's mobility). See
also United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630 (2d
Cir. 1972) (evidence contained in suitcases left out
in public where anyone might take them); State
v. Trantola, 461 S.W.2d 848 (Mo. 1971) (evi-
searches 16 have been recognized as legitimate
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The law recognizes valid consent searches as
an exception to the warrant requirement be-
cause of their "inherent reasonableness." ' 7 In
Blistamonte the Supreme Court had to deter-
mine the boundaries of such reasonableness.
This determination, however, was complicated
by Miranda. There the Court announced that an
individual placed under arrest or brought into
custody must be given warnings of his rights
to remain silent and to have the assistance of
counsel. One of the questions confronted in
Bustanzonte was whether to extend the know-
ing and intelligent waiver requirement of
Miranda, as well as Miranda-type warnings, to
noncustodial consent search situations.' 8
dence burning) ; State v. Murphy, 2 Ore. App. 25,
465 P.2d 900 (1970) (fingernail scrapings).
16 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) ; Bum-
per v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'17 Note, Effective Consent to Search and Sei-
zure, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260 (1964).
18 Following the Supreme Court's decision in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in
which the Court sought to safeguard an indi-
vidual's fifth and sixth amendment rights by re-
quiring warnings, some commentators predicted
that the Court would be equally vigilant in safe-
guarding an individual's fourth amendment rights
in consent, search situations. See F. IN1Au & J.
REI, CRIMINAL. INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS,
(2d ed. 1967). Inbau and Reid even recommended
that police officers advise suspects of their consti-
tutional right to refuse to let an officer search
when he does not present a warrant. Id. at
183-84. In Comment, Consent Searches: A Reap-
praisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 CoLum. L.
REv. 130, 158 (1967), it was not only predicted
that the same kind of knowing waiver as Miranda
required would be applied to consent searches, but
also a Miranda-type warning was suggested.
Shortly after Miranda, a few courts held that it
must be shown that a person was aware of his
right to refuse consent before the right can be
waived. See, e.g., United States v. Blalock, 255 F.
Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966), and United States v.
Moderacki, 280 F. Supp. 633 (D. Del. 1968).
However, these rulings were not adopted in the
subsequent decision of the Third Circuit in Virgin
Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1969).
In United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th
Cir. 1966) there was dictum to the effect that
warnings are necessary for an effective fourth
amendment consent, but the Seventh Circuit sub-
sequently called that position of "dubious pro-
priety." Byrd v. Lane, 398 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir.
1968). Hence, while some of the early authorities
indicated the courts might extend Miranda's re-
quirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver
with its commensurate warnings to cover the
fourth amendment, most courts rejected this prop-
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III. SCHNECKLOTH V. BUSTAMONTE
A. Facts and Procedural History
An automobile was stopped at 2:40 a.m. by a
policeman when he observed that the car's
right headlight and license plate light were
burned out. Bustamonte was one of six -per-
sons in the vehicle. The driver of the car did
not have a driver's license, but another passen-
ger, Alcala, produced one, explaining that the
car was his brother's. All six occupants got
out of the car at the officer's request. After
two more policemen arrived, the officer asked
Aicala if he could search the car.19 The
officer's uncontradicted testimony was that no
one was threatened with arrest 20 prior to the
request and that the situation was "all very
congenial." 21 The driver testified that Alcala
consented to the search and that he offered to
help with it. He even opened the trunk and the
glove compartment. The officers found three
checks wadded up under the left rear seat.
They had been stolen previously from a car
wash.
22
Bustamonte was charged and tried in a Cali-
fornia state court with possession of a check
with intent to defraud. 23 He moved to suppress
the introduction of the checks into evidence,
24
osition. See, e.g., Leeper v. United States, 446
F.2d 281 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Noa,
443 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1971); United States ex
rel. Harris v. Hendricks, 423 F2d 1096 (3d Cir.
1970); United States v. Goosbey, 419 F.2d 818
(6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Vickers, 387
F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1967); Gorman v. United
States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967).
19 The prosecutor admitted that there was no
probable cause for the search and that no warrant
was obtained. The Supreme Court's recent holding
in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)
would not be applicable to the present case. Robin-
son involved a search of the person incident to a
traffic arrest and not simply the issuance of a cita-
tion for missing lights and lack of a driver's
license, as in Bustamnonte.
20 While no one was under arrest, none of the
subjects was warned of his constitutional right to
refuse consent. No court ever determined whether
Alcala, the member of the group who consented to
the search, knew of his right to refuse consent.
21 412 U.S. at 220.
22 Id.
23 CAL. PENAL CoDE § 475(a) (1970).
24 Bustamonte was a third party to the search.
His standing to object to the introduction of the
seized evidence was based on FED. R. CRIm. P.
41(e). See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960) (anyone legitimately on premises where
search occurs may attack its validity via motion to
suppress when the fruits of that search are offered
arguing that the state had failed to meet its
burden of proving that Alcala's consent to the
search of the car had been voluntary.25 The
trial judge denied the motion, and Bustamonte
was convicted. The California Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, concluding that in light of all
the circumstances the defendant had voluntar-
ily consented to the search.2 6 The California
Supreme Court denied review, 27 and Busta-
monte sought a writ of habeas corpus in fed-
eral district court, which also denied his peti-
tion.28 Bustamonte then appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit.29 It set aside the district court's ruling
and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings.30 The state petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to
decide whether the test used by the circuit
court to determine valid consent was, in fact,
required by the fourth and fourteenth
amendments.31
B. Voluntariness as the Standard
The Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals by a vote of six to three. 32 Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, stated that
the issue before the Court was what the state
had to establish in order to meet its burden
33
of proving that consent had been voluntarily
given.34 In approaching this question, Justice
Stewart examined a line of cases in which the
Supreme Court had developed a voluntariness
standard for determining the admissibility of
confessions. 35 He noted that the confession
in evidence against him in a case based upon pos-
session). See also Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223 (1973); Simmons v. United States, 390
U.S. 377 (1968).
25 Under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) il-
legally seized evidence is inadmissible in state
prosecutions.
20 People v. Bustamonte, 270 Cal. App. 2d 648, 76
Cal. Rptr. 17 (1969).
27 The order of the California Supreme Court is
not reported.
28 The District Court's decision is not reported.
29 Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir. 1971).
30 The Ninth Circuit remanded on the grounds
that the state had the burden of proving that the
consent to the search had been given with the un-
derstanding that it could be freely and effectively
withheld. The District Court never reached this
issue. See note 20 supra.
31 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 405 U.S. 953
(1972).
32 Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dis-
sented, each writing a separate opinion. In a con-
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cases reflected an accommodation of the need
for police questioning as a mechanism for law
enforcement with a need to prevent unfair and
even brutal police tactics.3,6 Justice Stewart
stressed that these cases did not yield a talis-
manic definition of voluntariness, automatically
applicable to the variety of situations where
the question arose.3 7 Nor did voluntariness lit-
erally mean a "knowing choice." 38 The test in
these cases was whether the confession was the
product of an essentially free and uncon-
strained choice by its maker.39
Justice Stewart found that the voluntariness
of a confession is a question of fact to be de-
termined from the totality of the circum-
stances.40 He noted that no single factor has
ever been determinative, and that knowl-
edge of the right to remain silent has been
only one factor considered in deciding whether
curring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, accepted the
majority opinion written by Justice Stewart but
would have held that federal collateral review of
a state prisoner's fourth amendment claims should
be confined to the question of whether he was pro-
vided with a fair opportunity to raise such claims
and have them adjudicated in state courts. Justice
Powell argued that federal habeas corpus relief
should not be generally available for state prisoners
whose petitions are based upon the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment Justice Blackmun, concurring in a separate
opinion, agreed with the views stated in Justice
Powell's opinion, but noted that it was unnecessary
to reach the issue discussed by Justice Powell in
the present case.
-3 In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543
(1968) the Court held: "When a prosecutor seeks
to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a
search, he has the burden of proving that the con-
sent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given."
Id. at 548.
3 412 U.S. at 223.
351d. at 223-27. The confession cases examined
by Justice Stewart began with Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (a confession in a state
criminal case obtained by brutality and violence
was held invalid under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment), and ended with Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 473 (1964) (confession
held invalid where defendant was denied request
to consult with attorney). See also, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 507 n.3 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
321 n.2 (1959) (citing 28 cases).
36412 U.S. at 224-25.
37 Id. at 224, citing Columbe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568 (1961).
38 412 U.S. at 224.
39 Id. at 225.
40d at 227. This was the standard the Califor-
nia courts had applied.
a confession was voluntary.41 In none of the
confession cases did the due process clause re-
quire the prosecution to prove as part of its in-
itial burden that the defendant knew he had a
right to refuse to answer the questions that the
police asked him.
42
Justice Stewart then moved from the confes-
sion cases to cases dealing with consent
searches. 43 As with police questioning, he
found that two competing concerns must be
balanced-the legitimate need for searches and
the need to prevent official coercion.44 To-
gether, the prior consent search cases and the
competing concerns led him to the conclusion
that voluntariness of a consent search should
be given the same meaning as it had in the
pre-Miranda confession cases. Hence, whether
consent is "in fact 'voluntary' or was the product
of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a
question of fact to be determined from the to-
tality of all the circumstances." 45
Justice Stewart's result may be correct, but
he seems to have arrived at it through incorrect
reasoning. For instance, he should not have im-
ported the confession standard into consent
searches. In the consent search cases he cited,
the Court did not undertake a totality of the
circumstances analysis.4 . On the contrary,
4'Examples of some of the factors considered
are found in the following cases: Reck v. Pate,
367 U.S. 433 (1961) (use of physical punishment
such as deprivation of food or sleep); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (lack of educa-
tion); Fiskes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957)
(low intelligence); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596
(1948) (youth). See generally Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 508 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(Justice Harlan discusses the totality of the cir-
cumstances test).
42 412 U.S. at 226-27. The cases Justice Stew-
art relied upon preceded Miranda.
43 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543
(1968); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624
(1946); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582
(1946).
4 412 U.S. at 227.
45 Id. Later in the opinion, Justice Stewart
stressed that the fourth and fourteenth amendments
require that consent not be coerced, by implied
threat or covert force. He reiterated that it is the
duty of the courts to protect the constitutional
rights of citizens. Id. at 228-29, citing Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
46In Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582
(1946) the defendant was convicted of violating
rationing regulations when he sold gas without re-
quiring the necessary coupons. On appeal the issue
was whether the defendant had voluntarily con-
sented to the search which produced the evidence
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many of the cases examined only one factor. 47
Moreover, he failed to recognize that Miranda
clearly rejected the old voluntariness test for
confession cases.48 The object of Miranda was
to establish prophylactic rather than post hoc
safeguards to protect the privilege against
self-incrimination and to preserve the right to
counsel. By relying on the pre-Miranda confes-
sion cases, Justice Stewart seems to have ig-
nored their repudiation. He may have even been
implying that Miranda should be swept aside
and that the old voluntariness be brought back
for confession cases. As will be discussed later,
Justice Stewart was more justified when he rea-
used for conviction. While the Court mentioned
the totality of the circumstances test, the deci-
sion turned on the fact that the coupons were the
property of the Office of Price Administration and
therefore subject to inspection at any time. Al-
though the coupons were in the custody of a pri-
vate citizen, since they were considered public
property the defendant could not refuse a request
for their production. Hence the question of ade-
quate consent was irrelevant. In Zap v. United
States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946) FBI agents, when au-
diting defendant's books and records, found evi-
dence indicating that Zap had attempted to defraud
the Government. The Supreme Court held that a
private citizen who had executed a wartime gov-
ernment contract waived his right to privacy. Zap
could not object to a search made pursuant to a
power of inspection. In Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543 (1968) four policemen told the de-
fendant's grandmother they had a search warrant
and thereby obtained permission to search her
home. Although the warrant later proved to be in-
valid, a rifle found during the search was intro-
duced into evidence. The trial court considered the
consent given to be voluntary. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that submission to a claim of
lawful authority did not constitute valid consent.
Hence, in Davis and Zap it was unnecessary to
decide the issue of consent since the cases turned
on the right of inspection in special circumstances.
Bumper turned on only one key factor rather than
an examination of the totality of the circum-
stances.
4 See note 46 supra. Likewise, in Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), the Court did
not utilize a totality of the circumstances standard
as suggested in Bustamonte. In Johnson the police
simply claimed authority to search, when in fact
they lacked such authority. It was only this fact
that conclusively established that no valid consent
was given not the totality of the circumstances.
48 See Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth
Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65
Mica. L. Rxv. 59, 62 (1966): "I venture to say
that only one with an extravagant faith in the
actual operation of the 'totality of the circum-
stances' test could fail to see that the safeguards
provided by the old test were largely 'illusory.'"
soned that custodial interrogation is distinguish-
able from a noncustodial search because the
latter is not inherently coercive while the for-
mer is. Miranda only requires that the subject
be advised of and aware of his constitutional
rights when he is in custody.
C. Knowledge of the Right to Refuse Consent
After concluding that the totality of the cir-
cumstances was the proper test to use in con-
sent search cases, Justice Stewart considered
the question of whether proof of knowledge of
the right to refuse consent was required by the
voluntariness standard.49 He answered it in
part by analogizing to the pre-Miranda confes-
sion cases and examining prior consent search
cases. Justice Stewart found that a suspect's
knowledge of the right to remain silent had
never been determinative of whether a confes-
sion was the result of a free and unconstrained
choice.50 However, as Justice Marshall pointed
out in his dissenting opinion, the confession
cases never dealt with the question of a sus-
pect's knowledge of the right to remain
silent.5:1 The issue was instead whether the po-
lice coerced the suspect into confessing.52 In
addition, in Miranda the Supreme Court an-
nounced the proof of knowledge requirement,
and thus facilitated the prosecution's burden of
proof by requiring objective, procedural safe-
guards prior to questioning a defendant in cus-
tody. Hence, knowledge of the right to remain
silent became determinative of whether a con-
fession was voluntary.5
Justice Stewart stated that implicit in the
consent search cases was the notion that
knowledge of the right to withhold consent
was not a prerequisite to voluntary consent.
5 4
These decisions, however, provide little, if any,
support for the proposition that knowledge is
not a prerequisite to consent. Both Davis v.
United States and Zap v. United States were
49 412 U.S. at 229.
50 Id. at 226-27.
51 Id. at 280-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52 "[T]he questions of compulsion and violation
of the right itself are inextricably intertwined. The
cases involving coerced confessions therefore pass
over the question of knowledge as irrelevant, and
turn directly to the question of compulsion." Id. at
281.
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966).
54 412 U.S. at 234.
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decided on the ground of the right of the gov-
ernment to make an inspection; hence, the de-
fendants' knowledge of the right to refuse was
irrelevant. In Bumper v. North Carolina, the
knowledge issue did not have to be reached
since the policeman's representation that he
had a valid warrant when, in fact, he did not
was clearly coercive.55
Practical considerations also made Justice
Stewart reluctant to import a requirement that
a subject be aware of his right to refuse con-
sent. He was fearful that a proof of knowledge
requirement would cast serious doubt on
whether consent searches could be conducted
in the future.56 Moreover, even if it could be
shown that there was no coercion in a given
case, the prosecution would still have the "near
impossible burden" of demonstrating that the
subject of the search in fact had known of his
right to refuse consent.
5 7
Justice Stewart conceded that the problem
would not exist if the officer requesting con-
sent were required first to inform the subject
explicitly of his constitutional right to with-
hold it. Noting that a number of courts had re-
jected this position,58 he concluded that it
would be thoroughly impractical to impose on
the normal consent search the detailed require-
ments of an effective warning. He emphasized
that most consent searches occur in informal
and unstructured atmospheres such as in a per-
son's home or on the highway. They are unlike
the structured atmosphere of a trial or the in-
herently coercive aura of custodial interroga-
tion. Consequently, to require warnings would
interfere with standard investigatory practices
of law enforcement agencies. 9 Finally, Justice
55 See note 46 supra. See also 412 U.S. at
280-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56 412 U.S. at 229.
57 Id. at 230. Justice Stewart suggested that any
defendant who was the subject of a search could
easily and effectively frustrate the introduction
into evidence of the fruits of that search by deny-
ing that he in fact knew he could refuse to con-
sent.
58 See note 18 supra.
59 For it would be thoroughly impractical to
impose on the normal consent search the detailed
requirements of an effective warning. Consent
searches are part of the standard investigatory
techniques of law enforcement agencies. They
normally occur on the highway, or in a per-
son's home or office, and under informal and
unstructured conditions. The circumstances
that prompt the initial request to search may
Stewart suggested that a warning, absent an
on-the-scene determination of an individual's
understanding of his rights, would not insure
the effectiveness of fourth amendment protec-
tions. He implied that consent might be found
in all cases where the warning was given-
whether or not the individual was truly aware
of his rights.60
As -Justice Marshall pointed out in his dis-
sent, there are a number of ways to demon-
strate a subject's awareness of his right to re-
fuse consent.61 Justice Stewart conceded that a
warning requirement would be the easiest
method. Although he rejected such a warning
as too burdensome, he did not suggest that Mi-
randa warnings hinder police investigation.
Logically when an officer requests permission
to search, it would not seem burdensome to re-
quire him to tell the subject he need not per-
mit the search.62 Moreover, even assuming ar-
guendo that there is a burden in delivering a
warning, it should not outweigh the subject's
need for knowledge of his rights.63 Finally,
develop quickly or be a logical extension of
investigative police questioning. The police
may seek to investigate further suspicious cir-
cumstances or to follow up leads developed in
questioning persons at the scene of a crime.
These situations are a far cry from the struc-
tured atmosphere of a trial, where, assisted by
counsel if he chooses, a defendant is informed
of his trial rights. . . . And, while surely a
closer question, these situations are still im-
measurably far removed from "custodial inter-
rogation" where, in Miranda v. Arizona . . .
we found that the Constitution required cer-
tain now familiar warnings as a prerequisite
to police interrogation.
412 U.S. at 231-32.
60 Id. at 245.
61 For a discussion of other methods the prose-
cution might employ to demonstrate that a subject
was aware of the right to refuse consent see 412
U.S. at 285-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62 The Federal Bureau of Investigation has rou-
tinely informed subjects of their right to refuse
consent without any adverse effects on investiga-
tion. See Comment, Consent Searches: A Reap-
praisal After Miranda v. Arizona, 67 CoLuM. L.
Rav. 130, 143 n.75 (1967), citing a letter from J.
Edgar Hoover.63 Justice Marshall attacked the alleged imprac-
ticality of warnings in the following harsh lan-
guage:
I must conclude, with some reluctance, that
when the Court speaks of practicality, what it
really is talking of is the continued ability of
the police to capitalize on the ignorance of cit-
izens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what
they could not achieve by relying on the
knowing relinquishment of constitutional
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contrary to Justice Stewart's apprehension, a
warning in and of itself would not automati-
cally create a valid consent to search. The
warning would only be a threshold require-
ment to insure that the subject is aware of his
right to refuse. The question of police coercion
would still remain, as would the need to exam-
ine the actual abandonment of the right.
6 4
D. Consent as a Waiver
justice Stewart dealt next with the proposi-
tion that consent is a waiver of a person's
rights under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. 65 Bustamonte argued that by al-
lowing the police to conduct a search, an indi-
vidual waives whatever right he had to pro-
hibit the search. Under the mandate of
Johnson v. Zerbst,66 which concerned the
waiver of the right to counsel at a criminal
trial, Bustamonte contended that to establish
such a waiver the state must demonstrate "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege." 67 Justice Stewart
noted that the language of some previous deci-
sions might seem to require an intentional and
knowing waiver in consent search situations.
He found, however, that the Johnson doctrine
had been applied only to rights designed to in-
sure the fairness of a criminal trial and the re-
rights. Of course it would be "practical" for
the police to ignore the commands of the
Fourth Amendment, if by practicality we
mean that more criminals will be apprehended,
even though the constitutional rights of indi-
viduals go by the board. But such a practical
advantage is achieved only at the cost of per-
mitting the police to disregard the limitations
that the Constitution places on their behavior,
a cost that a constitutional democracy cannot
long absorb.
412 U.S. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting.)
64See 412 U.S. at 281 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing), where he used Miranda to show that Justice
Stewart's fears were groundless.
65 Id. at 235.
66 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
67 Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion,
took a similar position:
The Court holds today that an individual can
effectively waive [the right to be free of un-
reasonable searches] even though he is totally
ignorant of the fact that, in the absence of his
consent, such invasions of privacy would be
constitutionally prohibited. It wholly escapes
me how our citizens can meaningfully be said
to have waived something as precious as a
constitutional guarantee without ever being
aware of its existence.
412 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
liability of the truth-determining process. 6s He
stated that the protections of the fourth amend-
ment are of a wholly different nature and have
nothing to do with promoting the fair ascertain-
ment of truth at a criminal trial.69 The purpose
of the fourth amendment is to protect the
privacy of citizens. Justice Stewart concluded
that the reasons which require a knowing
waiver in fair trial situations were absent in
privacy cases, and that there was no reason to
extend the "knowing waiver" principle.
7 0
Justice Stewart correctly noted that in most
cases the fourth amendment protections do not
promote the fair ascertainment of truth at a
criminal trial, but rather the security of one's
privacy against unreasonable invasions by the
police.71 Moreover, Justice Stewart was also cor-
rect in finding that most of the case law apply-
ing the Johnson test of knowing and intelli-
gent waiver test concerns the safeguarding of
rights associated with the criminal trial. He
did not mention, however, that none of the de-
cisions limit the requirement of knowledge to
those rights which guarantee a fair trial.7 2 On
the contrary, beginning with Johnson, the
cases turn on whether the right is
"fundamental." 7T For example, in Glasser v.
68 Id. at 236. Justice Stewart noted that Johnson
concerned the waiver of the right to counsel at a
criminal trial and that the Johnson principle had
been applied to waiver of counsel at other stages
of the trial process. See, e.g., United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (line-up); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interro-
gation); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708
(1948) (entering of guilty plea). The principle
has also been applied to waiver of the right to
confront witnesses, Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1
(1966) ; waiver of the right not to be placed twice
in jeopardy, Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(1957) ; and to waiver of the right to a jury trial,
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S.
269 (1942).
69 412 U.S. at 241.
70Id.
71 But see Comment, The Doctrine of Waiver
and Consent, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 891, 902-03
(1974) where it is suggested that the infringement
upon a defendant's rights in a search situation is
especially egregious where he must stand trial for
possession of the very evidence illegally seized.
72 See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 748 (1970) (waiver of constitutional rights
not only must be voluntary but also must be a
knowing intelligent act done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences).
73 A waiver of a constitutionally protected inter-
est and "acquiesence in the loss of fundamental
rights" cannot be presumed. 304 U.S. at 464.
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United States,74 the Court said: "To pre-
serve the protection of the Bill of Rights ...
we indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental rights." 75 If the
focus is actually on fundamental rights, what is
it about the fourth amendment that makes it
less fundamental than other amendments? Jus-
tice Stewart in Bustamonte failed to reveal what
makes an uninformed waiver of a fourth
amendment right fair and the uninformed
waiver of a "trial right" unfair.
justice Stewart also overlooked that the Su-
preme Court itself has recognized that the fourth
and fifth amendments are equally vital when he
distinguished between the "truth ascertaining"
amendments and the privacy protections of the
fourth amendment. This equality of stature was
noted in Mapp v. Ohio70 where the exclusionary
rule of Weeks v. United States77 was made appli-
cable to the states.7
8 In Boyd v. United States
79
the Court announced that the fourth and fifth
amendments express "supplementing phases of
the same constitutional purpose-to maintain in-
violate large areas of personal privacy." 80 In
light of the Court's approach in the past to the
rights protected under the fourth and fifth
amendments, it would seem illogical to regard
one as more deserving of judicial protection
than the other. If the fifth amendment is de-
serving of the knowing and intelligent waiver
74 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
75 Id. at 70.
76 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
77232 U.S. 383 (1914).
78 We find that, as to the Federal Government,
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to
the States, the freedom from unconscionable
invasions of privacy and the freedom from
convictions based upon coerced confessions do
enjoy an "intimate relation" in their perpetua-
tion of "principles of humanity and civil liber-
ties secured only after years of struggle . . !"
They express "supplementing phases of the
same constitutional purpose-to maintain in-
violate large areas of personal privacy." The
philosophy of each Amendment and of each
freedom is complementary to, although not de-
pendent upon, that of the other in its sphere
of influence-the very least that together they
assure in either sphere is that no man is to be
convicted on unconstitutional evidence. (cita-
tions omitted).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961).
79 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
80 Id. at 630. But cf. Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (consent to search is not
evidence of a testimonial or communicative na-
ture).
requirement, the fourth amendment is equally
so.81
E. Custodial and Noncustodial Consent
Searches
After distinguishing Miranda earlier in the
opinion, Justice Stewart considered whether the
Court should require a knowing waiver for
consent searches as a means of insuring
against police coercion, just as it had done in
the case of custodial interrogation for the con-
fession cases.8 2 Viewing noncustodial consent
searches as closely analogous to investigative
questioning, he concluded that the knowing
waiver requirement is unnecessary. He reasoned
that there is no equivalent danger of police
coercion inherent in a noncustodial request for
consent to search such as that made in
Bustamonte.2  He explicitly left open the
question of whether a knowing and intelligent
waiver might be required if consent to search
were sought after the subject was taken into
custody.
[T]he present case does not require a deter-
mination of the proper standard to be applied
in assessing the validity of a search authorized
solely by an alleged consent that is obtained
from a person after he has been placed in cus-
tody. We do note, however, that other courts
have been particularly sensitive to the height-
ened possibilities for coercion when the "con-
sent" to search was given by a person in
custody.84
According to some commentators,8 5 justice
Stewart was on solid ground when he concluded
that the knowing and intelligent waiver re-
quirement need not be applied to noncustodial
consent searches. In Miranda, the Court found
that the techniques of police questioning and
81 A strict fourth amendment waiver standard
would, in effect, operate as an exclusionary rule.
By lowering the standard for waiver of fourth
amendment rights the Court may be attempting to
limit the scope and force of the exclusionary rule.
Some members of the Court have expressly stated
their disenchantment with the rule. See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
82See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472
(1966).
83 412 U.S. at 247.
84 Id. at 240 n.29.
85 See Note, Voluntariness of Consent to Search,
87 HARV. L. REV. 213, 218 (1974).
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the nature of custodial surroundings are inher-
ently coercive.86 Consequently, the warnings
are to serve as a prophylactic device to dispel
the compulsion inherent in custodial
situations. 8 7 Justice Stewart therefore appears
correct in likening a noncustodial search to
noncustodial interrogation. If noncustodial in-
terrogation requires neither a knowing waiver
nor Miranda warnings, such waiver and fourth
amendment warnings are not mandated in a
noncustodial consent search situation.88 Under
this reasoning, Bustamonte and the other mem-
bers of the party did not have to be warned of
their fourth amendment rights because they
were not in custody.
Regardless of whether Justice Stewart was
correct in making the distinction between cus-
todial and noncustodial consent searches, 9 the
86 384 U.S. at 458. By "custodial interrogation,"
the Court meant "questioning initiated by law en-
forcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
*of action in any significant way." Id. at 444.
87 Id. at 477.
8 Justice Stewart suggested that noncustodial
searches will normally occur on a person's own
territory absent an inherently coercive atmosphere.
412 U.S. at 247.
89 Some commentators have suggested that the
Court's separating noncustodial and custodial
searches is a distinction without a difference. They
argue that Miranda does not solely rest on police
coercion. First, Miranda represents a move away
from the subjective due process test of waiver of
constitutional rights toward the objective approach
requiring knowledge of the right in question. Sec-
-ond, in conjunction with this prophylactic empha-
sis, Miranda indicates that knowledge of the right
in and of itself is a threshold requirement of any
valid waiver of that right. See Note, Schneckloth
v. Bnstamnonte: A New Era in Consent Searches?,
35 U. PITT. L. REV. 655 (1974); cf. Comment
Consent Searches: A Reappraisal After Miranda
v. Arizona, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 130 (1967).
Certainly, the language of the Court in Miranda
indicates that the Court was not only concerned
with police coercion but also with another vital
proposition-that a defendant's statements should
not be used against him unless they were made
while he was aware of his constitutional right to
remain silent and cognizant of the consequences of
waiving that right. The Court stated that any
statements made should "truly be the product of...
free choice" (384 U.S. at 458)-a choice which is
made "knowingly and competently." Id. at 465. The
Court also stated: "For those unaware of the privi-
lege [against self-incrimination] the warning is
needed simply to make them aware of it-the
threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as
to its exercise." Id. at 468. Moreover, the Court
stated: "This warning is needed in order to make
him aware not only of the privilege, but also of
the consequences of foregoing it. It is only through
distinction stands. Taking his reasoning to its
logical conclusion, a knowing waiver should at
least be required in a custodial consent search
situation. Justice Stewart himself acknowl-
edged that the considerations would be differ-
ent when the subject is in custody. It is thus
possible that the Court may require a showing
that a subject who assents to a search while in
custody was aware of, or advised of, his right
to refuse before the consent will be considered
valid.
IV. CUSTODIAL CONSENT SEARCHES:
POsT-BUSTAMONTE DEVELOPMENTS 90
The Supreme Court has not yet answered
the question left open by Bustamnonte: whether
a custodial consent search requires proof of
knowledge of the right to refuse. However, a
number of federal courts have faced the issue.
Surprisingly, no court appears to have held, as
a matter of law, that a subject need be aware
of or advised of his right to refuse consent
when he is in custody.91 Instead of preserving
the distinction between custodial and noncus-
todial consent searches, the courts have blurred
it. In short, whether or not the subject is in
custody, the courts are applying a totality of
the circumstances test. Three general ap-
proaches to custodial consent searches have
emerged: a balancing approach, a "constructive
notice" approach and the "no warning whatso-
ever" approach.
A. The Balancing Approach
The balancing approach, as adopted by the
an awareness of these consequences that there can
be any assurance of real understanding and intelli-
gent exercise of the privilege." Id. at 469. Finally,
the Court indicated that a waiver should not be
made in ignorance of the right to counsel because:
"Only through such a warning is there ascertain-
able assurance that the accused was aware of this
right." Id. at 472.
90 For a general discussion of the validity of con-
sent searches on an individual in the custody of
law officials see Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 858 (1966).
91United States v. Watson, No. 73-1539 (9th
Cir.), 14 BNA CR. L. REP. 2299 (March 20, 1974)
erroneously cited the case as holding as much. See,
e.g., United States v. Garcia, 496 F.2d 670, 673 n.8
(5th Cir. 1974) ; State v. Price, 521 P.2d 376, 377
n.4 (Hawaii 1974). The full opinion in Watson
was recently published in the official reporter and
the case is clearly consistent with the balancing
approach of the Ninth Circuit. See 504 F.2d 849,
853 (9th Cir. 1974).
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Sixth92 and Ninth Circuits, 93 does not differ-
entiate between consent to search given before
or after custody/arrest.94 "Arrest is but one
factor, albeit a critical one, in determining
whether or not the consent was voluntary." 9 5
Hence, although the presence or absence of
custody alone is not controlling as a matter of
law, the courts adopting the balancing ap-
proach have themselves scrutinized the facts to
insure that the coercive factors do not out-
weigh the non-coercive ones.
United States v. RothinanP9 serves as an ex-
cellent example. Here the appellant was
convicted for possession of marijuana with in-
tent to distribute.9 7 He argued that the mari-
juana introduced into evidence should have
been suppressed as the fruit of an improper
search. After going through a magnetometer
successfully at an airport, Rothman was de-
tained by an officer. He eventually grabbed the
deputy's hand and jerked him. He was arrested
for assaulting a federal officer, handcuffed, and
given his Miranda warnings.98 Rothman's
checked luggage was removed from the plane
and brought to the office in which he was
being held by the deputy. The deputy asked
him for permission to search, and Rothman re-
fused. Thereafter, an FBI agent was called
and he arrived and interrogated Rothman. The
agent then went into an adjoining room. After
the agent left, Rothman told the deputy to go
ahead and open the bags. The deputy refused,
saying that they would probably get a search
warrant.99 Rothman then took the keys lying
92 United States v. Hearn, 496 F.2d 236 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974).
93 United States v. Heimforth, 493 F.2d 970 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 908 (1974); United
States v. Rothman, 492 F2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1973).
94 As used in this context arrest includes custody,
but custody does not necessarily include arrest.
95 492 F.2d at 1264 n.1.
98 492 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1973).
9721 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1970).
98 492 F.2d at 1263.
99 Id. In United States v. Agosto, 502 F.2d 612
(9th Cir. 1974) the court held that the statement
of an officer that he would obtain a search war-
rant if consent were not given, and that in the
meantime he would secure the garage premises, is
not such a lack of voluntariness as a matter of
law to vitiate consent. But see United States v.
Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 496-97 (2d Cir. 1974),
where Judge Newman, in a concurring opinion,
cautioned that he would be inclined to reject a
finding of voluntariness obtained in response to
statements about the discretionary aspect of a war-
on the desk and opened the luggage which
contained thirty-nine kilos of marijuana.
The trial court held that there was voluntary
consent, based primarily on Rothman's original
refusal to permit the search. It reasoned that
since Rothman was aware of his option to re-
fuse, his eventual consent was voluntary. 00
The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court and
noted that Bustamonte held that knowledge of
the right to refuse is a factor to be taken into
account, but that the prosecution is not required
to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite
to voluntary consent. It continued, however, by
emphasizing that
Bustainonte cuts two ways. The knowledge of
the right to refuse consent is no longer a nec-
essary condition for valid consent, but neither
is it necessarily a sufficient condition. It is
only an element to be considered as a part of
the "totality of the circumstances."' 0
Hence, the fact that the appellant might not
have been aware of his right to refuse would
not necessarily mean he was coerced. On the
other hand, because the trial court found he
was aware of his option to refuse, it did not
necessarily mean that his consent was
voluntary.
Pursuant to the reasoning of Justice Stewart
in Bustamonte, the court stated that it had to
accommodate two competing concerns-the
need for searches and the importance of assur-
ing the absence of coercion. 0 2 After a "care-
ful sifting of the unique facts of [this] case," '
0 3
the court determined that the balance was in
favor of the policy of assuring the absence of
coercion. Coercive elements were present since
Rothman had been arrested, handcuffed, and
held in incommunicado custody prior to open-
ing the bags. Furthermore, although given
Miranda warnings, he was interrogated for
rant if they did not in some way affirmatively
communicate this aspect of the warrant-issuing
process. Judge Newman reasoned that the subject
is misled into believing the only variable in the
choice whether to consent or not is time-rather
than the far more important variable of whether
the warrant will be issued at all. The subject
should not be led to believe that obtaining a war-
rant is a virtually automatic formality.
100 492 F2d at 1264.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 412 U.S. at 233.
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two hours.1 04 The court noted that under such
an atmosphere the government's burden of
proving voluntary consent is heavy.105 In light
of the "totality of the circumstances" test it
ruled that it was compelled to hold that "the
consent was not voluntary because it was sys-
tematically, psychologically coerced."106
The court stated that this was not the type
of case in which the police officers should rely
upon consent to justify a search since they had
ample time to get a warrant. 10 7 Finding no
justification for the coercive official tactics
which produced the consent, the court held the
trial judge's finding of consent was clearly
erroneous.
os
104 492 F.2d at 1264.
o10 Id. at 1264-65.
10, Id. at 1265. In United States v. Hearn, 496
F.2d 236 (6th Cir. 1974) the court neatly com-
pared the factors tending to establish a voluntary
and uncoerced consent with the factors tending to
establish an involuntary coercive consent search:
(a) [the defendant's] having been initially
given his Miranda advice of rights incident to
his arrest on the stolen welder charge; (b)
his continued freedom of movement and lack
of any physical restraint incident to his arrest
upon the stolen welder charge; (c) his pres-
ence on his own farm and in familiar sur-
roundings; (d) his acquiescence in the
officer's suggestion to 'go look at it' (i.e., the
traxcavator) and his affirmative response,
'Well, let's go see it'; and (e) his leading the
way to the barn and in mounting the bales of
hay in advance of the others.
Upon the other hand, factors tending to es-
tablish an involuntary and coercive consent
search include: (a) the presence of three law
enforcement officers on his farm; (b) his ini-
tial arrest upon the stolen welder charge; (c)
the suggestion by the officers that the barn be
inspected for the presence of the traxcavator;
(d) the use by the officers of information
gained by a prior unlawful search as the pred-
icate for their suggestion that the barn be in-
spected for the presence of the traxcavator;
and (e) the absence of any warning to the
appellant that he had a constitutional right to
refuse to consent to a search of the barn.
496 F.2d at 243.
The court concluded that the coercive factors,
though some of them were subtle and implicit,
would nevertheless substantially outweigh the
non-coercive ones. Accordingly, it concluded that
the trial court's determination that the consent was
freely and voluntarily given was clearly erroneous.
Cf. United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 841 (1973).
107 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
15 (1948).
108 492 F.2d at 1265. The court also rejected the
government's other theories to validate the search:
search incident to arrest and administrative search.
Since the voluntariness test of Bustamoute
was limited to noncustodial consent searches, it
would seem that the balancing approach incor-
rectly handles custodial consent searches. If
custodial searches are inherently coercive, then
under the mandate of liranda and the reason-
ing of Justice Stewart in Bustamonte, there
ought to be some mechanism to dispel that
compulsion. Advising the subject of his fourth
amendment rights would be the simplest and
most effective way to accomplish that goal.
On. the other hand, an argument can be
made on behalf of the balancing approach.
First, it is consistent with Bustamonte in that
the Court there admonished against the use of
mechanical rules in determining voluntari-
ness.105 Second, the approach is simply an exten-
sion of the accommodation between effective
law enforcement and non-coercive searches.
However, one problem with the balancing
approach as applied to custodial consent
searches is that it fails to clarify how the
accommodation is to be struck. 10 If indeed the
government's burden of showing voluntariness
is greater when the defendant is in custody,
the question remains as to how much greater.
Is custody to be given the same kind of weight
as other factors which courts must take into
account, such as the age of the accused, his ed-
ucational background, and intelligence?"' Or
should custody be given more weight than the
other factors in light of the specter of custodial
interrogation and because the police can then
more easily influence a subject's decision to
consent? If it is to be given more weight, how
much and by what standards? It appears that
the Ninth Circuit in Rothman gave the factor
of custody substantial weight, in light of the
fact that it reversed the trial court's findings
of fact.
A second problem with the balancing ap-
proach is suggested by Judge Renfrew's dis-
sent in Rothman.1 2 He could not agree with
109 412 U.S. at 224.
110 In Bnstamonte Justice Stewart did acknowl-
edge that "account must be taken of subtly coer-
cive police questions, as well as the possibly vul-
nerable subjective state of the person who
consents." 412 U.S. at 229.
'"' See id. at 226.
112 492 F.2d at 1267. Judge Renfrew is a United
States District Judge for the Northern District of




the majority that the appellant did not volun-
tarily consent. He vigorously argued that the
majority was mistaken in applying the "clearly
erroneous" rule to a review of the trial court's
finding of fact. 13
Judge Renfrew criticized the majority for
not stating what standard of persuasion should
have been applied by the trial court in deter-
mining whether consent is voluntary. He noted
that generally consent to search without a war-
rant must be shown by "clear and positive"
evidence." 4 He stated that this vague standard
may mean a preponderance of the evidence or
that it may mean evidence establishing consent
beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 5 Judge Renfrew
further suggested that the "preponderance of
the evidence" standard was the appropriate one
in this case. He attacked the majority's criti-
cism of the trial court's reliance on the appel-
lant's initial refusal to permit a search, since
that factor related to the question of his psy-
chology. "This question, involving to a great
extent an analysis by the trier of fact of the
demeanor of the witness, is best left to the
trier of fact. Indeed the 'clearly erroneous'
rule is based upon that principle." 116 He con-
cluded that if the preponderance of the evi-
dence rule is the appropriate standard of proof
in this kind of case, then reversal was com-
pletely unwarranted.
1 17
This conclusion led Judge Renfrew to
believe that either the majority adopted the
reasonable doubt standard or that its holding is
founded solely on law and not on facts. He
wrote that if it were the former standard, an
anomaly had been created since the Ninth Cir-
cuit has adopted a preponderance standard for
judging voluntariness of confessions. 118 More-
"R3Id.
14 Sherrick v. Eyman, 389 F.2d 648, 651 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 874 (1968).
"15 492 F.2d at 1267.
116 Id.
117 According to Judge Renfrew:
If the preponderance of the evidence rule is
the appropriate standard of proof in this case,
then reversal is completely unwarranted. The
combination of taking the facts in a light most
favorable to the government, i.e., stressing the
facts supporting voluntariness, and applying
the clearly erroneous rule is too great a bar-
rier to overcome for reversal.
Id. at 1267-68.
118 See United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d 749
(9th Cir. 1972). Cf. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477 (1972).
over, even if the reasonable doubt standard
were appropriate here, he was not convinced
that the trial court's ruling was clearly
erroneous." 19
In the final analysis Judge Renfrew sus-
pected that the majority actually decided the
case on the raw principle of law: "No person
can voluntarily consent to a search while in
custody if the authorities have a reasonable op-
portunity to obtain a warrant." 120 If this is in
fact the rule of the majority, he stated, it cre-
ated the inconsistent situation in which a de-
fendant in custody could confess to the com-
mission of a crime but not consent to a
search.' 21 He also noted that such a rule of
law was in conflict with Bustamonte since the
Court admonished against the use of mechani-
cal rules in determining voluntariness.
122
Arguably, a rule that a person cannot volun-
tarily consent to a search while in custody if
the authorities have a reasonable opportunity
to obtain a search warrant is tantamount to re-
quiring a showing of knowledge of the right to
refuse consent. The former rule contemplates
that if the police have probable cause to
search, they should be required to obtain a
warrant from a detached magistrate. If the po-
lice are not required to obtain a warrant, then
requiring knowledge of the right to refuse
might be said to replace the need for a magis-
trate. Under this reasoning, it would appear
that Judge Renfrew is incorrect in his conclu-
sion that the majority decided the rule of law
he suggested. The majority could just as easily
have required warnings or a showing that the
accused is aware of the right to refuse consent
when the subject is in custody. The majority,
however, explicitly repudiated that approach.
12 3
Therefore, the court either applied the "reason-
able doubt" standard, or it applied the "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard.
If the standard to be applied in the future is
one of reasonable doubt, perhaps trial courts
should begin with a presumption that the con-
sent to search was involuntary, just as crimi-
119 "The reasonable doubt standard would have
to arise from consideration of appellant's psychol-
ogy, a factor which does not leap forth from the
printed pages of the record." 492 F.2d at 1268.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 See 412 U.S. at 224.
123 492 F.2d at 1264 n.1.
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nal trials favor the defendant by presuming his
innocence. As long as the defense raises a rea-
sonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the
consent, then the trier of fact should be al-
lowed to find that it was involuntary. On the
other hand, if the standard used is that of a
preponderance of the evidence, then the trier
of fact need only find that it was more likely
than not that there was not consent.
Regardless of which standard the court ap-
plied, Judge Renfrew is correct in suggesting
that the court should have clearly stated which
one it applied. Without this clarity, appellate
courts may assume the trial courts' role as
the finder of fact. As between the "prepon-
derance of the evidence" and the "reasonable
doubt" standards, there is little question that
the latter would assure greater protection
against coercion when the search is conducted
while the subject is in custody. If, however,
courts are concerned about the possibilities of
coercion, it would seem that a prophylactic
rule rather than the post hoc reasonable doubt
standard would be more effective. Such a pro-
phylactic rule may even be required in light of
Miranda. On the other hand, Bustamonte itself
seems to call for a "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard, in light of the accommodation
struck between effective law enforcement and
uncoerced searches.
24
B. Combination of Miranda Warnings-Put
Subject on Constructive Notice
The second approach is the one taken by the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
United States v. Gorman.12 5 Although the case
was decided before Bustamonte, it specifically
answered the question of whether Miranda-
type warnings are required when a subject is
in custody. The Gorman decision was adopted
124 The majority often quotes from . . . Bus-
tatmonte. That case, however, does not support
the majority's decision in that the Supreme
Court approached the facts with a much
greater willingness to find voluntary consent.
Though the respondent in Bustainonte was not
in custody, there was no evidence that he
knew that he could refuse to allow a search.
The majority here, in contrast, seems to begin
with a presumption of involuntariness. Per-
haps, as the majority says, Bustamonte cuts
both ways, but it does not justify the majori-
ty's swath.
492 F2d at 1268 n.6 (dissenting opinion).
125 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967).
by many courts even before Bustainonte was
decided and court continued to follow it after
Bust amonte.1
26
In Gorman the defendant was arrested and
brought to headquarters. He was advised of his
right to remain silent, to call an attorney, to
have an attorney provided for him if he could
not afford one, and of the fact that anything
he said might be held against him.127 At the
end of an interview with an FBI agent, he
was asked whether he would object to a search
of his motel room. He said, "Go ahead; look
in the room." 28
The court recognized that the search was
neither incident to an arrest nor pursuant to a
warrant. It could only be justified on the
ground that Gorman voluntarily consented to
it. Distinguishing two other cases' 29 where
custodial consent searches had been held in-
valid, the court concluded that the search here
was voluntary. It held that
when the accused is directly asked whether he
objects to the search, there must be at least
some suggestion that his objection is signifi-
cant or that the search waits upon his consent.
When this is combined with a warning of his
right to remain silent and his right to counsel,
which would seem in the circumstances to put
him on notice that he can refuse to cooperate,
126See, e.g., United States v. De Marco, 489
F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1973) where the court did not
have to reach the question whether fourth amend-
ment warnings would be required if the subject
were in custody. In United States v. Kohn, 365 F.
Supp. 1031 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 763
(2d Cir. 1974), the court held that the mere fact
that a suspect is under arrest does not negate the
possibility of voluntary consent, neither does the
suspect's knowledge that the search will almost
certainly demonstrate his guilt. See also People v.
Strawder, 34 Cal. App. 3d 370, 108 Cal. Rptr. 901
(1973); State v. Price, 55 Hawaii 442, 521 P.2d
376 (1974); cf. United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d
67 (2d Cir. 1973) ; United States ex rel. Lunder-
gan v. McCann, 417 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1969). The
Third Circuit explicitly adopted the Gorman ap-
proach. Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F2d 1055
(3d Cir. 1969). The Seventh and Tenth Circuits
have held simply that it is unnecessary to advise
the suspect of his right to refuse, even when he is
in custody, for there to be valid consent. See Hayes
v. Cady, 500 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Cage, 494 F2d 740 (10th Cir. 1974).
127 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
-128 380 F.2d at 161.
229 See Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217
(9th Cir. 1960); Judd v. United States 190 F.2d
649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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we think it fair to infer that his purported
consent is in fact voluntary.130
The court stated that it could not accept the
suggestion that a specific warning of fourth
amendment rights is necessary to validate a
warrantless search after the suspect has been
arrested. 13 1 The court reasoned as follows:
Although the analogy with Miranda... has a
surface plausibility, we do not think that the
Miranda prescription, formulated to give
threshold warnings of fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights at the earliest time in a critical
proceeding, must or ought to be mechanisti-
cally duplicated when circumstances indicate
the advisability of requesting a search.... To
single out for further warning a request to
search premises of an accused is to assume
that a different order of risks has not been
covered at the threshold. But that things
which might be found in a search could be
used against an accused seems implicit in the
warning of the right to remain silent which,
as the Court observed, is calculated to make
him "more acutely aware * * * that he is not
in the presence of persons acting solely in his
interest." 132
The court also distinguished between the
purposes of the fifth and sixth amendments on
the one hand and the fourth on the other. It
stated that Miranda is concerned with the ex-
clusion of unreliable evidence, such as a con-
fession stemming from fear or force, the exclu-
sion of self-incriminating statements whether
reliable or not, and the need to assure a de-
fendant he may have a lawyer before any fur-
ther interrogation. The rules governing
searches are concerned with the maintenance
of civilized standards of police practice. 33 The
court concluded that the objective of this
fourth amendment policy seems to be achieved
when the police have given the basic Miranda
warnings, when a defendant subsequently vol-
untarily submits to an orderly interrogation
free from any coerciveness other than that
implicit in the fact of arrest or custody, when
a straight forward request for permission is
made, and when an unambiguous and positive
response is received. 34
130 380 F.2d at 163-64.
L31 Id. at 164.
13 Id. Cf. 384 U.S. at 469.
233 380 F.2d at 164.
134 Id.
The reasoning in Gorman is very similar to
that subsequently adopted by the Supreme
Court in Bustamonte.3 5 There the Court em-
phasized that the exclusionary rule, prohibiting
the introduction of illegally procured evidence,
is not designed to preserve a fair trial, but to
inhibit illicit police practices. In contrast,
where knowledge of a right is necessary for
waiver, there has been a danger that without
the requirement, unjust convictions might re-
sult. For example, an unknowing waiver of
counsel might well mean the imprisonment of
an innocent person. When fourth amendment
rights are waived without awareness of the
right to refuse consent, the argument runs that
there is no danger of yielding untruthful
information.
13
In arriving at their decisions, both courts
sought to distinguish between'the rights pro-
tected by the fourth amendment and those
which relate to the guarantee of a "fair trial."
This distinction is not adequately discussed by
either court, and it appears to be based merely
on the substantive content of the respective
constitutional rights rather than on the funda-
mental nature of the liberties which they guar-
antee. Both Gorman and Bustanonte concluded
that the purpose of the Johnson v. Zerbst
knowing waiver requirement is to protect the
fairness of a trial. As indicated earlier, how-
ever, the real purpose of the standards in
Johnson, is to protect fundamental rights'
37
Perhaps the courts have decided that the lan-
guage in Johnson was mere rhetoric. Yet they
continue to insist that the fourth amendment is
no less fundamental.
3 8
Another problem with the Gorman approach
is that it erroneously assumes that the Court in
Miranda was only concerned with the preser-
vation of the right to a fair trial. Such an as-
sumption overlooks one of the prime bases for
the decision in Miranda. While it is true that
the Miranda warnings help to reduce the pos-
sibility of an unrealiable confession, the major
'135 "We therefore see no reason in policy or
precedent to automatically borrow a procedure
adapted to one set of constitutional rights at one
stage of a criminal proceeding and apply it to a
quite different right, serving quite different pur-
poses, at another stage." Id.
136 412 U.S. at 235-46.
1.37 See note 73 supra.
'
3 s See 412 U.S. at 248.
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objective of the decision was to prevent physi-
cally and psychologically coercive police tac-
tics. The Miranda warnings were conceived of
as a mechanism to reduce the potential for
abusive police behavior. The Court in Miranda
specifically pointed out that the constitutional
foundation underlying the privilege against
self-incrimination is
the respect a government-state or federal-
must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens .... [Olur accusatory system of crim-
inal justice demands that the government seek-
ing to punish an individual produce the evi-
dence against him by its own independent
labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expe-
dient of compelling it from his own mouth."z9
Consequently, if Miranda was intended to
curtail abusive police practices, it can not be
said that the fifth amendment preserves a fair
trial, while the fourth does not. Furthermore a
trial, is just as tarnished by the introduction of
evidence seized in violation of an individual's
constitutional rights,140 as it is by the admis-
sion into evidence of a coerced confession. The
question then is not whether the confession or
the evidence is reliable, but whether it was ob-
tained by coercing the defendant and capitaliz-
ing on his ignorance.
141
Although the Gorman approach perceives the
fourth and fifth amendments as having differ-
ent purposes, many courts continue to hold that
Miranda warnings coupled with the request for
permission to search are all that is required to
validate a custodial consent search. The theory
is that the warnings and the request for permis-
sion give the defendant constructive knowl-
edge that he may refuse to consent.142 This
may be true, yet the theory can just as easily
cut the other way. The accused might reason
that, since he has been told that he has a right
139 384 U.S. at 460.
140 This tarnishing is especially true when the
charge is possession. See note 71 supra.
141 The sixth amendment clearly does not pro-
tect the fairness of a trial in the sense of deterring
coercive police behavior. Rather it is through the
guarantees of counsel, the right to a jury and to
confront witnesses that the accused is afforded a
fair trial. In short, he is insured that he will be
represented by a lawyer who knows the rules of
the trial system and that he will have an opportu-
nity to present his side of the story to an impar-
tial finder of fact.
to remain silent and a right to a lawyer and
since he has not been told that he can refuse
the search, he therefore must allow it. Or he
might simply perceive the request to search as
a "formality."
Requiring a fourth amendment warning may
be the only way to insure that the accused has
consented to the search with full knowledge.
Without an explicit fourth amendment waiver
when the defendant is in custody, it is difficult
to know whether the defendant, in fact, volun-
tarily waived the right. Moreover, such a
fourth amendment warning would not be un-
duly burdensome to police investigations and
could easily be appended to the request to
search. 43
C. Rejection of "Constructive Notice" Ap-
proacl---No Warning Required
Although initially intimating that it would
follow the Gorman approach, the Fifth Circuit
has taken what appears to be the least consist-
ent position with Miranda and Bustanonte on
the question of custodial consent searches. In
United States v. Luton, 44 the defendant
was convicted of possession of an unregistered
fire arm. 45 On appeal he contended that as a
matter of law he had the right to withhold
consent and require the police to obtain a
search warrant upon a showing of probable
142 Such a theory implies that the fourth and
fifth amendments overlap. The fifth amendment
warning against self-incrimination is apparently
sufficiently encompassing to protect fourth amend-
ment guarantees. The theory, however, appears to
directly conflict with the court's conclusion that
the amendments have different purposes and Jus-
tice Stewart's suggestion in Bustainonte that the
protections of the fourth amendment are of a
"wholly different order." 412 U.S. at 242.
143 The reluctance of courts to give consent
searches greater constitutional protection is puz-
zling in light of Mr. Justice Goldberg's statement
in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) :
[N]o system of criminal justice can, or
should, survive if it comes to depend for its
continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdica-
tion through unawareness of their constitu-
tional rights. . . . If the exercise of constitu-
tional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a
system of law enforcement, then there is
something very wrong with that system.
378 U.S. at 490.
-44 486 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
Luton v. Mississippi, 417 U.S. 920 (1974).
145 26 U.S.C.A. § 5861 (1970). The weapon was
discovered in the trunk of the defendant's car dur-




cause.146 He sought to distinguish Bustamonte
on the ground that it dealt only with consent
given by an individual who was not in cus-
tody. He argued that custody is such an inher-
ently coercive condition that one subjected to
it must be specifically informed of his rights
before he can waive them.
1 47
The court replied that this argument was
without merit in light of prior cases.
148 It
stated that these cases established that in the
Fifth Circuit consent to search may be given
by a person under arrest who has not been
specifically informed of his fourth amendment
rights, "so long as there is no proof of coer-
cion or intimidation and if prior to the search
Miranda warnings are given."1 49 Through the
use of italics the court seemed to make the
prior Miranda warnings essential to the deci-
sion. The court implied that without the prior
Miranda warnings consent to search given by
one in custody would be considered invalid as
a matter of law. In short, the Fifth Circuit
seemed to be following the Gormn approach.
In United States v. Garcia,150 however, the
Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the suggestion
made in Liton. Garcia dealt with the validity of
a border search which resulted in the appel-
lant's conviction for possession of heroin with
intent to distribute.' 9 ' The facts were as fol-
lows: Mrs. Garcia and her son attempted tp
cross the border between Mexico and El Paso,
Texas. After her license plate number was
routinely placed in a computer system at the
inspection station, the computer report indi-
cated she was suspected of smuggling heroin.
Mrs. Garcia was then referred to a secondary
inspection. She possessed a valid permanent
resident alien card. A search of her car failed
to disclose any contraband. The customs inspec-
tors also searched Mrs. Garcia and her son,
but all that was found was a key to a storage
locker at a bus depot. The inspectors knew
that such lockers were often used by drug
dealers to transfer narcotics. A special agent
146 486 F.2d at 1023.
147 Id.
148 See United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973);
United States v. Canseco, 465 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.
1972).
149 486 F.2d at 1023.
150 496 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1974).
:15121 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1970).
was dispatched and about an hour after the
original detention he arrived and questioned
Mrs. Garcia and her son. The special agent
asked Mrs. Garcia if she would mind showing
the contents of the locker and she agreed. She
accompanied the officers to the bus station and
opened the locker. After examination of its
contents, they found what was later shown to
be heroin.152 The officers then placed Mrs.
Garcia under arrest for smuggling heroin and
"for the first time [she] was advised of her
Miranda protections."' 53 She later explained
her role in the heroin operation.
The Fifth Circuit determined that Mrs.
Garcia's detention constituted "custodial in-
terrogation," -54 and that the statements she
had made prior to being warned of her rights
to remain silent and to have counsel were
inadmissible.155 Next the court considered
whether the heroin seized from the locker
could be admitted into evidence at the new
trial. The government sought to validate the
search on a consent theory. 58 Mrs. Garcia
contended that the government was under an
obligation to demonstrate not only that her al-
leged consent had been uncoerced, but also that
it had been obtained with an understanding
that it could be freely and effectively withheld.
She conceded that in Bustamonte the Supreme
Court rejected this contention for noncustodial
situations. However, she argued that custody
heightens the possibilities for coercion so as to
require a specific warning of one's fourth
amendment rights.5 7 The court replied that it
had already refused to distinguish custodial
from noncustodial searches.' 58 Thus, knowl-
edge of fourth amendment rights is not neces-
152 496 F2d at 671-72.
15 Id. at 672.
354 See United States v. Salinas, 439 F.2d 376
(5th Cir. 1971), where the court delineated when
a border search becomes custodial.
155 The court accordingly granted her a new
trial which would exclude these statements. 496
F.2d at 673.
158 Because the court found that the search
could not be justified as a consent search, it did
not treat in depth the Government's contention
that the search was permissible under border
search principles as well. Id. at 675 n.23.
157 Id. at 673.
158 See note 148 supra. Cf. United States v.
Horton, 488 F.2d 374, 380 n.4 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
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sarily required to validate consent to search
after a suspect is in custody. 5 9
Mrs. Garcia next argued that the Miranda
violation should invalidate her purported
consent.' 60 "If the evidence taken in violation
of Miranda cannot be used to aid the Govern-
ment on the issue of guilt . . . the statements
elicited should similarly not be used by the
Government during a motion to suppress to
show her consent." 161
The court replied that while its independent
application of Miranda principles to fourth and
fifth amendment protections had been some-
what nebulous, 162 it was holding that "prior
Miranda warnings are not required to validate
consent searches in the circumstances here
presented." 163 The court reasoned that the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation plays a crucial role in preserving the
integrity of the trial process, and that "this
clearly was the principal basis for the Court's
Miranda decision." 164 It stated that while the
fourth amendment proscription against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures is no less impor-
tant than fifth amendment protections, it has
not been recognized as fostering the integrity
of the trial process.165 In a fifth amendment
situation, a defendant's statements, in and of
themselves, present the potential constitutional
evil. For fourth amendment purposes, however,
it is the unreasonable search, not the use of a
defendant's statements proving consent to
search, which must be condemned. "A search
and seizure produces real and physical evi-
dence, not self-incriminating evidence ...
Therefore, Miranda's ratio decidendi ... should
not be superimposed ipso facto to the wholly
159 496 F.2d at 673.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 673-74.
162 In United States v. Luton, 486 F.2d 1021
(5th Cir. 1973), the use of italics seemed to make
prior Miranda warnings more crucial to the deci-
sion. The court noted in Garcia that neither
Luton, Legato, or Canseco directly presented a
consent search situation without prior Miranda
warnings. The court noted that in United States v.
Horton, 488 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1973), it was
faced with such a situation, and a custodial con-
sent search was validated when Miranda warnings
were not given until after the completion of the
search.
163 496 F.2d at 674.
164 Id.
165 Id. The court cited Bustanionte, 412 U.S. at
241.
different considerations in fourth amendment
analysis." 166
The Fifth Circuit thus went a step beyond
the Gorman approach. It held that the failure
of an officer to warn a suspect subjected to
custodial interrogation of his Miranda and
fourth amendment rights does not vitiate his
consent. The Gorman approach at least re-
quires Miranda warnings and the request for
permission to search, reasoning that -this will
adequately advise a defendant of his fourth
amendment rights. In Garcia, however, no
warning of any kind is required to validate the
consent, let alone to dispel the inherent coer-
cion of custody. Hence, while the court pays
lip service to the need to consider coercion,1
67
it undermines that need by not even insisting
on the Miranda warnings prior to a custodial
search. This is not to suggest, however, that
the Gornan approach is correct.
V. IMPLICATIONS
While it is true of all exceptions to the war-
rant requirement, a serious implication of Bus-
tamonte and the other consent search cases is
that the police may now be free to carry out a
search that they, rather than an impartial mag-
istrate, have decided upon. Instead of main-
taining an equilibrium between the need for
effective law enforcement and the need to pre-
vent coercion, many courts seem to have tipped
the scales in favor of law enforcement officials
at the expense of the individual. The police
may simply be able to approach a home owner
and conduct a charade of asking for consent.
If the police display any firmness, they would
inevitably receive some form of consent. The
individual, in practice, may well receive inade-
quate protection of his constitutional rights be-
cause juries and trial courts are more likely to
accept the government's contention that he
consented than the individual's claim that he
was coerced. Moreover, without the knowing
waiver requirement, and especially where the
individual is in custody, the government may
well be able to capitalize on the ignorance of
citizens.
A corollary of Bustamonte and its progeny is
that consent to search may be "finessed" under




the voluntariness test-whether or not the indi-
vidual is in custody. An excellent example arose
in Mann v. Superior Court"6 s where the defend-
ant was charged with possessing marijuana and
maintaining a place for the use of narcotics.
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The police came upon the defendant's property
and surveyed the interior while standing in
some bushes outside the window.Y0 They ob-
served some invited guests who, after knocking,
were told to enter. Soon afterwards, the police
knocked on the door, and one of the voices from
the party answered "come in" in response to the
knock, reasonably anticipating the arrival of
other guests. The police found a small quantity of
marijuana inside the residence, and arrested all
persons present. They also conducted an exten-
sive search.' 7' The officers admitted that they
lacked lawful probable cause at the time they
approached the front door. By the only prose-
cution testimony offered, they specifically elim-
inated the odor of marijuana (which was de-
tected only after entry) as a factor in the
probable cause for the subsequent arrests. 72
168 Although the case was decided before Busta-
monte, it is still illustrative. In Mann v. Superior
Court, 3 Cal. 3d 1, 472 P.2d 468, 88 Cal. Rpr. 380
(1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971), the de-
fendant pleaded not guilty to the charge and
moved to suppress the marijuana seized at his
home, claiming a violation of his fourth amend-
ment rights. His motion was denied after an evi-
dentiary hearing in the state trial court. Mann then
sought a writ of mandate directing the trial court
to suppress the challenged evidence and this was
denied by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court of California. Mann then pleaded guilty to
possession of marijuana under the narcotics count.
The State's motion to dismiss the remaining count
was granted. One month later, Mann petitioned
the United States District Court for a writ of
habeas corpus. This was denied and he appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Mann
v. Smith, 488 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 932 (1974). The court held that, subse-
quent to a plea of guilty, there can be no federal
collateral attack based upon an alleged violation of
constitutional rights occurring prior to the guilty
plea. There was no question of the voluntary and
intelligent character of the plea.
169 Cal. Health & Safety Code of 1940, ch. 10,
§ 11557 (repealed 1972); Cal. Health & Safety
Code of 1939, ch. 9, § 11530 (repealed 1972).
170 Query whether the police officers were tres-
passing.
'11 Cf. Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.3d
626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973).
172 See Mann v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d at 13,
88 Cal. Rptr. at 387, 472 P.2d at 475 (1970)
(Peters, J., dissenting).
The prosecutor saved his case by relying on a
consent theory.
To construe a simple "come in" in response
to a knock, voiced by persons reasonably ex-
pecting other guests-and certainly not police
officers-into a consent permitting blanket ar-
rests and a comprehensive search of the prem-
ises is alarming. Although there was no coer-
cion, it can hardly be said that there was
consent, even under a totality of the circum-
stances test. Not only was the defendant una-
ware of his right to refuse consent, but he was
also unable to exercise that right because of
the police's subterfuge. At the very least, there
should have been some attempt on the part of
the officers to announce their identify prior to
"seeking" consent to enter the premises. 73
Furthermore, what is to prevent the police
in a future situation from fabricating the bare
"come in" ?1 4 Under Mann the police could
173 This is not only because of constitutional
mandates, but also because of CAL. PEN. CODE § 844
(West 1975), which provides: "To make an ar-
rest, a private person, if the offense be a felony,
and in all cases a peace officer, may break open
the door or window of the house in which the per-
son to be arrested is, or in which they have rea-
sonable grounds for believing him to be, after hav-
ing demanded admittance and explained the
purpose for which admittance is desired."
'74 The almost certain inevitability of the fabri-
cated "come in" is illustrated by the so-called
'dropsy' testimony in street drug arrests. The fol-
lowing criticisms which Professor Irving Younger
made of McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967)
(an informer's identity need not be disclosed in
every case) are relevant to the future of consent
searches:
[The McCray majority] said that "nothing
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a state court judge in
every such hearing to assume the arresting of-
ficers are commiting perjury."
Why not? Every lawyer who practices in
the criminal courts knows that police perjury
is commonplace.
The reason is not hard to find. Policemen
see themselves as fighting a two-front war-
against criminals in the street and against "lib-
eral' rules in court. All's fair in this war, in-
cluding the use of perjury to subvert "liberal"
rules of law that might free those who "ought"
to be jailed.
For the first few months (after Mapp v.
Ohio), New York policemen continued to
tell the truth about circumstances of their
searches, with the result that evidence was
suppressed. Then the police made the great
discovery that if the defendant drops the nar-
cotics on the ground, after which the police-
man arrests him, then the search is reasonable
1975],"
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conceivably snoop around a person's home,
enter it, and then claim that they were told to
"come in." Surely the constitutional rights as-
sured by the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ments demand greater protection.'7 5
A final implication is that not only have
some courts encouraged the police to use con-
sent searches in situations where a warrant
could have been obtained, but also they may
have paved the way for greater invasions of
and the evidence admissible. Spend a few
hours in the New York City Criminal Court
nowadays, and you will hear case after case in
which a policeman testifies that the defendant
dropped the narcotics on the ground, where-
upon the policeman arrested him. Usually the
very language of the testimony is identical
from one case to another.
This is now known among defense lawyers
and prosecutors as "dropsy" testimony.
Far from adopting a presumption of per-
jury, the McCray case almost guarantees
wholesale police perjury. When his conduct is
challenged as constituting an unreasonable
search and seizure, all the policeman need say
is that an unnamed "reliable informant" told
him that the defendant was committing a
crime. Henceforth, every policeman will have
a genie-like informer to legalize his master's
arrests.
Younger, The Perjury Routine, 204 THE NATION
596, 596-97 (1967).
For more information on the "perjury routine"
see P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE PowER ch. 11, at 180
(1969) ; Chevigny, Police Abuses in Connection
with the Law of Search and Seizure, 5 CRIM. L.
BULL. 3 (1969).
75 While arrest and search warrants are often
issued perfunctorily, the preference for these war-
rants is justified on the ground that, at least, the
police must make a record before the event of the
basis for their actions. Consider J. SKOLNICK,
JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL-LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
DFocRATnC SOCIETY (1966):
[T]he policeman perceives his job not sim-
ply as requiring that he arrests where he finds
probable cause. In addition, he sees the need
to be able to reconstruct a set of complex
happenings in such a way that, subsequent to
arrest, probable cause can be found according
to appellate court standards. In this way, as
one district attorney expressed it, "the police-
man fabricates probable cause." By saying this,
he did not mean to assert that the policeman
is a liar, but rather that he finds it necessary
to construct an ex post facto description of
the preceding events so that these conform to
legal arrest requirements, whether in fact the
events actually did so or not at the time of
the arrest. Thus, the policeman respects the
necessity for "complying" with the arrest laws.
His "compliance," however, may take the form
of post hoc manipulation of the facts rather
than before-the-fact behavior.
Id. at 214-15.
privacy than are necessary or permitted in
order to conduct effective law enforcement.
17 6
Unlike warrant searches, there may be no lim-
its to the scope of consent searches. Moreover,
even if there is a theoretical limit, it may not
exist in practice since it would be difficult for
a defendant to prove that he limited the scope
of a search when he consented. Hence, police
officers may now be free to rummage about a
house, unconstrained by anything except their
own whims and desires.177 The result is that a
search conducted without a warrant may now
give an officer more authority than a search
conducted pursuant to a warrant specifically
delineating the limits of the search.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte the Supreme
Court held that knowledge of the right to re-
fuse consent is but one factor to be considered
in a noncustodial consent search situation. It
also held that the absence of a warning did not
vitiate consent to search in the noncustodial
setting. The Court reasoned that warning the
subject of his right to withhold consent would
be impractical because noncustodial consent
searches arise under informal and unstructured
conditions. It specifically reserved the question
of the significance of custodial conditions.
No case has been found which holds as a
matter of law that the subject of a custodial
search must be shown to have been aware of,
or advised of, his right to refuse before there
can be valid consent. Instead, the courts are
continuing to apply a totality of the circum-
stances test, using one of three approaches: a
balancing approach, a "constructive notice" ap-
proach, or a "no warning whatsoever" ap-
proach.
In light of the inherently coercive nature of
custodial interrogation, one might have thought
176 Such "consent" searches are reminiscent of
the "general warrants" which the framers of the
Constitution attempted to eliminate through the
fourth amendment. See Justice Douglas's dissent-
ing opinion in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 180 n.1 (1974), wherein he traces the histori-
cal background of the fourth amendment.
-77 For an example of abuse under a warrant-
less search see Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S.
346 (1957), where the police gutted a home during
a warrantless search.




that something more than a totality of the cir-
cumstances test would be required to dispel
coercion when the search is custodial. Certainly,
the circumstances under which a subject is in
police custody can hardly be called "unstruc-
tured." When a person is in custody the police
control the situation. Unlike the atmosphere of
the noncustodial setting, when the subject is in
custody the police would have ample opportu-
nity to give a warning. Of course, a warning
would not be a panacea for obliterating coer-
cive tactics used to secure consent. But a direct
communication that the accused has a right to
refuse and that his right will be respected could
serve to "fortify the accused against the coer-
cion inherent in the custodial setting." -19
By conducting a search on the basis of con-
sent, the police can potentially circumvent
three important protections of the warrant pro-
cedure. First, they can avoid submitting the
issue of probable cause to search to a magis-
trate's independent assessment. Second, they do
not need to make a record in the form of a
sworn affidavit prior to the search which
would protect against the possibility that an
17) Gentile v. United States, 493 F.2d 1404 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 979, 981 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
ex post facto justification will be based upon
what the search turns up. Finally, the police
may be relieved of the particularity require-
ment of the warrant. 80
In the final analysis, Schneckloth v. Biesta-
vzonte and its progeny may be signalling an
erosion of fourth amendment rights. Perhaps
the cases are a reaction to both Mapp and Mi-
randa. While it does not necessarily follow
that by not extending the "knowing and intelli-
gent" requirement to at least custodial searches
the fourth amendment will be completely emas-
culated, individuals can certainly ill-afford even
a modest recession of these fundamental rights.
The courts must continue to perform, not abdi-
cate, their traditional role as the guardian of the
people.' 8
180 Id.
'81 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886). See also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298 (1921) :
It has been repeatedly decided that these
Amendments [the Fourth and Fifth] should
receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent
stealth, "encroachment upon" or "gradual de-
preciation" of the rights secured by them, by
imperceptible practice of the courts, or by
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PROSECUTION UNDER THE HOBBS ACT AND THE
EXPANSION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
According to several commentators, the
criminal case load -in the federal court system
has reached unprecedented proportions.' This
can be attributed to efforts by Congress to ex-
pand federal criminal jurisdiction to areas la-
beled as auxiliary to what have been termed
"true" federal crimes.2 True federal crimes
usually involve a special federal interest such
as protection of a federal official, or federal
functions such as delivery of the mails. This
type of federal prosecution has been referred to
as being "self defensive." 3 Auxiliary federal
jurisdiction, on the other hand, implies by its
very label that other than purely federal mat-
ters must be evaluated before federal involve-
ment is compelled. Although deemed by Con-
gress to require federal prosecution, these
auxiliary areas derive jurisdiction from a legal
" See Abrams, Consultant's Report on Jurisdic-
tion: Chapter Two, in WORKING PAPERS OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Abrams]; H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW (1973) [hereinafter cited as
FRIENDLY]; Some Observations on the Condition
of the Federal Courts, Address by the Honorable
Philip W. Tone, United States Circuit Judge for
the Seventh Circuit, before the Chicago Council
of Lawyers, October 23, 1974; Hufstedler, Comity
and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the
Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 841 (1972).
Judge Tone said:
In the metropolitan centers, the criminal busi-
ness of the federal district courts leaves little
time for civil cases. The newer judges in this
district spend the great majority of their trial
time in criminal trials. I would estimate
85-90% for myself while I was a district
judge.
2 Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and
Prosecutor's Discretion, 13 LAw & CoNTEmp.
PRoB. 64 (1948).
Professor Schwartz indicated that federal juris-
diction was being employed in three different
ways: (1) The punishment of anti-social conduct
of a distinctively federal concern; (2) The secur-
ing of compliance with any federal administrative
regulation; (3) The punishment of conduct of
"local concern" which was for some reason
deemed by Congress to warrant federal interven-
tion.
3Id. at 67. See also Abrams, supra note 1.
Other examples of true federal crimes are as fol-
lows:
base which does not involve a specific federal
entity or activity requiring protection. One of
the most common jurisdictional bases is inter-
state commerce.4 Along with the broad nature
of interstate commerce as the authority for ju-
risdiction are the efforts of ambitious federal
prosecutors not only to intensify their prosecu-
torial activity but also to stretch the statutory
language to areas which, though not reflected
in the legislative history, arguably fall within a
broad construction of a federal act.5 In order
for the prosecutions' expansive advocacy to
succeed, the courts must acquiesce in this
broad interpretation of such statutes.6 The
(a) Assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain
officers or employees, 18 U.S.C. § 111
(1948) ;
(b) Bribery of public officials and witnesses,
18 U.S.C. § 201 (1962) ;
(c) Conspiracy to defraud the Government
with respect to claims, 18 U.S.C. § 286
(1948) ;
(d) Mutilation, diminution, and falsification of
coins, 18 U.S.C. § 331 (1951) ;
(e) Mutilation of national bank obligations,
18 U.S.C. § 333 (1948) ;
(f) Desertion of mails, 18 U.S.C. § 1700
(1948) ;
(g) Obstruction of mails generally, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (1948) ;
(h) Timber removed or transported, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1852 (1948) ;
(i) Personal property of United States, 18
U.S.C. § 2112 (1948).
4 See, e.g., Kidnapping-Transportation, 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (1956); Transportation of stolen
vehicles, 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (1948) ; Interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia, 18
U.S.C. § 1953 (1961) ; Interference with commerce
by threats or violence (Hobbs Act), 18 U.S.C. §
1951 (1948) ; Interstate and foreign travel or
transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises,
18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1965).
5 FRIENDLY, supra note 1 at 27. See also Huf-
stedler, supra note 1; Tone, supra note 1. Judge
Tone said:
In addition, in this district, the legal staff of
the United States Attorney has more than
doubled in the past few years, while the num-
ber of district judges has remained the same.
The result has been not only more cases filed
but more complex and time-consuming cases.
Much more courtroom time must now be allo-
cated to criminal cases.
6 FRIENDLY, supra note 1. Judge Friendly wrote:
The old issue of encroachment on the state
PROSECUTION UNDER THE HOBBS ACT
Hobbs Act7 -is one of many statutes passed in
this century which has been used to expand
the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction."
Examination of the application of the Hobbs
Act reveals an urgent need to reconsider the
present reach and interpretation of federal
criminal jurisdiction. It raises the fundamental
question of what kind of role the federal judici-
ary should assume in criminal prosecutions.
This comment will analyze two aspects of the
expansion of the Hobbs Act. One is the purely
jurisdictional expansion which has been carried
as far as the Civil Rights cases as well as being
based upon an effect which need only be poten-
tial.9 The other aspect involves expansions of
the "substantive" part of the Hobbs Act to
areas rarely discussed in the legislative history
and not prosecuted until very recently.' 0 This
analysis will be considered in terms of the pro-
gression of prosecution under the Hobbs Act
and the response by the federal judiciary.
Initial inquiry into the intended reach of the
Hobbs Act necessarily includes the reach of
the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934,11 the pred-
tribunal is still with us but it is only one as-
pect of the problem. This as I see it, is that
the inferior federal courts now have more
work than they can properly do-including
some work they are not institutionally fit to
do. This arises in part because Congress is
continually giving them more to do and in
part, because of the Supreme Court's generos-
ity in comstruing the grants made by the Con-
stitutim and Congressioial legislation (em-
phasis provided).
See also E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTiON TO LEGAL
REASONING (1949) [hereinafter cited as Lxvii.
7 Interference with commerce by threats or vio-
lence, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1948).
8 See note 4 supra.
0 See Abrams, supra note 1, at 38; Comment,
Scope of Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Coin-
inerce Clause, 1972 U. ILl.. L.F. 805. See, e.g., the
public accommodations section of the Civil Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1964). See also Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) ; Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.
1974).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d
595 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Braasch,
505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Crowley, 504 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Irali, 503 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Staszcuk, 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.
1974); United States v. Augello, 451 F.2d 1167
(2d Cir. 1971).
11 Anti-Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 420
(1934).
ecessor of the Hobbs Act. The purposes and
application of the Anti-Racketeering Act are
important for two reasons. First, the language
of the two acts are similiar. Second, much of
the Hobbs Act hearings and debate concen-
trated on the inclusion of activities found by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Local
80722 to be outside the purview of the Anti-
Racketeering Act of 1934.13 Therefore, consid-
12315 U.S. 521 (1942).
3. The Anti-Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 420
(1934), reads in pertinent part:
420a. Interference with trade and commerce
by violence, threats, etc.:
Any person who, in connection with or in
relation to any act in any degree affecting
trade or commerce or any article or commod-
ity moving or about to move in trade or com-
merce-
a. Obtains or attempts to obtain, by the use
of or attempt to use or threat to use force, vi-
olence, or coercion, the payment of money or
other valuable considerations, or the purchase
or rental of property or protective services,
not including, however, the payment of wages
by a bona fide employer to a bonafide em-
ployee; or
b. Obtains the property of another, with his
consent, induced by wrongful use of force or
fear, or under color of official right; or
c. Commits or threatens to commit an act
of physical violence or physical injury to a
person or property in furtherance of a plan or
purpose to violate subsections a or b; or
d. Conspires or acts concertedly with any
other person or persons to commit any of the
foregoing acts; shall, upon conviction thereof,
be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by
imprisonment for up to ten years or by a fine
of $10,000 or both.
420d. Provided, That no court of the United
States shall construe or apply any of the pro-
visions of sections 420a to 420e of this title in
such a manner as to impair, diminish, or in
any manner affect the rights of bonafide labor
organizations in lawfully carrying out the le-
gitimate objects thereof, as such rights are ex-
pressed in existing statutes of the United
States.
The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1948) states:
a. Whoever in any way or degree obstructs,
delays or affects commerce or the movement
of any article or commodity in commerce, by
robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires
so to do, or commits or threatens physical vi-
olence to any person or property in further-
ance of a plan or purpose to do anything in
violation of this section shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than twenty years, or both.
b. As used in this section-
1. The term robbery means the unlawful
taking or obtaining of personal property
from the person or in the presence of another,
against his will, by means of actual or
threatened force, or violence, or fear of
19751
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eration of the scope of the Anti-Racketeering
Act helps in determining more precisely the
intended reach of the Hobbs Act.'
4
Prior to the passage of the Anti-Racketeer-
ing Act, broad-based hearings, entitled "Inves-
tigation of the Matter of So-Called Rackets
With a View to Their Suppression," were
conducted by a sub-committee of the Commit-
tee on Commerce.'1 While fundamentally con-
cerned with racketeering, the hearings failed to
clarify the meaning or scope of the offense and
contributed to the amorphous quality of racket-
eering. George B. McGovern, a labor
representative, testified, "The definition appar-
ently as accepted by the committee, is that a
racketeer is one of a group who conspires to
do something which is against the interests of
man," 'l and the committee agreed. One indi-
vidual testified that racketeering was "synon-
injury, immediate or future, to his person or
property, or property in his custody or pos-
session, or the person or property of a rela-
tive or member of his family or of anyone
in his company at the time of the taking or
obtaining.
2. The term extortion means the obtaining
of property from another, with his consent,
induced by wrongful use of actual or threat-
ened force, violence, or fear, or under color
of official right.
3. The term "commerce" means commerce
within the District of Columbia, or any
Territory or Possession of the United States;
all commerce between any point in a State,
Territory, Possession, or the District of
Columbia and any point outside thereof; all
commerce between points within the same
State through any place outside such State;
and all other commerce over which the
United States has jurisdiction.
'4 United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387 (7th
Cir. 1967). The court in Pranno said:
They [defendants' attorneys] cite statements
in congressional debate in 1946 prior to the
enactment of the so-called Hobbs Act, indicat-
ing a purpose to deal with interference by
members of labor unions with motor vehicles
engaged in interstate commerce. The quoted
statements must, however, be viewed in the
context of expanding the coverage of legisla-
tion already in effect so as to cover activities
which the Supreme Court had previously held
were not within the former act.
385 F.2d at 389.
15 Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Com-
inerce, Investigation of the Matter of So Called
"Rackets" With a View to Their Suppression, 73rd
Cong., 2nd Sess., vols. I & II, pts. 1-6 (1933-34)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
16 Id. at vol. I, pt. 2.
omous with organized crime" 17 while others
were more specific. Judge Skillman, for in-
stance, defined racketeering as the "extortion
of money from persons engaged in legitimate
business, or otherwise, by the use of force or
threats." Is Many of the examples referred to at
the hearings were of direct obstructions of in-
dividuals attempting to move goods across
state lines in order to market them.' 9 The res-
olution mandating these hearings referred to
newspaper accounts of the "so-called 'beer
rackets,' 'poultry rackets,' 'milk rackets,' 'food
rackets,' . . .-20 Other testimony suggested
that racketeering was an organized crime
rather than a crime performed by an individ-
ual,2 1 that it included gangs setting up protec-
tive societies,22 payments made to protect
against labor disputes, 23 and forcing individu-
als who tried to bring food into a city from
out of state to load the goods onto trucks
driven by local drivers.2 4 From the variety of
ideas expressed at the hearings, it is difficult to
derive a notion of what conduct the Anti-
Racketeering Act was meant to reach.
In an early interpretation of the statute, one
district court 25 recognized the difficulty of de-
fining racketeering, and resorted to reading the
six parts of the pre-statute hearings primarily
because the act passed without debate. The
court wrote:
'7 Id. at vol. I, pt. 1 (Testimony of Judge Rob-
ert P. Patterson). See also Comment, The Scope
of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Com-
merce Clause, 1972 U. Irs.. L.F. 805.
Is Hearings, supra note 15, vol. I, pt. 2.
19 Id. at vols. I & II, pts. 1-6. Senator Cope-
land, chairman of this committee, said, "We have a
protective racket, however, in the poultry business,
the poultry industry. Live poultry brought into
New Jersey, before it gets into New York City,
has to be loaded by certain men into certain
trucks. Otherwise it never lands in New York
City." Id. at vol. I, pt. 1.
20 Id. at vol. I, pt. 1.
21 Id. at vol. I, pt. 3 (statement of Mr. Green,
United States Attorney).
22 Id. at vol. I, pt. 2 (statement of Dr. Clayton
J. Ettinger).
23 Id. at vol. I, Pt. 1 (statements of George Z.
Medalie, United States District Attorney, Augus-
tine J. Smith, Sec. New York County Grand Ju-
rors Association, and Judge Thomas C. T. Crain,
District Attorney of New York City).
24 Id. at vol. I, pts. 1 & 2.
25 United States v. McGlone, 19 F. Supp. 285
(E.D. Pa. 1937).
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We did this [read the hearings], not with
the thought that the ideas and information
contained therein would be controlling neces-
sarily on a court, but inasmuch as racketeer-
ing, as at present understood, is a compara-
lively modern phrase of peril to the public it
was considered that these hearings attended by
outstanding figures in the world of law and
criminal investigation, would throw considera-
ble light on the evils sought to be prevented
and methods of prevention.
2 6
From the hearings, the court relied upon the
definition given by the then Assistant Attorney
General, Joseph B. Keenan:
It is the organized use of threats, coercion,
intimidation, and use of violence to compel the
payment for actual or alleged services of arbi-
trary or excessive charges under the guise of
membership dues, protection fees, royalties, or
service rates, the cloak of blackmail and
extortion.27
Yet it conceded, as did Keenan himself, that
the definition was much too broad.
28
The inconclusiveness of the hearings in de-
fining the proscribed activity can in part be at-
tributed to the fact that the hearings covered a
wide range of additional topics including kid-
napping, problems of sub-machine guns, jail
penalties and their deterrent effect, parole poli-
cies, gun control, and the need for a federal
Scotland Yard.29 Also, these hearings dis-
cussed the local nature of some of these activi-
ties and the need to restrict federal involve-
ment in the control of these areas. For
instance, Keenan testified that the basic prob-
lem of enforcement should be regarded as
local. 30 Professor John B. Waite of the Uni-
versity of Michigan stated:
28 Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
27 Id. at 287-288.
28 Hearings, supra note 15, vol. I, pt. 1, pp. 4-6.
29 Id. See generally vols. I & II, pts. 1-6.
30 Mr. Keenan states:
Basically the problem of law enforcement is
and should be the task of each single local
community. If it happens in some local com-
munity for the time being delegated the duty
of enforcing the laws to those who are either
incompetent or corrupt, surely it is not an im-
possible task for the members of such commu-
nity to rectify these conditions. The matter of
such correction is not and should not consti-
tute a Federal problem.
Id. at vol. I, pt. 1, p. 5.
Racketeering is very largely a local crime,
and it is only the local authorities that possi-
bly can handle it. It is not the Federal gov-
ernment. It has got to be done by local
authorities.21
Thus, even at this stage, the potential for an
overcrowded federal court system was noticed.
The few cases that were decided after the
enactment of the Anti-Racketeering Act, but
before the Hobbs Act was passed, provide a
view of the activities which the courts and
prosecutors deemed within the purview of the
Act. The evils included the use by union
officials of their positions to threaten labor
trouble or violence unless money was paid and
also the direct interference by individuals with
the movement of trucks carrying goods in in-
terstate commerce for sale or delivery. In
United States v. McGlone2 a union official
was charged with threatening to stop the
movement of trucks by the victim's company
unless money was paid. However, a labor pro-
vision within the Act resulted in the defend-
ant's acquittal. 3 In both Nick v. United
States24 and United States v. Compagna, 5
union strikes and violence were threatened by
the defendant union officials, the effect of which
would have been the prevention of the shipment
of films from out of state. In 1942 the Supreme
Court decided United States v. Local 807.8 In
this case the defendant, an official of a local
truckers union, conspired "to use and did use
violence and threats to obtain from the own-
Professor L. B. Schwartz wrote in 1948:
If genuinely national interests are at stake,
the controversies should not have to compete
with local breaches of the peace crowding the
calendar.
Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prose-
cutor's Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 64,
67 (1948).
31 Hearings, supra note 15, vol. I, pt. 3, p. 245.
Judge Skillman testified: "Ninety percent of crime
is probably purely local, has its beginning and end
within the confines of the city or the state, and as
to those matters, obviously the Government (Fed-
eral), under the present Constitutional restrictions
does not have the power." Id. at vol. I, pt. 2, p.
182.
22 19 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
33 Id. See also Anti-Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 420 (1934).
34 122 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1941).
22 146 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 567 (1945).
36 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
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ers" of trucks driven into New York from out
of state money equivalent to the union wages
for the day.
The inference to be drawn from the above-
mentioned cases is that the Anti-Racketeering
Act, as perceived by the prosecutors and some
courts, was aimed at threats of labor strikes
and violence to affect the stoppage of produc-
tion by companies, and at direct stoppage of
individuals trying to move across state lines to
market goods. The fact that these cases in-
volved actual stoppages of companies or indi-
viduals moving goods or accepting goods in in-
terstate commerce suggests that the effect upon
interstate commerce may have a significant re-
lationship to a specific determination of the
kinds of activity within the purview of this Act
or the Hobbs Act.
The Court in Local 807 did not uphold the
conviction despite the serious danger involved
in such activity. The Court questioned whether
or not the defendants' purpose was to obtain
"the payment and wages by a bona fide em-
ployee." It concluded that the activity fell
under the labor proviso and was, in effect, a
protection of wage demands.37 The controversy
stemming from the Court's substantial limita-
tion of the Anti-Racketeering Act eventually
induced Congress to pass the Hobbs Act so as
to reach the activities condoned in Local 807.38
The reaction to Local 807 and other legisla-
tive history of the Hobbs Act supports the
view that the effect upon commerce is a neces-
sary part of the intended proscriptions. Prior
to the passage of the Hobbs Act, its sponsor,
Mr. Hobbs, stated:
I want to make it perfectly clear that the sole
and simple purpose of this bill is to do the
best we can to protect interstate commerce
and free the highways and streets of this
country of robbers.39
Representative Summer stated, "The right of a
citizen of the country peacefully to proceed
along a public highway, carrying his produce
to market is a sacred right." 40 In reference to
the purposes of the Hobbs Act, Representative
Jennings stated:
37 Id. at 535.
38 91 CONG. REc. 11912 (1945).
39 Id. at 11900.
40 Id. at 11909.
It is a trap for a man who is boob enough to
go out and undertake to trample the rights of
American citizens under his feet and commit
highway robbery and interfere with them in
their right to market these products across
state lines. Properly, Congress could if it so
desired occupy the whole field with respect to
legislation affecting interstate commerce, but
we do not choose to do that. It is true that the
statutes of most States denounce robbery and
extortion as crimes but this act is peculiarly
appropriate because these offences many times
are committed at State lines and may in the
perpetration and consummation of the crimes
cross and recross State lines.41
The 1947 hearings on the effectiveness of the
Hobbs amendment in suppressing racketeering
focussed on the direct obstruction of the inter-
state movement of non-union dealers who de-
sired to market their goods.42 This emphasis
upon the interstate commerce aspect of the
Hobbs Act and its apparent requirement of di-
rectness and substantiality lends support to the
limitation of both the jurisdictional scope and
substantive aspect of the Hobbs Act.
Although analysis of the Hobbs Act and its
predecessor fails to reveal a clear notion of the
Act's objective, the nature of the actions
brought and the similarity of the language of
both acts are instructive on this point.4 3 The
Hobbs Act sought to discourage two activities:
labor extortion and obstruction of the move-
ment of individuals across state lines for the
purpose of marketing their goods. Both of
these activities have direct effects upon com-
41 Id. at 11911.
42 House Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Department report on "investigation of
the Effectiveness of the Anti-Racketeering Laws
and the Administration Thereof." H.R. Ri. No.
238, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) (hereinafter
cited as H.R. 238).
The major example considered in this report
was the disruption of the Philadelphia fruit mar-
kets. Farmers that were trying to carry their
goods to market were forced to unload their
trucks and lose the value of both seasoned crops
and perishable produce. Some of the farmers did
make it to market only to find that no one would
handle their goods. The report stated that "activ-
ity calculated to render their journey in commerce
futile and meaningless comes well within the ambit
of the legislative authority of Congress." Id. at 21.
43 See United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387, 389
(7th Cir. 1967); United States v. McGlone, 19 F.
Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
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merce. In the case of labor extortion, the
threat, if carried out, would stop the business
or company from continuing because of the
lack of labor. Such company would no longer
need goods including those delivered from out
of state. In the case of the obstruction of inter-
state movement, the threats were of violence
towards the victim, taking of the goods while
in transport, and forcing such victim to turn
back.4 4 It is difficult to be any more conclusive
from this early history and prosecution. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
Unhappily, there is no table of logarithms
for statutory construction. No item of evidence
has a fixed or even average weight. One or
another may be decisive in one set of circum-
stances, while of little value elsewhere. A
painstaking, detailed report by a Senate Com-
mittee bearing directly on the immediate ques-
tions may settle the matter. A loose statement
even by a chairman of a committee, made
impromptu in the heat of debate, less inform-
ing in cold type than when heard on the floor,
will hardly be accorded the weight of an
encyclical.
45
The Hobbs Act has been extensively ex-
panded since the 1940's and the early prosecu-
tion discussed above. The meaning of the word
"racketeering" and the target of the Act as
enunciated in the early prosecution has not
constituted a barrier to expansion for either
the prosecutors or the courts. Moreover, the
expansion has been both jurisdictional and
substantive. The jurisdictional expansion has
become so intertwined with the substantive ex-
pansion that it is virtually impossible to sepa-
rate them.
The Hobbs Act confers jurisdiction when an
individual "in any way or degree obstructs, de-
lays, or affects commerce." 46 Because the
matter of jurisdiction, as indicated at the be-
ginning of this comment, is auxiliary, it argua-
bly is distinct from the primary substantive
focus of the act. Accepting the above, this pri-
mary focus would be the general crime of rob-
bery and extortion. Yet, "effect upon commerce"
44 See H.R. 238, supra note 42; United States v.
Local 807, 315 U.S. 521 (1942) ; United States v.
McGlone, 19 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
45 Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading
of Statutes, 47 COLUmn. L. REv. 527, 543 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as Frankfurter].
is included in the definition of the offense and
therefore is a fundamental part of the crime
itself.47 Essentially two elements must be
proved for a Hobbs Act conviction: (a) that
there was either a robbery or an extortion and
(b) that there was an effect upon interstate
commerce by such extortion or robbery.
48
While an argument could be made that the ef-
fect upon interstate commerce is neutral and
by itself involves no evil,49 such an effect pro-
vides a definition of the boundaries within which
the proscribed activity falls. Congress could
have provided for other areas of jurisdiction in
addition to "affecting interstate commerce" and
thereby expand the scope of the Act. Because
such additional areas were not established the
46 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1948). See also note 13
sup ra.
47 See Abrams, supra note 1, at 33; Schwartz,
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutor's
Discretion, 13 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 64 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
48 See United States v. Nakaladsld, 481 F.2d
289 (5th Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Provenzano,
334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1964).
49 The effect the jurisdictional element has on
determining the evil which arguably can be
reached is an important part of this comment and
is addressed later on. The jurisdictional element is
a major feature of each offense. Abrams wrote in
his consultant's report: "The jurisdictional ele-
ment by itself, is not a proper index of criminal-
ity nor, for that matter, does it involve undesirable
conduct. Transportation in interstate commerce,
use of mails and similar pegs are in themselves
neutral activities." Abrams, supra note 1, at 40. It
can be argued that certain effects upon interstate
commerce can be considered in a negative manner
(i.e., obstructions, delay) given our industrial and
interdependent society, but it is one step further to
say that such delay or' obstruction necessitates
criminal sanctions.
The effect, though, can be very serious. The
court in United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d at
527, stated:
[I]t was enough proof of the effect of their
acts upon interstate commerce, that the group
found it more effective, when they were black-
mailing the producers, to threaten them with a
strike against the theatres. Nothing could
more completely illustrate the unity of the
whole industry; all its parts were like those
of a single elastic member in which an impact
upon one part is instantly transmitted every-
where. Moreover, not only would the produc-
ers feel the check upon the interstate move-
ments of their films when the exhibitors were
tied up; but since many of the exhibitors did
business on a small margin and must have a
constant supply of films to keep going at all, a
very short cessation of that supply at the




existing jurisdictional base has become increas-
ingly important in defining the purposes of the
Act. Its very use implies some limitation and
that limitation relates substantively to the type
of activity sought to be stopped.
The inquiry here is what meaning does "ef-
fect upon interstate commerce" bring to the
Hobbs Act. The analysis necessitates two ap-
proaches. The first is whether the jurisdic-
tional base is restricted by limitations placed
upon it by the Constitution. The second ap-
proach, from a statutory perspective, involves
the question of whether the jurisdictional base
can also be considered a part of the statute
where it is directly connected to the type of
proscribed activity. Determination of these is-
sues depends upon whether "effect upon inter-
state commerce" should be interpreted as it
was at the time the Hobbs Act was passed or
on a constitutional level as per the currently
accepted scope of interstate commerce, thereby
allowing for an expansive reading over time.50
5oSee generally Frankfurter, supra note 45;
LEvi, supra note 6. Mr. Justice Holmes, in Mis-
souri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), wrote
in reference to constitutional interpretation:
With regard to that we may add that when
we are dealing with words that also are a con-
stituent act, like the Constitution of the
United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of
which could not have been foreseen completely
by the most gifted of its begetters. It was
enough for them to realize or hope that they
had created an organism; it has taken a cen-
tury and has cost their successors much sweat
and blood to prove that they created a nation.
The case before us must be considered in the
light of our whole experience and not merely
in that of what was said a hundred years ago.
Levi wrote in AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REA-
SONING (1949) :
A change of mind from time to time is inevi-
table when there is a written constitution.
There can be no authoritative interpretation of
the Constitution. The Constitution in its gen-
eral provisions embodies the conflicting ideals
of the community. Who is to say what these
ideals mean in a definite way? Certainly not
the framers, for they did their work when the
words were put down. The words are ambigu-
ous. Nor can it be the Court, for the Court
cannot bind itself in this manner; an appeal
can always be made back to the Constitution.
Moreover, if it is said that the intent of the
framers ought to control, there is no mecha-
nism for any final determination of their in-
tent. Added to the problem of ambiguity and
the additional fact that the framers may have
intended a growing instrument, there is the in-
fluence of constitution worship. This influence
The legislative history of the Anti-Racket-
eering Act, as indicated earlier, included
much concern over federal intrusion into pri-
marily "local" matters. Many legislators felt
such activities should continue to be prosecuted
on the local level. 51 The hearings also empha-
sized the importance of local matters remain-
ing local as did the legislative history of the
Hobbs Act.52 Therefore the jurisdictional base
logically could be construed as a distinct limi-
tation on the scope of activities to be reached
by the Act. The examination in this comment
of the early history of both acts has demon-
strated that the activities involved, labor extor-
tion and obstruction of the interstate movement
of goods, direct the substantial effects upon
interstate commerce.53 This application by
prosecutors arguably reflects the desire to
stay within the intent of the legislature by pro-
secuting only those activities in which jurisdic-
tion can be constitutionally obtained while ad-
hering to the legislative protestations for
comity.
The factual situations prosecuted in the early
years of both Acts indicated that the effect upon
interstate commerce would be assumed from the
logical result of the situation in which the
victims refused to pay and thereby suffered
the consequences of the extortioner's threats.
The courts in effect declared that, but for the
payment to the extortioner, there would be a
direct and substantial effect upon interstate
commerce. 54 This approach seems proper since
to prosecute only those extortioners who carry
out their threats because of non-payment would
gives great freedom to a court. It can always
abandon what has been said in order to go
back to the written document itself.
Id. at 58-59.
51 See Hearings, supra note 15. Assistant Attor-
ney General Keenan remarked of his own defini-
tion of racketeering at these hearings:
If this broad definition were accepted, any at-
tempt to eradicate such evils would undoubt-
edly lead us into every branch of business
that is conducted in the country today ...
Basically the problem of law enforcement is
and should be the task of each single local
community.
rd. at vol. I, pt. 1.
52 See 91 CONG. RFc. 11839-11921, (1945).
-3 See text accompanying notes 1-45 supra.
54 United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524 (2d
Cir. 1944) ; Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660
(8th Cir. 1941); United States v. McGlone, 19
F.2d 285 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
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reward those who could create so much fear in
their victims that payment would be virtually
assured. The jurisdiction was derived, there-
fore, from a potential effect upon interstate
commerce. As in Nick v. Uzited States, the
court indicated that if the threat had been car-
ried out, there would have been a stoppage of
certain items coming to Missouri from
California. 5  While there was no actual effect,
the potential clearly existed in the unarticu-
lated probability of interference with interstate
commerce based upon the nature of the busi-
ness and seriousness of the threats. Local 807
and McGlone both involved threats of direct
obstruction or stoppage of individuals moving
goods across state lines to market.5" Actual ef-
fects in these cases met the jurisdictional re-
quirement. If the strikes had occurred in Nick
and Campagna, the business would have closed
and their demand for goods from other states
would stop.
57
The -interstate commerce aspect of the Hobbs
Act is inextricably tied to the nature of the ac-
tivity proscribed.58 The validity of requiring a
showing of substantial effect upon interstate
commerce is bolstered by the interpretations of
the Supreme Court at the time the Hobbs Act
and Anti-Racketeering Act were passed as to
what the necessary effect was to have on Con-
stitutional authority for federal prosecution. 9
55 122 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1941).
56United States v. Local 807, 315 U.S. 521
(1942); United States v. McGlone, 19 F.2d 285
(E.D. Pa. 1937).
57 United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524 (2d
Cir. 1944); Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660
(8th Cir. 1941).
5sSee generally Abrams, supra note 1;
Schwartz, supra note 47; Comment, The Scope of
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Conm-
inerce Clause, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 805.
59 See Note, Racketeering, Bank Robbery, and
"Kick-Back" Laws, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 445
(1934) :
The words of the Anti-Racketeering Act must
be contrasted with "the insistence heretofore
evidenced in the opinions of the Supreme Court
that only such intrastate activities come within
the commerce power of Congress as operate
to obstruct or burden interstate commerce "di-
rectly", "substantially", or "unduly" to select
but three of the most commonly employed re-
strictive adverbs.
Id. at 447. Although many cases decided during the
1940's were expansive in nature they still required
significant effects upon interstate commerce to
allow the application of statutes passed by Con-
gress. The Court in United States v. Wrightwood
Arguably, in light of the decisions and the leg-
islative history, the direct and substantial ef-
fects were the minimal levels required for the
application of the Hobbs Act to be valid.
For more than twenty years after passage of
the Hobbs Act the activity pursued by federal
prosecutors almost invariably involved labor
officials threatening strikes or work stoppages
unless their victims consented to pay the extor-
tionist fees.60 These extorted payments were to
Dairy, 315 U.S, 110 (1942) said that the com-
merce "power extends to those intrastate activities
which in a substantial way interfere with or ob-
struct the exercise of the granted power." 315
U.S. at 119. The Court in Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942) stated that the power could be
extended to activities "if [they] exert a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce." 317 U.S.
at 125. See also Live Poultry Dealers Protective
Association v. United States, 4 F.2d 840 (1924).
As will be shown later in this comment, many
of the activities prosecuted today under the Hobbs
Act involve intrastate actions which may or may
not have an indirect effect upon interstate com-
merce. See text accompanying notes 60-82 infra.
Whether they fall within jurisdictional purview of
the Hobbs Act depends upon the nature and extent
of the effect. The Hobbs Act makes the effect an
essential element of the offense. There was no find-
ing by Congress of an effect whenever the sub-
stantive activity proscribed was prosecuted; such
prosecution necessarily had to prove such effect to
the satisfaction of the judge. As the Court in
United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S.
441 (1953) said when discussing the constitutional
questions raised: "No precedent of this Court sus-
tains the power of Congress to enact legislation
penalizing failure to report information concern-
ing acts not shown to be in, or mingled with, or
found to affect commerce." 346 U.S. at 446.
1o See, e.g., Stironev United States, 361 U.S. 212
(1960) (labor official threatened obstruction of the
movements of cement to victim's company and also
threatened labor trouble if payments were not
made to him) ; United States v. Kramer, 355 F.2d
891 (7th Cir. 1966) (payment of union officer to
assure that there were good men on the job, oth-
erwise there would be obstruction by delay in pro-
duction) ; United States v. Critchley, 353 F.2d 358
(3d Cir. 1965) (union business agent threatened
labor strikes or "lay downs" if he did not receive
money; some lay downs actually occurred);
United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678 (3d
Cir. 1964) (union officer threatened labor trouble
from his men if not paid off); United States v.
Tolub, 309 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1962) (defendant, a
business agent for a union threatened labor trouble
if not paid a certain amount each week) ; Cape v.
United States, 283 F2d 430 (9th Cir. 1960)
(union business agent told company that current
labor troubles would cease if he were paid a certain
amount of money).
At the circuit court level the conviction in Sti-
rone was affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed
on a variance issue. Judge Hastie dissented at the-
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ensure that no strike would occur and that ne-
gotiated settlements would be made. Courts
continued to use the analysis that if the threats
were carried out, they would cause stoppages
or delays of interstate movement of goods es-
sential to the businesses involved.61 United
States v. Pranno62 and other early cases
clearly demonstrate that there had to be some
nexus between the threat and its potential ef-
fect upon interstate commerce in order to gain
jurisdiction under the Hobbs.63
Prosecutors then developed a theory that in
certain situations money paid to the extor-
tioner or robber depleted the victim's assets,
thus restricting the victim's buying power in
circuit court level on the grounds that the Hobbs
Act was being extended too far. He stated :
Finally it should be considered and kept in
•mind that the control and punishment of local
extortion is primarily the business of local or
state government. The Hobbs Act is auxiliary
and partially duplicating federal superimposi-
tion on state law enforcement. In the view of
Congress this is a desirable measure of federal
assistance to the states in the exercise of their
police power. But where state power and re-
sponsibility are thus primary and the national
government is merely performing an auxiliary
function, we should not be eager to stretch
federal jurisdiction to cover doubtful cases of-
fering only a tenuous or speculative theory of
federal jurisdiction.
262 F.2d 571, 579 (3d Cir. 1958).
See also United States v. Palmiotti, 254 F.2d
491 (2d Cir. 1958) (union business agent threat-
ened labor strikes on construction project unless
he was paid certain amounts of money); United
States v. Varlack, 225 F2d 665 (2d Cir. 1955)
(union official threatened to cause and prolong
work stoppages in the unloading of raw sugar
from ships unless personal payments were made to
him); Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171
(8th Cir. 1955) (labor representative threatened
labor trouble on pipeline construction project un-
less he was personally paid some money) ; Bianchi
v. United States, 219 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1955)
(union official used his position to threaten union
strike and unrest unless he was personally paid
money); Hulahan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441
(8th Cir. 1954) (labor official threatened labor
strikes which would put construction company out
of business unless money was paid to him person-
ally) ; United States v. Kemble, 198 F.2d 889 (3d
Cir. 1952) (union business agent stopped truckers
and forced them to pay him money before they
could unload).
61 See, e.g., Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d
182 (8th Cir. 1955); Hulahan v. United States,
214 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1954).
62 385 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1966).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 355 F.2d
.891 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Palmiotti,
.254 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1958) ; United States v. Var-
lack, 225 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1955).
interstate commerce and satisfying the require-
ment for "effect upon interstate commerce." In
United States v. Provenzano64 the court stated:
When resources of a business are depleted or
diminished in any measure or degree by pay-
ments of money obtained by extortion the
capacity to efficiently conduct such business is
to the extent of the diminishment . . . of its
resources likely to be impaired.65
Eventually many courts simply assumed the ef-
fect upon interstate commerce from the deple-
tion of assets alone and not from the projected
result of the threat if carried out.66 The
unarticulated probability or potential for effect
upon interstate commerce have become increas-
ingly more speculative in the recent decisions.
67
Now the courts consider the potential effect to
the business of paying the extorted fees rather
than the projected effect of the threat if carried
out. One major problem with this change to a
depletion of assets theory is in the likelihood
that the "potential effect" from such depletion
reaching a level where an "effect upon inter-
state commerce" can be assumed by the court
for jurisdictional purposes. Thus far there has
been little analysis of the possible ramifications
of this change to a depletion of assets for juris-
dictional purposes, or of the reasons why the
problems originally attacked by the Hobbs Act
did not suggest limitations upon the substantive
and jurisdictional requirements for prosecu-
tion.08
In United States v. Pacente, 9 for example,
the money extorted by the defendant from a
bar owner was equated with the effect upon in-
terstate commerce merely because the owner
usually purchased beer which had been brewed
in another state. The court thus resolved that
the depletion of assets meant less buying power
for the victim. This conclusion, however, would
64 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1964).
65 Id. at 679.
66 See, e.g., United States v. Irali, 503 F.2d
1295 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Pacente,
503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1974); Esperti v. United
States, 406 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1969) ; United States
v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968).
67 United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d 595 (5th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d
139 (7th Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Augello, 451
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971).
68 Id.
69 503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir. 1974).
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not necessarily follow unless the amount ex-
torted -was sufficient to put him out of business
or keep him from expanding. Otherwise, there
would have been no effect upon -interstate com-
merce. The more logical conclusion is that the
bar owner continued to purchase to meet the
customers' demands. The fact that minor ex-
tortions were made would not necessarily have
affected his buying habits of beer, since to stay
in business he had to meet the demands of his
customers coming into the tavern. The court in
this case disregarded any such analysis of the
probabilities and assumed the extreme effect.
While the temptation is strong to uphold the
conviction for this sort of activity, particularly
in light of the extortioner's official position,
consideration must be given to the purposes of
the statute, the jurisdictional requirements, and
the need for consistency of decisions.
The depletion of assets theory alone has cre-
ated significant basis for expansive use of the
Hobbs Act by federal prosecutors. Judge Swy-
gert of the Seventh Circuit stated in his dissent
in United States v. Ainabile :70
If a depletion of reserves is all that is nec-
essary to shlow the requisite affect [sic] on
commerce, then a threat of any kind to extract
moneyL made to a person who happens to
operate a business engaged to any extent in
interstate commerce comes within the statute's
proscription. Under this rationale, a retail
store owner, for example, would be afforded
federal protection from extortion, regardless
of the nature or the likely effect of the threat,
simply because his stock in merchandise had
in some measure moved in interstate com-
merce. I do not believe that the Hobbs Act was
intended to have such a broad reach.71
In United States v. A.gello 2 money was ex-
torted from a hamburger stand which pur-
chased meat from another state. Jurisdiction
was founded upon the depletion of assets with
the effect upon interstate commerce assumed
therefrom.7 3 The possibility for even further
extention is exemplified in United States v.
Pearson.7 4 Here the defendant attempted to rob
the safety deposit boxes of a hotel that had
70 395 F2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968).
71 Id. at 55.
72 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971).
73 Id.
74 508 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1975).
both in-state and out-of-state guests. The court
quickly dismissed the contention that there was
no federal jurisdiction, stating:
The evidence established that this hotel enter-
tained a large number of out of state visitors,
thus establishing the required interstate nexus.
Only slight evidence is required to show an
interference with interstate commerce. [cita-
tions ommitted] This point lacks merit.7 5
The court in Pearson assumed the effect with-
out any actual depletion of assets from the
mere fact of the presence of customers from
other states. Even if robbery had occurred
there was no suggestion that future operations
of the hotel would have been impaired or that
guests would not have returned because of
such robbery. The only evidence offered was
that of the registration cards indicating that a
number of the guests were from out of state.
78
Carrying this jurisdictional rationale to its
logical extreme, the requisite effect, albeit po-
tential, is established when robbery or extor-
tion is committed against any individual who
has in the past purchased goods manufactured
in another state. After all, these individuals are
potential buyers of goods whose resources have
been depleted. Is there a significant difference
between the potential effect upon interstate
commerce when $100 is taken from a ham-
burger stand or tavern and when $100 is taken
from the pocket of an individual on the street?
Furthermore, when a small amount of money is
taken from a store or tavern owner, the threat
to the existence of the enterprise is negligible.
The enterprise more than likely will continue
to purchase goods in interstate commerce to
meet the demands of its customers and forego
some profit because of the payoffs. An individ-
ual, on the other hand, is more likely to forego
some goods which may be made out of state if
such purchases are not essential to the contin-
ued existence of that individual. Assuming,
arguendo, that this theory on the interstate
commerce effect is valid, it is clear that the ac-
tivities reached by recent prosecutions are not
the same as those developed by the legislative
history or prosecuted during the initial twenty
years of the Hobbs Act.
7 7
75 Id. at 597.7
6 Id. at 596.
77 See note 60 supra.
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The Seventh Circuit, en banc, has carried
the "potential effect upon interstate commerce"
theory to what may be its furthest extent by
holding in United States v. Staszcuk :T
[T]hat the commerce element of the Hobbs Act
violation-the federal jurisdictional fact-may
be satisfied even if the record demonstrates
that the extortion had no actual effect on
commerce. Congressional concern is justified
by the harmful consequences of the class of
transactions to which the individual extortion
belongs, and jurisdiction in the particular case
is satisfied by showing a realistic probability
that an extortionate transaction will have
some effect on interstate commerce.
7 9
The Court decided that it was for the jury to
assess the probabilities of there being some ef-
fect upon interstate commerce at the time the
extortion took place. As with the depletion of
assets theory, the Court in Staszcuk did not
articulate how the jury was to analyze the
probabilities. In many other Hobbs Act prose-
cutions the Court has made the determination
of whether there was sufficient effect upon in-
terstate commerce to gain federal jurisdiction.
The purpose of the extortion in Staszcuk
was to ensure a zoning change to enable the
victim to build a particular building. The pay-
off was made but the building eventually built
could have been built under the former zoning.
The Court instructed the jury:
It is not necessary for you to find that the
defendant Staszcuk knew or intended that his
actions would affect, delay or obstruct com-
merce or the movement of any article in com-
merce; it is only necessary that the natural
effect of the act committed by him, whether
he was conscious of it or not, would be to
affect, delay or obstruct commerce. 80
In footnote eighteen the Court further stated:
The instruction in this case required the
jury to find that the "natural effect" of the
transaction would be to affect commerce ...
We find no significant difference between that
phrasing and a test phrased in terms of a
"realistic probability" of such an effect.81
78 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir. 1975).
79 Id. at 59-60.
80 Id. at 56 n.6.
81 Id. at 60 n.18.
In Staszcuk the assessment of the probabilities
rested upon the object of the payoff (the
change in zoning so a particular building
could be built) at the time it was made even
though the payoff actually caused no effect
upon interstate commerce and at the time of
trial such effect was virtually impossible.
Apparently, the Court disregards any effect
the jurisdictional element has upon the sub-
stantive nature of the offense by construing
"Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, de-
lays or affects commerce . . .by robbery or ex-
tortion . . ." as only the "Federal jurisdic-
tional fact." As was stated in judge Pell's
dissent in Staszcuk:
The net effect of the majority decision is to
construe the statute to read: 'Whoever in any
way or degree potentially obstructs, delays, or
affects commerce, even though he does not actu-
ally obstruct, delay, or affect commerce. . .' 82
But Judge Pell does not point out that many of
the earlier labor extortion Hobbs Act prosecu-
tions involved a situation where but for the pay-
off there would have been an effect upon inter-
state commerce. In those cases it was the po-
tential result, had the threat been carried out,
which provided federal jurisdiction. With the
depletion of assets theory this was reversed.
There it was the actual payoff that prevented
the carrying out of the threat which became the
"effect" upon interstate commerce. The deple-
tion of assets became, in these decisions, the
"evil" to be stopped. In Staszcuk, if there had
been no payoff the status quo would have re-
mained intact. Also, the depletion of assets
theory -is not used. The prevention of a zoning
change as a probable effect was not discussed.
The Court only discussed the effect in terms of
the building that required a zoning change be-
fore it could be built. This is taken further by
saying that the object which may bring about
an effect need only be in the mind of the per-
son paying the money at the time of the extor-
tion whether or not such object is carried out.
On a substantive level the courts are disre-
garding the history and early prosecution of
the Hobbs Act, and are reading the words as
broadly as the United States attorneys are
willing to argue.
82 Id. at 62 (Pell, J., dissenting).
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Disregarding the substantive deviations, one
must question whether the courts have inter-
preted correctly the words "effect upon inter-
state commerce." The answer to this is in part
dependent upon whether these words should be
interpreted solely in a constitutional sense or
by taking into consideration the statutory pur-
poses behind the Hobbs Act itself. Even as-
suming that the words "effect upon interstate
commerce" are literally coincident with the
farthest constitutional extention of the com-
merce power, it does not necessarily follow
that they should be -interpreted as such for
purposes of the Hobbs Act.
A constitutional interpretation of the juris-
dictional element of the Hobbs Act would limit
prosecution only to the extent the Supreme
Court would limit Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce. There are both legal and
policy reasons for opposing this kind of inter-
pretation.
The argument for a broad constitutional
reading of the jurisdictional base of the Hobbs
Act is justified by using the recent civil rights
cases and their apparent exhaustion of Con-
gress' power to regulate commerce under the
Constitution.83 Substantively it is very difficult
to analogize the civil rights proscriptions to
the Hobbs Act because of the entirely different
activities and circumstances involved. 4 The
civil rights cases involve situations where
"Congress itself has said that a particular ac-
tivity affects Commerce. .." 85 The Anti-Loan
Sharking Act is another example where Con-
83 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964). See also Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146 (1971) ; Abrams, supra note 1, at 36.
84 See United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 54
(7th Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion). Judge Swy-
gert stated in dissent:
The majority quotes from Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), to support the
proposition that, "Since Congress has used all
its 'broad and sweeping' commerce power in
enacting the Hobbs Act, the courts have
rightly attributed great scope to the statute." I
respectfully submit that the abstract language
quoted from McClung has no application to
the instant case. A decision upholding the con-
stitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
under the commerce power can hardly have
pertinency to the intended scope of the Hobbs
Act.
395 F.2d at 55 n.l.
s8 See Perez v. Unite States, 402 U.S. 146
gress made specific findings that a particular
activity had the requisite effect upon interstate
commerce.8 6
In Katzenbach v. McClung8 7 the Court re-
ferred to hearing testimony that discrimination
in restaurants had "a direct and highly restric-
tive effect upon interstate travel by
Negroes." 88 In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States 9 the Court sustained the constitution-
(1971). The Court in Perez referring to Heart of
Atlanta Motel said, "The Act declared that any inn,
hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides
lodging to transient guests affects commerce per
se." 402 U.S. at 153. The Court in Heart of At-
lanta Motel in reference to the Congressional power
to pass the Act which allowed equal access to hous-
ing and motel accommodations stated:
This testimony included the fact that our
people have become increasingly mobile with
millions of people of all races traveling from
State to State; that Negroes in particular
have been the subject of discrimination in
transient accommodations, having to travel
great distances to secure the same; that often
they have been unable to obtain accommodations
and have had to call upon friends to put them
up overnight .... These ... practices were
found to be nationwide, the Under Secretary of
Commerce testifying that there is "no question
that this discrimination in the North still ex-
ists to a large degree" and in the West and
Midwest as well.
379 U.S. at 303.
The Court in Katzenbach v. McClung stated:
Here, as there, Congress has determined for
itself that refusals of service to Negroes have
imposed burdens both upon the interstate flow
of food and upon the movement of products
generally. Of course, the mere fact that Con-
gress has said when particular activity shall
be deemed to affect commerce does not pre-
clude further examination by this Court.
379 U.S. at 303.
86 Anti-Loan Sharking statutes, Title II of the
Consumer Credit P-otection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 891
et seq. The Court in Perez v. United States, in
upholding the constitutionality of the Anti-Loan
Sharking Act, discussed many committee reports
and hearings which indicated the national problem
with loan sharking and then stated:
The essence of all these reports are hear-
ings was summarized and embodied in formal
congressional findings. They supplied Congress
with the knowledge that the loan shark racket
provides organized crime with its second most
lucrative source of revenue, exacts millions
from the pockets of people, coerces its victims
into the commission of crimes against prop-
erty, and causes the takeover by racketeers of
legitimate businesses.
402 U.S. at 156. See generally 114 CONG. REc.
14391, 14392, 14395, 14396.
87 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
88 Id. at 300.
89 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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ality of the Civil Rights Act requiring hotel or
motel accommodations for Negro guests affects
commerce per se." 90 The finding of unconsti-
tutionality of this activity also rested upon the
conclusion that it "substantially affected com-
merce" and constituted direct obstructions to
an individual's right to travel because of the
difficulty of getting accommodations at night.9'
The test of Congressional right to exercise
power under the Commerce Clause, as enunci-
ated in Heart of Atlanta Motel, was whether the
"activity sought to be regulated is commerce
which concerns more States than one and has
a real and substantial relation to the national
interest." 92
The Supreme Court in these civil rights
cases indicated that when Congress makes di-
rect findings of effect upon interstate com-
merce, the judicial inquiry need only concern
whether the finding of a "direct and adverse
effect on the free flow of interstate commerce"9
was rational and whether the activities involved
were of the class of activities intended to be
regulated by the Act.94
The prosecutions of the Hobbs Act, in con-
trast, have not relied on any legislative find-
ings of effect upon interstate commerce. As
has been indicated earlier, many of the activi-
ties now prosecuted under the Hobbs Act
would have a great deal of difficulty falling
into the class of activities that were being
proscribed by Congress when the Act was
passed. More important to the jurisdictional
issue, however, is the fact that the effect upon
interstate commerce for application of the
Hobbs Act must be found at trial and not in
the legislative history. It is a major part of the
application of the Act itself.95 The hearings be-
fore passage of the Anti-Racketeering Act did
not make general findings of an effect per se,
but indicated that the statute could only reach
those actions which did, in fact, affect inter-
state commerce.
90 Id.
91See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964) ; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964)
92 379 U.S. at 255.
93 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971) ; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
94 Id.
95 See Abrams, supra note 1; Schwartz, supra
note 2.
The Hobbs Act falls into the category de-
scribed in United States v. Darby9  in which
the court is left to determine whether the ac-
tivity has the prohibited effect upon interstate
commerce. It therefore must be distinguished
from the civil rights cases where Congress
found an effect per se or made the determina-
tion within the Act itself and thereby reduced
the evidentiary proof necessary for jurisdic-
tional purposes. The Court in Darby stated:
Congress has sometimes left it to the courts to
determine whether the intrastate activities
have the prohibited effect on commerce, as in
the Sherman Act. It has sometimes left it to
an administrative board or agency to deter-
mine whether the activities sought to be regu-
lated or prohibited have such effect, as in the
case of the Interstate Commerce Act, and the
National Labor Relations Act, or whether
they come within the statutory definition of
the prohibited Act, as in the Federal Trade
Commission Act. And sometimes Congress
itself has said that a particular activity affects
the commerce .... 97
The Hobbs Act history and application are in-
conclusive and ambiguous. The two clear sub-
stantive activities intended to be reached, espe-
cially in light of the early prosecution,
involved (1) labor officials threatening work
stoppage or strikes if money was not paid and
(2) actual stoppage of truckers and other indi-
viduals moving goods across state lines for
marketing. Both of these examples involve di-
rect effects upon interstate commerce. There-
fore, the substantial and direct effects which
Congress specifically found in the civil rights
situation must also be found by the courts in
the Hobbs Act cases.
Courts in recent Hobbs Act interpretations,
however, have reached activities not discussed
in the legislative history, yet which are neces-
sarily assumed to have a sufficient effect upon
interstate commerce.98 For example, the courts
have assumed said effect in police shakedowns,
the hamburger stand extortion, and the hotel
9
GUnited States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
97 Id. at 120.98 See, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d
595 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Irali, 503
F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Pa-
cente, 503 F2d 543 (7th Cir. 1974) ; United States
v. Augello, 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971); United
States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968).
9 See note 98 supra.
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robbery.9 9 Many of the recent Hobbs Act cases
have held that such obstructions upon interstate
commerce do not have to be specifically proved
despite the absence of legislative findings as to
the effect upon interstate commerce that could
be applicable to all activities which arguably
fall into the class of activities regulated. 100
There was no indication in the legislative his-
tory that the payoffs were going to actually
reduce the buying power of a tavern owner,
hotel owner, or hamburger stand. Furthermore,
these are not cases where the customers are
precluded from entering the establishments.' 0'
The Congressional hearings and legislative
history of the Hobbs Act do not reflect the na-
tional character of all the possible activities
that could arguably be included within the
amorphous term "racketeering." Courts have not
required actual proof of a national effect upon
interstate commerce. Nevertheless, broad inter-
pretations of the jurisdictional base should not
become a pretext for evading legislative his-
tory or denying past precedent, especially
where the activities reached could have been
adequately described by the legislators. 0 2 As
one commentator stated,
The maintenance of order is the precondi-
tion of any freedom in a society, and where
the subject matter of regulation is such as to
make unfeasible modes of law administration
other than those which involve ad hoc judg-
ments, considerable pressures are created in
favor of permitting an ad hoc judgment
scheme. Whether those pressures will succeed
depends not merely upon narrow questions as
to the naked comprehensibility of a statutory
phrase, but upon the entire context of the regu-
lation attempted, the danger to the public inter-
est of the activity as unregulated and the loss
to the individual which results from its regula-
tion.103
100Id. See also H.R. 238, supra note 42, at
11840-11912.
01See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964) ; Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
' 0 2 See generally LEvi, supra note 6; Abrams,
supra note 1; Amsterdam, The Void for Vague-
ness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 67 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam];
Frankfurter, supra note 45.
103 Amsterdam, supra note 102, at 95-96. With
the actual reach of the Hobbs Act in question,
such vagueness could lead to selective and unfair
enforcement by officials, license to prosecutors to
The damage to the individual is underscored
mostly in terms of the difference between the
state penalty and the federal penalty of up to
twenty years and the nonapplicability of double
jeopardy as the concept is presently
interpreted. 04 The present extention of the
Hobbs Act, jurisdictionally and substantively,
indicates a disregard on the part of the courts
of the legislative history and a significant de-
viation from the long standing policy of
strictly construing criminal statutes. 0 5
In 1960 Congress passed the Anti-Loan
Sharking Act which proscribes an activity in
which Congress specifically found a per se ef-
fect upon interstate commerce. Under the cur-
rent statutory and jurisdictional interpreta-
tions, this activity clearly falls within the
proscriptions of the Hobbs Act. The facts of
Perez v. United States,0 upholding the con-
stitutionality of the Anti-Loan Sharking Act,
involve the use of violence against a butcher
store owner in order to extort payments of
money and interest. The owner paid upon pe-
riodic demands and eventually went out of
business. Either a depletion of assets theory
or a direct effect theory could have brought
this activity into the purview of the Hobbs
Act. 07 It is unlikely, however, that Congress
would have passed the Anti-Loan Sharking
Act unless it felt that the specific activity of
loan sharking was distinct from the kinds of
activities covered by the Hobbs Act. Arguably,
at the time that Congress passed the Anti-
Loan Sharking Act, it assumed that the activi-
ties reached under the Hobbs Act were limited
to the kind that had already been prosecuted.
This was before federal prosecutors found new
arguments for the extention of federal jurisdic.
tion under the Hobbs Act.
Little has been said in recent prosecutions
under the Hobbs Act, about the fact that when
make initial determinations of fact, license to courts
to essentially write a law which substitutes the
law-making by a judicial elite for lawmaking by
elected representatives, and also undermines the
assumption that every man is presumed to know
the law.
30 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
105 LEvi, supra note 6; Amsterdam, supra note
102; Frankfurter, mepra note 45.
108 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
10 7 See United States v. Nakaladski, 481 F.2d
289 (5th Cir. 1973).
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it was passed the interstate commerce test was
stricter than is now being allowed. To accept
the interpretation of the commerce clause at
the time of passage of the Act, an assumption
must be made. That assumption is that Con-
gress, in attempting to write laws which are
constitutional, assumed the stricter test for ef-
fect upon interstate commerce.' 08 This would
mean that Congress, by adding the jurisdic-
tional base as an essential part of the gist of
the Hobbs Act, actually limited the scope of
the Act, thereby not reaching activities under
the presently interpreted reach of the com-
merce power.
An argument could be made that when Con-
gress passed the Hobbs Act they expected that
the jurisdictional base was to be as flexible as
the future constitutional interpretations al-
lowed. Moreover, an argument could be made
that congressional acquiescence regarding the
recent use of the Hobbs Act could be construed
as a ratification of the broad interpretation.
Congress, however, has a duty to write consti-
tutional statutes and is not empowered to dele-
gate unlimited authority to the courts. This vio-
lates the basic concept of separation of powers.
Regarding the acquiescence argument, Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter wrote, "[W]hile authority
conferred does not atrophy by disuse, failure
over an extended period to exercise it is proof
that it was not given." 1o
The first twenty years of prosecution of the
Hobbs Act indicates a different meaning than
is presently being allowed."10 The acquiescence
argument obviously assumes that Congress is
continually monitoring the judicial interpreta-
tions of the criminal statutes including the
Hobbs Act. This argument in support of the
308 The Court in United States v. Five Gam-
bling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953) stated:
This Court does and should accord a strong
presumption of constitutionality to Acts of
Congress. This is not a mere police gesture. It
is a deference due to deliberate judgment by
constitutional majorities of the two Houses of
Congress that an Act is within their delegated
power or is necessary and proper to execution
of that power. The rational and practical force
of the presumption is at its maximum only
when it appears that the precise point in issue
here has been considered by Congress and has
been explicitly and deliberately resolved.
346 U.S. at 449.
109 Frankfurter, supra note 45.
110 See note 60 supra.
present expansion must be rejected for policy
reasons. Such monitoring is not done in a
public manner; therefore citizens cannot know
what is criminal since the statutes will change
meaning by gradual accretions which are not
reflected in the legislative history or statutory
language. The effect, if allowed, would be the
creation of federal common law crimes tan-
gentially based upon a statute. In addition, the
present expansive interpretations of the Hobbs
Act should be rejected because there is evidence
that Congress at one time evaluated the Act's
target as being the direct obstruction of inter-
state movement of goods.' Considerations of
four factors: (1) legislative history; (2) the
first twenty years of prosecution; (3) the con-
gressional need to enact the anti-loan sharking
stature which under present intepretations could
have fallen within the purview of the Hobbs Act;
and (4) the judicial policy of strict construc-
tion of criminal statutes, suggests that the
Hobbs Act should be narrowed considerably
and the legislative functions returned to the
legislature.
In permitting the extension of the Hobbs
Act the courts have also disregarded any con-
sideration of comity. Although an acceptable
definition of what constitutes a local activity
has never been given, comity is a fundamental
precept of a political system made up of a con-
federation of states with individual state
governments."112 As previously indicated, the
history of the Hobbs Act included much dis-
cussion of the fear of intrusion into local mat-
ters. Substance must therefore be given to the
concept of comity. When considering the
anti-loan sharking bill, Congress had some
of the same fears of intrusion into local mat-
ters. In contrast to the Hobbs Act, Congress
found the effect upon interstate commerce to
be per se in the loan sharking situation, mak-
ing it clear that it desired the imposition of
"I H.R. 238, supra note 42.
112 See, e.g., Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82
(1971); Boyle v. Landry 401 U.S. 77 (1971);
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971) ; Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) ; Hufstedler, Comity
and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the
Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 841 (1972);
Note, Federal Court Intervention in State Crinii-
nal Proceedings, 85 HARV. L. REv. 301 (1971);
Note, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute and
Declaratory Judgments in Constitutional Litigation,
83 HARv. L. Rlv. 1870 (1970).
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federal authority."1 3 Yet, in Perez v. United
States, the issue was still raised in the dissent.
Mr. Justice Stewart said:
In order to sustain this law we would, in
my view, have to be able at the least to say
that Congress could rationally have concluded
that loan sharking is an activity with inter-
state attributes that distinguish it in some sub-
stantial respect from other local crime. But it
is not enough to say that loan sharking is a
national problem, for all crime is a national
problem. It is not enough to say that some
loan sharking has interstate characteristics, for
any crime may have an interstate setting. And
the circumstance that loan sharking has an
adverse impact on interstate business is not a
distinguishing attribute, for interstate business
suffers from almost all criminal activity, be it
shoplifting or violence in the streets.
Because I am unable to discern any rational
distinction between loan sharking and other
local crime I cannot escape the conclusion that
this statute was beyond the power of Congress
to enact"14
The fact that many of the activities now prose-
cuted under the Hobbs Act involve local con-
siderations raises the question of whether the
policy of comity should limit the expansion of
the scope of Hobbs Act prosecution. Mr. jus-
tice Frankfurter specifically referred to the im-
portance of considering the states' interests
when interpreting regulation based upon inter-
state commerce.
More frequently still, in the interpretation of
recent regulatory statutes, it becomes important
to remember that the judicial task in marking
out the extent to which Congress has exer-
cised its constitutional power over commerce
is not that of devising an abstract formula.
The task is one of accommodation as between
assertions of new federal authority and his-
toric functions of the individual states. Federal
legislation of this character cannot therefore
be construed without regard to the implications
of our dual system of government. In such
cases, for example, it is not to be assumed as
a matter of course that when Congress adopts
a new scheme for federal industrial regulation,
it deals with all situations falling within the
general mischief which gave rise to the legisla-
tion. The underlying assumptions of our dual
11 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971).
"4 Id. at 157 (dissenting opinion).
form of government, and the consequent pre-
suppositions of legislative draftsmanship which
are expressive of our history and habits, cut
across what might otherwise be the implied
range of legislation. The history of congres-
sional legislation regulating not only interstate
commerce as such but also activities inter-
twined with it, justify the generalization that,
when the Federal Government takes over such
local regulations in the vast network of our
national economic enterprise and thereby radi-
cally readjusts the balance of state and national
authority, those charged with the duty of leg-
islating are reasonably explicit and do not
entrust its attainment to that retrospective
expansion of meaning which properly deserves
the stigma of judicial legislation."15
The nature of auxiliary jurisdiction indicates
some potential infringement upon what was
once regarded as a state matter."16 Considering
this policy and the legislative history of the
Hobbs Act, the courts should be reluctant to
expand the interpretation of the Act to activi-
ties not specifically addressed by the
legislators."17
The above discussion of the expansion of the
Hobbs Act by no means assumes that those ac-
tivities should not be prosecuted by either a
state or federal agency. It does illustrate, how-
ever, the potential effect of drafting statutes
with auxiliary jurisdictional bases comprising
a fundamental part of the offense in addition
to general substantive provisions such as
robbery and extortion. The jurisdictional
link of "effect upon interstate commerce" has
legitimized federal involvement to the point
where the potential scope of federal prosecu-
tion is apparently without bounds.""8  The
125 Frankfurter, supra note 45, at 539-40.
"16 See Abrams, supra note 1; Schwartz, supra
note 2.
'17 See generally LEvr, supra note 6; Frank-
furter, supra note 45.
118 Abrams writes:
The use of the concept of "affecting com-
merce" in a Title 18 penal provision arguably
could be relied upon to extend to Federal
criminal law enforcement the scope of juris-
diction that attaches to other Federal regula-
tory legislation based upon a similar formula.
In section 1951 Congress has used a jurisdic-
tional formula which, if interpreted broadly
and extended to all substantive offenses, would
at least come close to being an exhaustive use
of the Federal constitutional power over
crime. Thus far, such a jurisdictional peg has
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Court's reluctance to limit the expansion of
these criminal statutes suggests two dangers
intrinsic in this kind of legislative enactment:
(1) Federal prosecutors hold virtually unlimited
discretion to define both the meaning of the
statutes as well as who they should reach; (2)
the haphazard jurisdictional system adds to an
increasingly overburdened federal judiciary
with little, if any, focus on the development of
federal expertise based on criminal statutes
which peculiarly require the involvement of the
federal justice and enforcement system.
Continued acquiescence by the courts to ex-
panding interpretations of the Hobbs Act as
set forth by the United States Attorneys'
offices encourages discretionary "legislative"
efforts on the part of the prosecutors as well as
state abdication of previously held responsibility
over "local crime." 119 The prosecutor then be-
comes the focal point upon which the legislation
is defined and the criminal justice system is
brought into force. Whether deference should
be given to the prosecutor's interpretations of a
statute if it appears reasonable on its face
is a difficult problem to resolve. Prosecutorial
discretion which ignores loan sharking inci-
dents arguably within the language of the
Hobbs Act but which reaches the activities, for
example, in the Pearson case lends support to
the conclusion that each United States Attorney
is able to define for himself the evils within
reach of the Hobbs Act.
20
If the broad interpretation of the Hobbs Act
by prosecutors and the subsequent acceptance
been used in Title 18 only once and then only
with respect to the substantive offenses of rob-
bery and extortion.
Abrams, supra note 1, at 38.
Stern, in Comment on Robbery, WORxING PA-
PERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS (1969), wrote:
By its terms then, the Hobbs Act can be
taken to confer federal jurisdiction not only
over every bank robbery but almost over any
robbery of any business concern in the nation.
The maker of federal law enforcement policy
determines to what extent the broad jurisdiction
is exercised.
319 See Hearings, supra note 15; Abrams, supra
note 1; Schwartz, supra note 2.
120 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971) ; United States v. Beck, 511 F.2d 997 (6th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d
595 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Nakaladsld,
481 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Hyde, 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971).
by the courts is laudatory because of the type
of individual and kind of activity reached, the
enforcement reliance becomes imbedded in the
method of selecting United States Attorneys
which by its nature is political, rather than in
the ability of Congress to formulate specifically
what is being proscribed by a given statute. As
Mr. Davis wrote:
Where law ends, discretion begins, and the
exercise of discretion may mean either benefi-
cence or tyranny, either justice or injustice,
either reasonableness or arbitrariness.'21
The temptation to extend the legislation is
great in cases where evil men otherwise would
go free, but both the judges and the prosecu-
tors have a responsibility to put aside private
attitudes and avoid rewriting legislation. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote:
To go beyond it [the words of the legislature]
is to usurp a power which our democracy has
lodged in its elected legislature. The great
judges have constantly admonished their
brethren of the need for discipline in observ-
ing the limitations. A judge must not rewrite a
statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it.122
Broad jurisdictional bases as in the Hobbs
Act enable prosecutors to arrive at far-reach-
ing interpretations which may encourage hap-
hazard application of a criminal statute. Many
commentators have remarked that the solution
is to better define auxiliary jurisdiction by pre-
scribing the specialized role to be taken by the
federal judiciary and the federal government.
23
L.B. Schwartz wrote in 1948:
The [federal] intervention, moreover, will be
haphazard and arbitrary until there is full
comprehension of the auxiliary role of the
government; i.e., until we cease to regard the
121 K. DAvIs, DIscREoNARY JuSTicE (1969).
122 Frankfurter, supra note 45, at 533.
123 See Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction
and Prosecutors Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEI P.
PROB. 64 (1948). Judge Friendlly wrote, ". . . the
present condition of the federal criminal code is in
utter disarray. Different jurisdictional tests are
provided without any sensible basis for distinction."
FRIENDLY, supra note 1, at 58. Hufstedler wrote in
Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role
of the Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 841,
856-57 (1972), that the federal code "is a grab-bag
into which Congress has thrown grave national
offenses, a myriad of offenses primarily or wholly
of local concern and petty violations of federal ad-
ministrative regulations."
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jurisdictional circumstance, which gives the
United States power to act, as the "gist" of the
federal offense.
124
One result of the expanding federal involvement
in the criminal field is the case overload in the
federal judiciary. Given increasing prosecu-
torial staffs and the broad jurisdictional base
of the Hobbs Act, for example, one suggested
solution has been to increase the future capac-
ity of the federal judiciary rather than to re-
duce the number of federal crimes. 2 5 Another
suggestion has been to narrow the jurisdic-
tional base or exclude the "essentially local
crime" by relegating them to the state courts.
To merely enlarge the federal judiciary, given
the jurisdicitional development, would only en-
courage broader federal prosecution with little
attention given to the issue of the specialized
role to be played by the federal judiciary. In
effect, it would encourage the use of the federal
courts as a depository for any kind of case that
arguably fits into the literal statutory language.
The long-term effect may make a mockery of
any legislative history or of any concept of
separation of federal and state criminal justice
systems. On the other hand, to summarily con-
clude that federal intervention must be reduced
does not answer the dilemma. Given the present
interpretation of interstate commerce as author-
ity for federal intervention, it would be difficult
to state generally that the "essentially local
crime" be excluded since that term has little if
any meaning today. It is apparent, though, from
the present Hobbs Act prosecutions that many
of these crimes have only remote and tangential
effects upon the national policy.
To deal with this situation a proposed revi-
sion of the federal criminal code includes a sec-
tion (207) which establishes standards by which
a United States Attorney makes the decision to
prosecute.126 Section 207 requires that the United
124 Schwartz, supra note 2, at 70.
125 See, e.g., Tone, supra note 1.
126 H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Pro-
posed section 207 reads as follows:
§ 207 Discretionary Restraint in Exercise of
Concurrent Jurisdiction
Notwithstanding the existence of concurrent
jurisdiction, federal law enforcement agencies
are authorized to decline or discontinue fed-
eral enforcement efforts whenever the offense
can effectively be prosecuted by nonfederal
agencies and it appears that there is no sub-
stantial federal interest in further prosecution
or that the offense primarily affects state,
States Attorney question whether there is a sub-
stantial national interest in his prosecution of a
given case. This essentially moves the inquiry
from the courts to the prosecutor. However,
this provision operates upon many questionable
assumptions. First, it assumes that each United
States attorney is capable of this type of as-
sessment and that he will act consistently. At
this point, it is unclear whether there will be
any sort of rulemaking system or whether the
decision will be made on a case by case basis.
Second, the assumption is made that Congress
is unable to limit the statute by its substantive
terms. This is a matter sometimes discussed when
the challenge to a statute is for "vagueness."
The court may try to determine whether a nar-
rower statute is possible or whether there is
something in the nature of the subject matter
which makes such drafting impossible. Section
207, in effect, provides the prosecutor with a
procedure to rely on when arguing that the
statute could not be narrowed in its drafting
and that the "substantial national interest"
must by necessity fall into the realm of admin-
istrative agencies because they can function on
a case by case basis. The legal justification for
local or foreign interests. A substantial federal
interest exists in the following circumstances,
among others:
(a) the offense is serious and state or local
law enforcement is impeded by interstate as-
pects of the case; (b) federal enforcement is
believed to be necessary to vindicate federal-
ly-protected civil rights; (c) if federal juris-
diction exists under section 201(b), the of-
fense is closely related to the underlying
offense, as to which there is a substantial fed-
eral interest; (d) an offense apparently lim-
ited in its impact is believed to be associated
with organized criminal activities extending
beyond state lines; (e) state or local enforce-
ment has been so corrupted as to undermine its
effectiveness substantially.
Where federal law enforcement efforts are
discontinued in deference to state, local or for-
eign prosecution, federal agencies are directed
to cooperate with state, local or foreign prose-
cution, by providing them with evidence already
gathered or otherwise, to the extent that this is
practicable without prejudice to federal law
enforcement. The Attorney General is author-
ized to promulgate additional guidelines for the
exercise of discretion in employing federal
criminal jurisdiction. The presence or absence
of a federal interest and any other question
relating to the exercise of the discretion ref-
erred to in this section are for the prosecuting
authorities alone and are not litigable.
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this seemingly disparate treatment could come
from a broad jurisdictional base which could
arguendo allow for virtually unlimited prosecu-
tion, but for the fact that the legislature is
relying on their administrative bodies to draw
the application of the statutes more narrowly.
Finally, the section operates on the assumption
that there is some method by which a deviation
from the standards of section 207 will be both
discovered and rectified. Even assuming it is
administratively feasible to make each United
States Attorney directly accountable for section
207 decisions, this allows the definition of na-
tional interest under broad statutes like the
Hobbs Act to be made by an appointed cabinet
official rather than by the legislature passing the
statutes. Judicial review of this decision does
not appear to be possible unless a formal ad-
ministrative procedure is set up; problems
would immediately emerge with the speedy trial
rights which must be upheld. The only present
review has involved decisions by the Justice
Department, when an appeal has reached the
Supreme Court level, to nolle prosequi because
of a violation of some internal policy. 27 This
has been done rarely and since these policies are
not public it is unlikely that a defendant will
have ready access to such information. If the
defendant could use the standards set forth in
section 207 and collaterally raise the issue of
compliance with that section, the federal courts
would become bogged down to an even greater
degree than now with cases that may eventu-
ally end up in the state courts for prosecution.
This would, in effect, turn over to the federal
courts the task of applying national policy
evaluations on a case by case basis. This runs
directly counter to any notion that the federal
judiciary is not a legislative body and even
makes it look like an administrative agency.
The implementation of section 207 will effec-
tively remove from the legislature much of the
responsibility of determining the national policy
as per the criminal justice system.
One other suggestion is to separate the ju-
risdictional base from the substantive offense.
This has been suggested by a proposed revised
127 See Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264
(1966) (per curiam).
criminal code. 128 However, if the broad substan-
tive language of the offense remains, the result is
to allow the prosecution to draw on more than
one jurisdictional link. The effect of this is an
even greater expansion of the prosecution's
discretion. The separation of the jurisdictional
base may be an important step towards clarifying
the definition of the auxiliary role of the fed-
eral government, but to do this without also
narrowing the substantive offense as it in-
volves a substantial federal interest does little
to improve the situation. It merely removes the
confusion of the jurisdictional link as to
whether it has any effect upon the substantive
offense proscribed.
The solution lies with Congress to more spe-
cifically define what they intend to proscribe,
concentrating on whether the activities in-
volved are of sufficient national concern to
warrant federal prosecution. Congress should
realize the potential both for future expansion
of the legislation and for the possible negative
effects upon the federal and state criminal justice
systems. Such specific definition of the substan-
tive offenses will enable the federal judiciary to
develop their expertise focussing on specific
areas determined by the legislative branch to
be of vital national concern. If this is not done,
as the Hobbs Act prosecution attests, crimes
will be arbitrarily and inconsistently prosecuted
in both federal and state courts with little con-
sideration of judicial responsibility, comity, or
the need for efficiency. The haphazard applica-
tion of the Hobbs Act resulted in greater
prosecutorial discretion which not only disre-
garded the legislative history and the first
twenty years of prosecution, but also substan-
tially disregarded any division between federal
and state governments. Both the present prosecu-
tors and the federal judiciary could take steps
to curb this situation, but the major responsi-
bility must remain with the legislature to de-
velop a well-reasoned and organized criminal
code.
128 H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See
generally Dobbyn, A Proposal for Changing the
Jurisdictional Provisions of the New Federal
Criminal Code, 57 CORMELL L. REv. 198 (1972);
Levine, The Proposed New Federal Crimial Code:
A Constitutional and Jurisdictional Analysis, 39
BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1972).
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